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A LEGITIMIZING MYTH
STANLEY INGBER*
Theorists have often heralded the first amendment as creating a
neutral marketplace of ideas. Proponents of this model view the market
as essential to our society's efforts to discover truth andfoster effective
popular participation in government. Professor Ingber asserts that the
theoretical underpinnings of this model are based on assumptions of ra-
tional decisionmaking that are implausible in modern society. He in-
sists that, in reality, the market is severely skewed in favor of an
entrenchedpower structure and ideology. Professor Ingber explores ef-
forts to reform and correct this market defect and finds them equally
flawed He concludes that the marketplace may fulfill its allegedfunc-
tions only ff we explore a theory offreedom of conduct; the market as it
exists today simply fine-tunes differences among elites, while difusing
pressurefor change bypreserving a myth ofpersonal autonomy needed
to legitimate a governing system strongly biased toward the status quo.
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Scholars' and jurists2 frequently have used the image of a "mar-
ketplace of ideas" to explain and justify the first amendment freedoms
1. See, e.g., T. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT 7-8
(1966) [hereinafter cited as T. EMERSON, FIRST AMENDMENT]; A. MEIKLEIOHN, FREE SPEECH
AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-GOVERNMENT 82-89 (1948) [hereinafter cited as A, MEIKLEJOHN,
FREE SPEECH]; A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLrrICAL FREEDOM 73-75 (1960); Baker, Scope of the First
4mendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964, 964-90 (1978); Director, The Parity of the
Economic Market Place, 7 LL. & ECON. 1, 3-10 (1964); Ingber, Defamation: A Conflict Between
Reason andDecency, 65 VA. L. REV. 785, 792-94 (1979); Meiklejohn, The First Amendment IsAn
Absolute, 1961 Sup. CT. REV. 245, 255-63; Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First
Amendment: In Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CALIF. L. REV. 1159, 1161-62 (1982);
Shiffrin, Government Speech, 27 UCLA L. REV. 565, 583-84 (1980); Wellington, On Freedom of
Expression, 88 YALE LJ. 1105, 1129-31 (1979). See generally T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREE-
DOM OF EXPRESSION (1970) [hereinafter cited as T. EMERSON, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION].
2. The marketplace of ideas permeates the Supreme Court's first amendment jurisprudence,
See, e.g., Board of Educ. V. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 866 (1982); Widmar V. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267
n.5 (1981); Citizens-Against Rent Control V. City of Berkeley, 454 U.S. 290, 295 (1981); Consoli-
dated Edison Co. V. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 530, 537, 538 (1980); FCC V. Pacifica Found.,
438 U.S. 726,745-46 (1978); Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy V. Virginia Citizens Consumer Coun-
cil, 425 U.S. 748,760 (1975); Bigelow V. Virginia, 421 U.S. 809, 826 (1975); Miami Herald Publish-
ing Co. V. Tomillo, 418 U.S. 241, 248 (1974); Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
390 (1969); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 382 (1966).
The Court's opinions similarly reflect an image of robust debate. See, e.g., Brown V. Hartlage,
456 U.S. 45, 52-53 (1982); Gertz V. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974); Miller V. Califor-
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of speech and press.3 Although this classic image of competing ideas
and robust debate dates back to English philosophers John Milton4 and
John Stuart Mill, 5 Justice Holmes first introduced the concept into
American jurisprudence in his 1919 dissent to Abrams v. United
States:6 "the best test of truth is the power of thought to get itself ac-
cepted in the competition of the market."' 7 This theory assumes that a
process of robust debate, if uninhibited by governmental interference,
will lead to the discovery of truth, or at least the best perspectives or
solutions for societal problems. A properly functioning marketplace of
ideas, in Holmes's perspective, ultimately assures the proper evolution
of society, wherever that evolution might lead."
The marketplace doctrine, however, once rooted in American ju-
risprudence, grew a new shoot that benefitted its new environment. In
addition to its usefulness in the search for truth and knowledge, the
marketplace came to be perceived by courts and scholars as essential to
effective popular participation in government. 9 In order for a democ-
nia, 413 U.S. 15, 34 (1973); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 43 (1971); Red Lion,
395 U.S. at 392 n.18; New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
The Court also has often referred to the marketplace in terms of the competition of ideas that
it fosters. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1976); Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23,
32 (1968); cf. Virginia State Rd of Pharmacy, 425 U.S. at 762 ("society also may have a strong
interest in the free flow of commercial information").
3. The freedoms of speech and press have often been referred to jointly as the freedom of
expression. E.g., T. EMERSON, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 1, at 3.
4. See J. MILTON, AREOPArICA (London 1644), in 2 COMPLETE PROSE WoRKs OF JOHN
MILTON 486passim (E. Sirluck ed. 1959).
5. See J. MILL, On Liberty, in ON LIBERTY AND CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE
GOVERNMENT 1, 13-48 (R. McCallum ed. 1948).
6. 250 U.S. 616 (1919).
7. Id at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
8. See Corwin, Bowing Out "Clear and Present Danger", 27 NOTRE DAME LAW. 325, 332-34
(1951). See, for example, Justice Holmes's dissent in Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673
(1925)("If in the long run, the beliefs expressed in proletarian dictatorship are destined to be
accepted... the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their chance and have
their way.").
As early as 1644, John Milton similarly argued in an address to the Parliament of England:
[Tihough all the windes of doctrin were let loose to play upon earth, so Truth be in the
field, we do injuriously by licensing and prohibiting to misdoubt her strength. Let her
and Falshood grapple; who ever knew Truth put to the wors, in a free and open encoun-
ter.
J. MILTON, supra note 4, at 561 (footnotes omitted); see Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494,
584-85 (195 1)(Douglas, J., dissenting); Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting); T. JEF-
FERSON, First Inaugural Address (Mar. 4, 1801), reprinted in THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 384, 384-
85 (S. Padover ed. 1943); see also International Bhd. Elec. Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d
34, 40 (2d Cir. 1950); W. BAGEHOT, The Metaphysical Basis of Toleration, in 2 LITERARY STUDIES
422, 425 (R. Hutton ed. 1879).
9. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269-72 (1964); Thornhill v.
Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 102 (1940); Emerson, First Amendment Doctrine and the Burger Court, 68
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racy to function effectively, the citizens whose decisions control its op-
eration must be intelligent and informed. Under this theory, the
quality of the public exchange of ideas promoted by the marketplace
advances the quality of democratic government. Given the importance
the United States has placed on democratic government, this view of
the marketplace of ideas has helped the freedoms of press and speech
to assume something of a preferred position within our constitutional
scheme. 10
This focus on a marketplace seeking truth and promoting an in-
formed citizenry has had a curious impact on judicial and scholarly
attitudes toward the first amendment. Courts usually articulate consti-
tutional rights as "individual rights" that are justified because of the
protection they afford to the person exercising the right. But courts that
invoke the marketplace model of the first amendment justify free ex-
pression because of the aggregate benefits to society, and not because
an individual speaker receives a particular benefit."1 Courts that focus
their concern on the audience rather than the speaker' 2 relegate free
expression to an instrumental value, a means toward some other goal,
rather than a value unto itself.13 Once free expression is viewed solely
as an instrumental value, however, it is easier to allow government reg-
CALIF. L. REv. 422, 423 (1980); Karst, Equality as a Central Princvle of the First Amendment, 43
U. CH. L. REv. 20, 23 (1975).
10. See, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 115 (1943); see also Saia v. New York,
334 U.S. 558, 562 (1947); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1945); Thomas v. Collins, 323
U.S. 516, 530 (1945); Follett v. McCormick, 321 U.S. 573, 575 (1943); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321
U.S. 158, 164 (1943); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943);
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, 262-63 (1941); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940);
Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147, 161 (1939); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242, 258 (1937), Chief
Justice Stone's dissent in Jones v. Opelika, 316 U.S. 584, 608 (1942), vacated, 319 U.S. 103 (1943),
is one of the most frequently cited attempts to recognize first amendment freedoms as being in a
"preferred position."
11. Mill stated this quite clearly:
Were an opinion a personal possession of no value except to the owner; if to be ob-
structed in the enjoyment of it were simply a private injury, it would make some differ-
ence whether the injury was inflicted only on a few persons or on many. But the peculiar
evil of silencing the expression of an opinion is, that it is robbing the human race; poster-
ity as well as the existing generation; those who dissent from the opinion, still more than
those who hold it.
J. MILL, supra note 5, at 14-15.
12. "It is the right of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral
and other ideas and experiences which is crucial here." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395
U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
13. Professor Laurence Tribe writes with great vehemence that the freedom of speech must
be regarded not merely as a means to some further end, but as an end in itself. L. TIuBE, AMERI-
CAN CoNsTmrrrioNAL. LAW § 12-1, at 576 (1978). Professor Emerson also holds such an "end in
itself' perspective. See T. EMERSON, FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION, supra note 1, at 6-8. But see infra
note 67.
MARKETPLA CE OF IDEAS
ulation of speech if society as a whole "benefits" from a regulated sys-
tem of expression.
Scholarly critics of the marketplace model argue that the model
itself suggests a vital need for government regulation of the market.
The imagery of the marketplace of ideas is rooted in laissez-faire eco-
nomics.14 Although laissez-faire economic theory asserts that desirable
economic conditions are best promoted by a free market system, to-
day's economists widely admit that government regulation is needed to
correct failures in the economic market caused by real world condi-
tions. Similarly, real world conditions also interfere with the effective
operation of the marketplace of ideas: sophisticated and expensive
communication technology, monopoly control of the media, access lim-
itations suffered by disfavored or impoverished groups, techniques of
behavior manipulation, irrational responses to propaganda, and the ar-
guable nonexistence of objective truth, all conflict with marketplace
ideals. 15 Consequently, critics of the market model conclude, as have
critics of laissez-faire economics, that state intervention is necessary to
correct communicative market failures. 16
This article explores these and other aspects of the marketplace
theory of the first amendment, exposes the theory's fallacies, and ex-
plains its persistence. Part I develops classic marketplace theory and
attempts to expose its basic assumptions.' 7 Part II explores the reality
of the marketplace of ideas and asserts that the moders assumptions
are implausible.' 8 This section further suggests that the market is
14. Economists have praised the laissez-faire economic model as facilitating optimal produc-
tion and allocation of goods. See, e.g., M. FRIEDMAN & R. FRIEDMAN, FREE TO CHOOSE 1-13
(1980); A. MARSHALL, PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS 63-70 (8th ed. 1950); A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY
INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONSPassim (7th ed. London 1793)(Ist
ed. London 1776); D. RICARDO, Principles of Folitical Economy and Taxation, in THE WORKS OF
DAVID RICARDO lpassim (J. McCulloch new ed. 1888); Evans & Body, Introduction to FREEDOM
AND STABILITY IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 1-2 (D. Evans & RL Body eds. 1976); Furubotn, Worker
A4lienation and the Structure of the Firm, in GOVERNMENTAL CONTROLS AND THE FREE MARKET
195, 216-17 (S. Pejovich ed. 1976); Simon, The Crucial lssue Is Freedom, in DILEMMAS FACING
THE NATION 1 passim (H. Prochnow ed. 1979).
Interestingly, Justice Holmes, whose free speech opinions are the legal origins of this laissez-
faire view of the first amendment, see, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630
(1919)(Holmes, J., dissenting), also frequently reminded the Court that laissez-faire was not a
constitutionally required theory of economic life. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 75
(1905)(Holmes, J., dissenting), overruled, Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421
(1952).
15. See Baker, supra note 1, at 965-66.
16. See, e.g., J. BARRON, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS FOR WHOM? 319-28 (1973).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 21-71.
18. See infra text accompanying notes 72-240; cf Nagel, How Useful is Judicial Review in Free
Speech Cases?, 69 CORNELL L. REV. 302passim (1984)(arguing that assumptions supporting use
of judicial processes to protect free speech implausible).
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strongly biased in favor of positions that support entrenched interests.
Part III evaluates proposals offered to overcome this bias and rejects
them as unworkable, dangerous, and inconsistent with the articulated
purpose of the first amendment. 19 Part IV considers, in lieu of the mar-
ketplace of ideas, the more realistic functions of "freedom of expres-
sion" in our society;20 it argues that the present marketplace simply
fine-tunes differences among elites while defusing pressure for change
and fostering a myth of personal autonomy essential to the continued
popular acceptance of a governing system biased toward the status quo.
I. CLASSIC MARKETPLACE THEORY
A. A Searchfor Truth.
Classic marketplace theory assumes that truth is discovered
through competition with falsehood and stresses that any authorita-
tively imposed truth is plagued with the danger of error.21 John Stuart
Mill thus argued that repression may interfere with the market's ability
to seek truth: first, if the censored opinion contains truth, its silencing
will lessen the chance of our discovering that truth; secondly, if the
conflicting opinions each contain part of the truth, the clash between
them is the only method of discovering the contribution of each toward
the whole of the truth; finally, even if the censored view is wholly false
and the upheld opinion wholly true, challenging the accepted opinion
must be allowed if people are to hold that accepted view as something
other than dogma and prejudice; if they do not, its meaning will be lost
or enfeebled.22 Mill accordingly believed that those who considered
clashes among competing views unnecessary wrongly presumed the in-
fallibility of their own opinions. 23
Justice Holmes also appreciated the danger of assuming infallibil-
ity. He wrote in his Abrams dissent:
Persecution for the expression of opinions seems to me perfectly logi-
cal. If you have no doubt of your premises or your power and want a
certain result with all your heart you naturally express your wishes in
law and sweep away all opposition. To allow opposition by speech
seems to indicate that you think the speech impotent, as when a man
says that he has squared the circle, or that you do not care whole-
19. See infra text accompanying notes 241-350.
20. See infra text accompanying notes 351-418.
21. See J. MILL, supra note 5, at 13-48; see also J. MILTON, supra note 4, at 548-68; J.
LOCKE, - Letter Concerning Toleration, in THE SECOND TREATIsE OF GOVERNMENT (AN ESSAY
CONCERNING THE TRUE ORIGINAL, ExTENT AND END OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT) AND A LETrER
CONCERNiNG TOLERATION 125, 139-43 (J. Gough ed. 1966).
22. See J. MILL, supra note 5, at 46-47.
23. Id at 15 ("All silencing of discussion is an assumption of infallibility.").
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heartedly for the result, or that you doubt either your power or your
premises. But when men have realized that time has upset many
fighting faiths, they may come to believe even more than they believe
the very foundations of their own conduct that the ultimate good de-
sired is better reached by free trade in ideas-that the best test of
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competi-
tion of the market, and that truth is the only ground upon which their
wishes safely can be carried out.24
Although Holmes wrote these words in dissent, the Supreme Court
later embraced the essence of his position when it stated that "[u]nder
the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea."25
The market model avoids this danger of officially sanctioned
truth;26 it permits, however, the converse danger of the spread of false
doctrine by allowing expression of potential falsities. 27 Citizens must
be capable of making determinations that are both sophisticated and
intricately rational if they are to separate truth from falsehood.28 On
the whole, current and historical trends have not vindicated the market
model's faith in the rationality of the human mind,29 yet this faith
24. Abrams, 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
25. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40 (1974); see also id ("However perni-
cious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the conscience ofjudges and juries
but on the competition of other ideas."). For a partial listing of the decisions utilizing the market-
place model, see supra note 2.
26. This is another way of saying that the political state may be an especially unsuitable body
to make the determination of what is true and what is false. See American Communications
Ass'n v. Douds, 339 U.S. 382, 442-43 (1950)(Jackson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part);
J. MILTON, supra note 4, at 559; F. POLLACK, The Theory of Persecution, in ESSAYS IN JURISPRU-
DENCE AND ETHICS 144, 163-64 (1882); Monro, Liberty of Expression: Its Grounds and Limits, 13
INQUIRY 238, 253 (1970). Free speech issues can be viewed in terms of allocation of institutional
competence. In strictly pragmatic terms, the history of official determination of truth has been
noted especially for its errors. See Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 406 (1967)(Harlan, J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part)("Any nation which counts the Scopes trial as part of its heri-
tage cannot so readily expose ideas to sanctions on a jury finding of falsity."). See generally Fried,
Two Concepts of Interests: Some Reflections on the Supreme Court's Balancing Test, 76 HARV. L.
REv. 755, 767-70 (1963).
27. Cf Kalven, A Commemorative Case Note: Scopes v. State, 27 U. CHI. L. Rav. 505, 516
(1960)("classic free speech theory is really a defense of the risk of permitting afalse doctrine to
circulate").
28. The belief that people ultimately are able to determine truth is, at best, an unverifiable
assumption. Mill, for example, assumed that man cannot be certain that he has found the truth.
See J. MILL, supra note 5, at 17. Accordingly, the validity of the hypothesis that the public can
discover truth through the workings of the marketplace is itself unprovable. More significantly,
the same fallibility argument which demands that choices and evaluations be made by members
of the public individually rather than by government can be made for any governmental action,
not just those restricting speech. Recognizing this, Mill responded that "[clomplete liberty of con-
tradicting and dispproving our opinion is the very condition which justifies us in assuming its
truth for purposes of action." Id
29. Cf. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)(Brandeis, J., concurring)('Te rem-
edy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence. Only an emergency can justify repres-
sion."). This unverifiable, idealistic, and perhaps naive view of the power of truth has not gone
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stands as a foundation block for most recent free speech theory.30
B. Self-Government and Democracy.
Classic marketplace theory recognizes the search for truth as the
primary goal of free speech. In the United States, however, constitu-
tional theorists also view free speech as a corollary to democratic the-
ory. For example, Professor Alexander Meiklejohn perceives freedom
of speech as an outgrowth of the American consensus that public issues
shall be decided by universal suffrage.3' The only truth that self-gov-
erning individuals can rely upon is that which they themselves devise
in the give and take of public discussion and decision.32 Meiklejoln
argues that
[plublic discussion of public issues, together with the spreading of
information and opinion bearing on those issues, must have a free-
dom unabridged by our agents. Though they govern us, we, in a
deeper sense, govern them. Over our governing, they have no power.
Over their governing we have sovereign power.33
uncriticized. See, e.g., M. LERNER, THE MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES 290 (1943);
Auerbach, The Communist ControlAct of 1954: A ProposedLegal-Poliical Theory ofFree Speech,
23 U. CHL L. REv. 173, 187 (1956)(citing M. LERNER, supra). The law of defamation, for exam-
ple, is based on the antithesis of Milton's position that truth always defeats falsehood. See J.
MILTON, supra note 8, at 561.
It is unlikely that the dispute over the "power of truth" theory can ever be resolved. The
critics of the argument generally speak in the short run-M. LERNER, supra, at 290, uses Nazism
as an example of falsity prevailing-and the supporters say only that truth prevails in the long
run. Because there is no definition of how long the long run is, however, there is no way either to
verify or to disprove the thesis that truth ultimately will prevail.
30. Holmes's marketplace image does not necessarily emphasize the triumph of objective
truth through rationality. The market can be viewed as a method of approaching truth that is
preferable, in spite of its imperfection, to any method that relies on governmental determinations
of the truth. See Wellington, supra note 1, at 1131. A slightly different view of the marketplace
posits that it does not matter whether any objective truth exists. Those views accepted in the
marketplace are defined as true; those rejected are by definition false. This has been called the
"survival" theory of truth. See Auerbach, supra note 29, at 187 n.25. Viewed in this way, the
marketplace is more egalitarian than rational. Individuals have the right to determine truth or
falsity not necessarily because they are qualified to do so, but because it "is a deduction from
the basic American agreement that public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage."
A. MEIKLEiOHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 1, at 27.
31. A. MEIK.LEJoHN, FREE SPEECH, supra note 1, at 27. See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM (1960); Meiklejohn, The Barenblatt Opinion, 27 U. CHI. L. REV. 329 (1960);
Meiklejohn, supra note 1.
32. Meiklejohn insists that in a system of self-government such a process of testing truth
through the market "is not merely the 'best' test. There is no other." A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL
FREEDOM 73 (1960).
33. Meiklejohn, supra note 1, at 257. The first amendment theory adopted by the Supreme
Court frequently appears to track Meiklejobn's views. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 273 (1964)(where the ability of the people to act as sovereign was perceived as the
"central meaning of the First Amendment"). See generally BeVier, The First Amendment and
Political Speec" An Inquiry into the Substance and Limits of Principle, 30 STAN. L. REv. 299,
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In the words of the Supreme Court, "speech concerning public affairs is
more than self-expression; it is the essence of self-government."
34
The literature on the relationship between free speech and self-
government reveals two perspectives. The first, the social value per-
spective, emphasizes the social value of an informed citizenry. 35 The
second, the individual perspective, stresses the importance of a deci-
sionmaking process open to the entire citizenry.36 Proponents of the
social value perspective insist that the "best" decisions can only be
reached in a democracy if the citizenry is fully aware of the issues in-
volved, the options available, and the interests or values affected.
Meiklejohn, a leading proponent of the social value perspective, insists
that when "a free man is voting it is not enough that truth is known by
someone else, by some scholar or administrator or legislator. The vot-
ers must have it, all of them."' 37 Consequently, Meiklejohn argues that
no opinion, no doubt, no belief or counterbelief, and no relevant infor-
mation may be kept from the citizenry. A "profound national commit-
ment"'38 to robust uninhibited debate exists because it is "essential to
the welfare of the public." 39
If, as Professor Meiklejohn and others suggest, democratic govern-
ance depends on the wisdom of the voters, all evidence bearing on pub-
lic decisions must be available to the community without any
intervening "preselection" by the state on the basis of truth or falsity.4°
Content based restrictions leave the public with an incomplete, and
perhaps inaccurate, perception of the social and political universe.
Thus, these restrictions can undermine the search for truth and distort
308-09 (1978); Bork, Neutral Princiles and Some FirstAmendment Problems, 47 IND. L.J. 1, 26-28
(1971); Brennan, The Supreme Court and the Meiklejohn Interpretation of the Firsft Amendment, 79
HARV. L. REv. 1, 14-20 (1965); Kalven, The New York Times Case: 4 Note on the "Central
Meaning of the First Amendment," 1964 Sup. CT. REv. 191,204-10. Although Justice Brennan did
not cite Meiklejohn's works in his New York Times opinion, he has virtually conceded their direct
influence. See Brennan, supra,passim.
34. Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).
35. See, e.g., Karst, supra note 9, at 23.
36. See infra notes 44-53 and accompanying text.
37. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 75 (1960).
38. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 270.
39. Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945).
40. Thomas Scanlon has ably developed this aspect of free speech theory; he calls it the
"Principle of Limited Authority." See Scanlon, Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. PA. L. REv. 1020,
1041-44 (1973); Scanlon,.4 Theory ofFreedom of Expression, 1 PHIL. & PuB. AFF. 204, 222-26
(1972) [hereinafter cited as Scanlon, Theory of Freedom of Expression]. Scanlon's characterization
follows loosely from Kant's notion of individual sovereignty. I. KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE
MErAPHYSICS OF MORALS 50-59 (L. Beck trans. 1959); see also J. LOCKE, supra note 21, at 126-27.
Jefferson referred to this as one of the "unceded portions of right." Letter from Thomas Jefferson
to Noah Webster (Dec. 4, 1790), reprinted in 8 THE WRnINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 111, 113
(Memorial ed. 1903).
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the process by which citizens make critical decisions. "It is [this] muti-
lation of the thinking process of the community," asserts Meiklejohn,
"against which the First Amendment to the Constitution is directed."'4'
The social value perspective, however, developed in a culture
where the mechanisms of the pamphleteer and the town meeting epito-
mized free expression. Consequently, all who wished to speak had ac-
cess to a marketplace where their beliefs could be publicly
disseminated. Right conclusions were "to be gathered out of a multi-
tude of tongues, [rather] than through any kind of authoritative selec-
tion."42 From this perspective the assumption developed that a free
market mechanism for ideas exists in the absence of government inter-
vention. Thus, proponents of the social value perspective believe that if
only government can be kept away from "ideas," the self-operating
force of "[flull and free discussion" will promote ideas that are "true to
our genius" and keep us from "embracing what is cheap and false." 43
The second perspective in the literature on the relationship be-
tween free speech and self-government stresses the importance of a
decisionmaking process open to the entire citizenry.44 Proponents of
this "individual perspective" assert that each person's ideas have the
same inherent worth45 and, thus, each citizen has an equal right to par-
ticipate in governmental decisionmaking.46 Therefore, "government
must afford all points of view an equal opportunity to be heard."47
41. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960)(emphasis omitted). If free speech is to
protect "the thinking process of the community" from interference by governmental agents, then
there arguably should be no objection when the community determines through the marketplace
the "true" or "preferable" position and outlaws from discussion that which is "false" and "non-
preferable." In this scheme the public, as sovereign, has chosen which of the multitude of tongues
spoke the wisest. For further discussion of this point, see infra note 98.
42. United States v. Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)(L. Hand, J.),
a'd, 326 U.S. 1 (1945). Representative of this perspective is Justice Douglas's eloquent dissent in
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951):
When ideas compete in the market for acceptance, full and free discussion exposes the
false and they gain few adherents. Full and free discussion even of ideas we hate en-
courages the testing of our own prejudices and preconceptions. Full and free discussion
keeps a society from becoming stagnant and unprepared for the stresses and strains that
work to tear all civilizations apart.
Full and free discussion has indeed been the first article of our faith.
Id at 584 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
43. Dennis, 341 U.S. at 584 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
44. See, e.g., T. EMERSON, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note I, at 6-7.
45. This perspective closely parallels the Jacksonian model of democracy. See L. LEWIS,
DEMOCRACY AND THE LAW 199-201 (1963). But see infra text accompanying notes 343-53 (dis-
cussing whether these ideals serve merely as a myth to legitimate status quo views).
46. In the United States, all citizens are "peers" and are equally noble. In British culture, a
peer is a member of a select nobility, distinct from the common people. Our Constitution, see
U.S. CONsT. art. I, § 9, cl. 8, and our language have rejected the view that some individuals are of
more intrinsic worth than are others.
47. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 96 (1972).
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Proponents of the individual perspective reject the elitist's argu-.
ment that only experts are fit to decide specific areas of social policy,4 8
and accordingly would deny to elites control over communications.
This egalitarian argument may be based on either concerns of political
policy or political principle.49 The political policy justification is essen-
tially consequentialist: popular decisions are preferable to elitist deci-
sions because they will lead to more good consequences and fewer bad
ones. Meiklejolm is predominantly a consequentialist. Thomas Scan-
lon, on the other hand, is representative of those who believe that egali-
tarianism is based on political principle rather than political policy.50
Scanlon does not defend freedom of speech because it will lead to bet-
ter decisions; instead, he contends that government must recognize the
political principle of equal individual worth if it is to legitimately com-
mand the allegiance and obedience of its citizens. To be legitimate a
government must allow its citizens to recognize governmental authority
"while still regarding themselves as equal, autonomous, rational
agents.",51
Dean Harry Wellington developed this relationship between per-
sonal autonomy and governmental legitimacy more fully, asserting that
"in a secular, democratic society there is no legitimate way in which the
mature, legally competent individual can be required to surrender to
others responsibility for his moral views."'52 An autonomous person, in
Wellington's view, cannot blindly accept the judgment of others. He
may rely on the other's judgment, but he must also be able to give
independent reasons for believing that opinion to be correct. Thus, a
legitimate government, according to both Wellington and Scanlon,
must respect this individual autonomy. A legitimate government must
recognize the right of each individual to participate in and influence
governmental decisionmaking not because decisions reached this way
necessarily are best, but because only decisions so derived deserve obe-
dience.53 Although Meiklejohn, Scanlon, and Wellington all accept the
essential role of the marketplace of ideas in a democratic process, they
48. See, e.g., B. SKINNER, WALDEN Two 54-55 (1948).
49. For a detailed attempt to distinguish between legal decisions based on policy and those
based on principle, see Wellington, Common Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards:
Some Notes on Adjudication, 83 YALE L.J. 221 (1973).
50. For a list of some of Scanlon's writings, see supra note 40.
51. Scanlon, Theory ofFreedom of Expression, supra note 40, at 214.
52. Wellington, supra note 1, at 1135.
53. Professor Baker best made this point:
Obligation exists only in relationships of respect. ... To justify legal obligation, the
community must respect individuals as equal, rational and autonomous moral beings.
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approach their positions from different perspectives: Meiklejohn's con-
cern is that the decisions ultimately made must benefit society; Scanlon
and Wellington insist that the process by which these decisions are
reached must be popularly perceived as legitimate.5 4
C. The Impact of Dffiering Marketplace Perspectives.
Constitutional theorists who believe that the only function of free
speech is to further self-government can justify restrictions on free
speech in a democracy; theorists who believe that free speech furthers a
quest for truth cannot justify such restrictions.5 5 If free speech is
merely a correlate of democracy then it need extend only to communi-
cation pertinent to democratic decisionmaking. A distinction between
protected public speech and unprotected private speech might then be
justified. A right founded upon the deliberative role of citizens in a
democratic political order need not apply to all forms of expression;
debates over artistic merit, the best style of personal life, or the quality
of Mrs. Smith's pies would probably not qualify for protection.5 6 From
this perspective, the concerns of the first amendment only extend to the
"'discovery and spread of political truth.' -57
Some Supreme Court decisions,5 8 and other scholarly opinions, 59
seem to accept this bifurcated view of speech; however, the Court has
For the community legitimately to expect individuals to respect collective decisions, i.e.,
legal rules, the community must respect the dignity and equal worth of its members.
Baker, supra note 1, at 991.
54. But see infra text accompanying notes 351-441 (suggesting that the function of alleged
marketplace of ideas is unrelated to respect of individual autonomy).
55. In one sense, theorists who correlate freedom of speech with democracy grant a broader
freedom to expression than do those theorists who focus upon the quest for truth. Proponents of
the self-government perspective concede that there may be no truth or that, if it exists, it is unver-
ifiable. For these proponents, arguments in the marketplace need only be concerned with prefer-
ence, suitability, and practicality, and not with discovery of ultimate truths.
56. Indeed, Professor Meiklejohn viewed the first amendment as an absolute restriction on
governmental interference but thought this absolute rule protected only speech pertinent to demo-
cratic government. See A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEEcH, supra note 1, at 24-25. In later years,
however, Professor Meiklejohn found the distinction between public and private speech difficult
to maintain. He was finally compelled to conclude that "novels and dramas and paintings and
poems" also bear upon public issues, and are within the ambit of the first amendment,
Meiklejohn, .upra note 1, at 263.
57. Bork, supra note 33, at 31 (quoting Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)(Bran-
deis, J., concurring)).
58. See Wolston v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 443 U.S. 157, 166 n.8, 166-67 (1979)(plaintiff did
not thrust himself into public spotlight because there was no public controversy, and his refusal to
testify before grand jury investigating Soviet espionage did not make him public figure); Hutchin-
son v. Proxmire, 443 U.S. 111, 134-35 (1979)(first amendment designed to protect debate on public
issues; no public issue because plaintiff only became public figure through the alleged defama-
tion); Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 61 (1976)(there is "surely a less vital
interest in the uninhibited exhibition of material that is on the borderline between pornography
and artistic expression than in the free dissemination of ideas of social and political signifi-
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carefully avoided committing itself to such a view. In Abood v. Detroit
Board of Education,60 the Court recognized:
It is no doubt true that a central purpose of the First Amendment
"'was to protect the free discussion of governmental affairs.'" ...
But our cases have never suggested that expression about philosophi-
cal, social, artistic, economic, literary, or ethical matters-to take a
nonexhaustive list of labels--is not entitled to full First Amendment
protection. 61
Nonetheless, the Supreme Court has made other distinctions based on
the self-government justification for free speech in order to find certain
statements outside the protection of the first amendment. For instance,
although the Court historically regarded the truth or falsity of a belief
to be of no legal significance,62 it found that the democratic principles
justifying the first amendment's protection of opinions does not extend
cance")(Detroit ordinance dispersing "adult" theatres and bookstores upheld); Time, Inc. v. Fire-
stone, 424 U.S. 448, 457 (1976)(requiring actual malice for defamation unjustified where case
involving reporting on judicial proceedings "would add almost nothing toward advancing the
uninhibited debate on public issues," and where plaintiff neither a public figure nor placed herself
in public arena); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342-43, 347 (1974)(standards of first
amendment protection for communications about public figures different than those about private
figures); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 40-44 (1971)("the determinant whether the
First Amendment applies to state libel actions is whether the utterance involved concerns an issue
of public or general concern"); Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 24 (197 1)("free expression... is
designed and intended to remove governmental restraints from the arena of public discussion");
Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 85 (1966)("[c]riticism of government is at the very center of con-
stitutionally protected area of free discussion"); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254,
269 (1964)("freedom of expression upon public questions is secured by the First Amendment,"
and it "'was fashioned to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing about of political
and social changes' ")(quoting Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)).
59. See generally BeVier, supra note 33, at 308-09; Bork, supra note 33, at 26-28; Kalven,
supra note 33, at 204-10.
60. 431 U.S. 209 (1977).
61. Id at 231 (quoting concurring opinion of Powell, J., 431 U.S. at 259)(footnote omitted).
Even "prurient, patently offensive depiction or description of sexual conduct" has been held de-
serving of first amendment protection if shown to "have serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value." Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973).
62. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974)("Under the First Amendment
there is no such thing as a false idea."); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 445 (1963); United States
v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944); id at 92-95 (Jackson, J., dissenting); see also Kingsley Int'l
Pictures Corp. v. Regents, 360 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1959); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Bar-
nette, 319 U.S. 624, 634 (1943); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 310 (1940);cf. International
Bhd. of Elec. Workers, Local 501 v. NLRB, 181 F.2d 34, 40 (2d Cir. 1950)(L. Hand, C.J.)(opinion
of United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit), aft'd, 341 U.S. 694 (1951).
The Court's policy against inquiring into the truth of a belief at issue under the first amend-
ment reflects the Court's dislike for content regulation. See Hudgens v. NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 520-
21 (1976); Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205, 209-12 (1975); Police Dep't v. Mosley,
408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972). See generally Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categori-
zation and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 HARv. L. REv. 1482 (1975); Karst, supra
note 9, at 26-35, 65-67.
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to statements of fact.63 Despite Mill's exhortation as to the value of
falsehood,64 the Court has concluded that all ideas, but only accurate
statements of fact, further self-government. 65 Under this view, false
statements of fact have no constitutional value. The Court accordingly
has protected those who spread false information only when it believed
the truth would too often be suppressed by chilling the speech of those
unsure of their information's accuracy. 66 In short, if the first amend-
ment is viewed as based upon the value of free speech to the demo-
cratic process, then the ambit of protected speech encompasses only
communications that the courts determine relevant to this concern. 67
63. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340 (1974). Philosophers have long de-
bated whether fact can be distinguished from opinion. See, e.g., F. COOPER, LIVING THE LAW 6
(1958)(observing that facts announced in court opinions are not objectively determined, but are
rather the result of subjective judgment and inference); W. BISHIN & C. STONE, LAW, LANGUAOE,
AND ETHICS 151, 151-52 (1972)(reprinting S. LANGER, PHILOSOPHY IN A NEW KEY 89-91 (3d ed.
1957)(describing human tendency to abstract forms from sensory experiences as viewed in the
light of the past)); W. BISHIN & C. STONE, supra, at 146-48 (reprinting B. RUSSELL, THE
PROBLEMS OF PHILOSOPHY 7-12 (1959)(enumerating the difficulties encountered in differentiating
between appearance and reality)). The courts, however, seem to believe that fact can be distin-
guished from opinion on something of an "I know it when I see it" basis.
64. See supra text accompanying notes 21-22.
65. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 340-41 (1974); see also Ocala Star-Banner
Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 301 (1971)(White, J., concurring); Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374,
405 n.2 (1967)(Harlan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See generally Nimmer, The
Right to Speakfrom Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied to Libel and Misapplied to
Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 935, 949-52 (1968).
66. See Ocala Star-Banner Co. v. Damron, 401 U.S. 295, 301 (1971).
67. Commentators have offered explanations not based on a marketplace theory to justify the
preferential treatment free expression has received from both the courts and scholars. Professor
Emerson, for example, has argued that the first amendment embodies Western aspirations for
individual self-fulfillment and full intellectual development. See T. EMERSON, FIRST AMEND-
MENT, supra note 1, at 4-7. His theory proposes that an individual can develop ideas and affirm
his conceptions of his "self' only if he can speak freely. Id at 6-7. It echoes Justice Brandeis's
statement that the "final end of the State [is] to make men free to develop their faculties."
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)(Brandeis, J., concurring).
This does not, however, distinguish speech from any other human activity. "An individual
may develop his faculties. . . by trading on the stock market, following his profession as a river
port pilot, working as a barmaid, engaging in sexual activity, playing tennis, rigging prices or in
any of thousands of other endeavors." Bork, supra note 33, at 25; see Schauer, Speech and
"Speech"-Obscenity and "Obscenity" An Exercise in the Interpretation of Constitutional Lan-
guage, 67 GEO. LJ. 899, 911-12 (1979). He may communicate his self-view as much by the kind
of car he drives-a Pinto or a Mercedes-or the clothes he wears-jeans or three-piece suits-as
he does by communication through language. Consequently, Emerson cannot tenably distinguish
thought and communication from action by claiming that the former, but not the latter, is "the
fountainhead of all expression of the individual personality." T. EMERSON, FREEDOM OF EXPRES-
SION, supra note 1, at 9. Indeed, behavior may communicate an individual's personality more fully
and accurately than any verbal communication-i.e., "a picture is worth a thousand words." Ex-
pression, however, must not be defined so broadly as to include all behavior. The argument sup-
porting special protection for expression simply is unconvincing unless the rationale of the first
amendment can be legitimately narrowed so as not to include and justify an unlimited freedom of
behavior. The marketplace theory provides precisely such a narrowing rationale. The self-fulfill-
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D. The Implicit Assumptions of the Marketplace.
As the previous sections demonstrate, the economic metaphor of
the marketplace emphasizes the uniqueness of each market participant.
Furthermore, before there can be any assurance that the ultimate good
will triumph in the marketplace, it is apparent that these individuals
must fairly and equally consider all ideas through a process of rational
evaluation. The existence of this process is based on several implicit
assumptions.6 8
First, if truth is to defeat falsity through robust debate in the mar-
ketplace, truth must be discoverable and susceptible of substantiation.
If truth is not ascertainable or cannot be substantiated, the victory of
truth in the marketplace is but an unprovable axiom.6 9 In order to be
discoverable, however, truth must be an objective rather than a subjec-
tive, chosen concept. 70 Consequently, socioeconomic status, experi-
ence, psychological propensities, and societal roles should not influence
an individual's concept of truth. If such factors do influence a listener's
perception of truth, the inevitable differences in these perspectives
caused by the vastly differing experiences among individuals make res-
olution of disagreement through simple discussion highly unlikely.
And if the possibility of rational discourse and discovery is negated by
these entrenched and irreconcilable perceptions of truth, the dominant
"truth" discovered by the marketplace can result only from the triumph
of power, rather than the triumph of reason.71
The second necessary assumption of the marketplace model's em-
phasis on the power of rationality is that individuals can separate the
form in which competing positions are presented from their substance.
Individuals must not be influenced by an idea's packaging, no matter
how pleasing or offensive it may be to their individual taste; otherwise,
the marketplace would favor the most attractively packaged ideas
rather than those with the "best" substance.
ment function of the first amendment, therefore, is only a beneficial by-product of market theory
and is not an independent justification for the amendment.
68. These assumptions have been recognized and critiqued by other scholars. See, e.g.,
F. SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH: A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 15-34 (1982); Baker, supra note 1, at 974-
76; Kendall, The "Open Society" and Its Fallacies, 54 AM. PoL ScI. REv. 972, 977-79 (1960);
Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Towarda Moral Theory of the First Amendment, 123 U.
PA. L. REv. 45, 81-82 (1974).
69. In such a case, continued reliance on the marketplace of ideas can be justified only if the
market somehow produces the best, if not the true, result, or if the market employs, at least, a
preferred method for choosing among potential results. See Baker, supra note 1, at 967.
70. Cf. James, Pragmatism-4 New Namefor Some Old Ways of Thinking, in READINGS IN
JURISPRUDENCE 227, 228 (J. Hall ed. 1938)("Truth happens to an idea. It becomes true, is made
true by events.")(emphasis in original).
71. For further consideration of this prospect, see infra text accompanying notes 127-31.
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For the marketplace to accomplish the goals attributed to it, both
of these assumptions must hold. Part II, however, demonstrates that
experience in the real marketplace fails to confirm these optimistic
assumptions.
II. MARKET REALITY-FLAW OR STATUS Quo BIAS
A free economic market, arguably, values goods and services and
allocates resources in a manner that maximizes utility.72 If the compet-
itive nature of the market is eliminated, however, or if the market's
rationality is corrupted through socialization or propaganda, then the
marketplace can no longer be trusted to properly value a particular
good or service. In fact, just such real world conditions often have pre-
vented "free" competitive economic markets from optimally allocating
and producing goods and services. The recognized ability of private
economic power to skew and manipulate the economic market 73 has
led to popular acceptance of active government involvement in this
market.74
Although laissez-faire economic theory has diminished in stature,
it is curious that those who applaud its demise seem committed to re-
taining the symbols of a laissez-faire communicative market.75 Yet, the
72. See, e.g., K. GEORGE & J. SHOREY, THE ALLOCATION OF RESOURCES 31 (1978); F.
KNIGHT, THE ECONOMIC ORGANIZATION 32-35 (1951); P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 38-42 (1 lth
ed. 1980); H. SIMONS, ECONOMIC POLICY FOR A FREE SOCIETY 46-47 (1948).
73. Many first amendment critics insist that the market of ideas has also been skewed and
manipulated:
With the development of private restraints on free expression, the idea of a free
marketplace where ideas can compete on their merits has become just as unrealistic in
the twentieth century as the economic theory of perfect competition. The world in which
an essentially rationalist philosophy of the first amendment was born has vanished and
what was rationalism is now romance.
Barron, Access to the Press-A New First Amendment Right, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1641, 1678 (1967).
74. Antitrust limitations, minimum wages, maximum hours, truth-in-lending, prohibition of
misleading or fraudulent advertising and unconscionable consumer contracts, and support of farm
product prices are intrusions on a laissez-faire system. Yet even the most conservative of our
citizens have apparently accepted, in principle, these intrusions. Debate on these issues has in-
stead focused on the extent, degree, and scope of these governmental intrusions into the economic
market.
75. See, e.g., Emerson, The Affrmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REv. 795, 796
(1981). One explanation why the philosophy of Adam Smith has been rejected while the beliefs of
John Stuart Mill have been praised, if not implemented, is that the two philosophies arc directed
toward different social classes. Laissez-faire economics assumes that the individual is in the best
position to determine his or her own needs and to make decisions accordingly. Government intru-
sion into the economic market assumes that certain individuals are incapable of ascertaining or
effectuating their own good. The breakdown in laissez-faire economics has therefore led to legis-
lation "protecting" blue-collar workers and those with limited education. See examples noted
supra note 74. Legal paternalism in the market of speech and ideas, on the other hand, might
impose upon the process of deliberation of those who most identify themselves with such a pro-
cess: white-collar and educated classes.
M,4RKETPL4 CE OF IDEAS
marketplace of ideas is as flawed as the economic market. Due to
developed legal doctrine and the inevitable effects of socialization
processes, mass communication technology, and unequal allocations of
resources, ideas that support an entrenched power structure or ideology
are most likely to gain acceptance within our current market. Con-
versely, those ideas that threaten such structures or ideologies are
largely ignored in the marketplace. The following review of how legal
doctrine and marketplace realities affect each of the assumptions of the
market model illustrates this status quo bias.
A. The Assumption of Discoverable Truth and An Open Society.
1. The Status Quo Orientation ofLegal Doctrine. A brief review
of two prominent first amendment doctrines illustrates both their de-
pendence on the marketplace imagery of an open society searching for
truth and their contrasting tendency to support the beliefs of the status
quo.
a. Clear andpresent danger. The clear and present danger test 76
is firmly rooted in marketplace doctrine that "freedom to think as you
will and to speak as you think are means indispensable to the discovery
and spread of political truth."77 Under this test, government cannot
regulate speech solely on the grounds of the intrinsic danger of the
ideas being conveyed. Government justifiably can suppress, limit, or
forbid speech only when it is delivered in circumstances that prevent
the audience involved from reasonably considering the message before
it. In such an emergency setting the marketplace is likely to malfunc-
tion because opposing speakers cannot fairly and adequately present
their ideas and the public cannot give them a fair and intelligent hear-
ing. As Justice Brandeis indicated, the danger must be "clear" to pre-
vent suppression based on irrational fear,78 and it must be "present" for
Classic liberals, such as Mill and Bentham, were well-bred gentlemen of the upper crust.
They attempted to maximize human happiness by minimizing external interference with individ-
ual choice. Perhaps such liberals saw individual liberty as the best arbiter of happiness because
they were at the apex of British society and needed nothing to make them happy other than
removal of the governmental and moral strictures they found inconvenient. That lawyers would
similarly be more solicitous of views opposing paternalism in expression than in economics should
not be surprising once it is remembered that they are purveyors of ideas and stand as elites in our
culture's public decisionmaking processes. See generally Ingber, The Interface of aMyth and Prac-
ticeinLaw, 34 VAND. L. REv. 309,310,325-31 (1981)(discussing role of lawyer as decisionmaker).
76. Speech is not constitutionally protected when, in Justice Holmes's words, it creates a
"clear and present danger that [the speech] will bring about the substantive evils that Congress has
a right to prevent." Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
77. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)(Brandeis, J., concurring).
78. Id at 376.
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"if there be time to expose through discussion the falsehood and falla-
cies . . . the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced
silence. ' 79
The clear and present danger test presupposes that market imper-
fections sometimes give speakers an unacceptable level of advantage in
influencing others. Because information opposing the speaker's view-
point cannot be transmitted instantaneously to all market participants,
the real market substantially departs from the theoretical one.80 There-
fore, emergency situations are exempted from first amendment cover-
age. As long as sufficient time remains for the marketplace's process of
deliberation to persist, however, and as long as lawless action is not
imminent, no emergency exists and all speech must be protected.
Yet the goal of free speech is not merely to have citizens enjoy
participating in an effete truth-seeking process. Instead, citizens seek
truth through free speech precisely to influence choice and behavior.
Recognizing that beliefs are important primarily because those who
hold them are likely to act accordingly, Holmes conceded that "every
idea is an incitement. '81 Ironically, however, Holmes's "clear and
present danger" formula allows government officials to prohibit expres-
sion precisely when such speech threatens to incite action.82 An inter-
pretation of the first amendment that permits the state to cut off
expression as soon as it comes close to being effective essentially limits
the amendment's protection to encompass only abstract or innocuous
communication.83 Consequently, speech is constitutionally protected
under the clear and present danger test as long as it is either ineffec-
tive84 or insignificant. 85 In either instance the test creates an establish-
ment bias.
79. Id at 377.
80. See generally A. LEUONHUFVUD, KEYNES AND THE CLASSICS (1969).
81. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925)(Holmes, J., dissenting)(An idea "offers
itself for belief and if believed it is acted on unless some other belief outweighs it or some failure
of energy stifles the movement at its birth.").
82. Holmes's description in Abrams of the materials that would be protected by his test is
apt--the "silly pamphlet [published] by an unknown man," 250 U.S. at 628, and the "poor and
puny anonymities" too insignificant "to turn the color of legal litmus paper," id at 629.
83. Meiklejohn observed the danger that the Holmes/Brandeis test might guarantee freedom
only "to engage in mere academic and harmless discussion." A. MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH,
supra note 1, at 44.
84. For example, a speech counselling against participating in the military draft made before
an unsympathetic chapter of the Veterans of Foreign Wars would not be perceived by courts as
posing a clear and present danger, although the same speech given before a group of college
students of draftable age might well be so viewed. If the speech before the students can be prohib-
ited or criminalized, expression would be cut off precisely at the point when it was likely to be
most meaningful. For decisions suggesting that the clear and present danger test might not even
allow discussion in the first, less threatening, context above, see, for example, Debs v. United
States, 249 U.S. 211, 216-17 (1919); Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U.S. 204, 210 (1919), where
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Other factors peculiar to the clear and present danger test accentu-
ate this bias. The test is both ad hoc and vague. Speakers receive no
warning whether their contemplated speech extends beyond the param-
eters of constitutional protection. The test is totally contextual, giving
little guidance to either the speaker or the official censor who must pre-
dict the impact of the expression. 6 For the speaker, this lack of notice
fosters continuous uncertainty and thus may chill a risk-averse speaker
who desires to minimize his personal legal peril.87 Such a person may
censor himself by intentionally avoiding those messages he perceives as
approaching the fringe of official acceptability. The official, in turn,
must decide when the expression is clearly dangerous and when insuffi-
cient time exists for a full and fair hearing of responsive expression that
would allow good counsel to defeat bad.88 The censor's evaluation in-
volves a two-tiered decision. First, the official must evaluate the speech
ideologically to determine whether it is good or evil, because if the
speech is good the lack of sufficient time for response is irrelevant. 89
But under the market model, only the marketplace can accurately sepa-
rate good from evil; therefore, no criteria can exist to determine
whether speech is sufficiently evil to warrant exclusion from the mar-
ket. Second, the official must calculate the seriousness of the speech's
evil, because the market requires greater response time for more serious
evils. This requirement forces the official to differentiate without any
expressions delivered to audiences with no special proclivity to be supportive still subjected the
speakers to criminal prosecutions.
85. This conclusion should be contrasted with claims that the United States is an open society
engaging in a quest for truth. A society cannot claim to be seeking truth wherever it may lead,
however, if it tolerates only an appreciation of minor deviations from the established norm. The
test of the market process must be "whether it permits criticism of the fundamental beliefs and
practices of the society" and allows such criticism the opportunity to spawn genuine change.
T. EMERSON, FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 1, at 16; see also J. MILL, supra note 5, at 19 ("un-
less the reasons [for free discussion] are good for an extreme case, they are not good for any case").
86. Ironically, in another context, Holmes himself realized language's dependence on con-
text. See Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918)("A word is not a crystal, transparent and
unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according
to the circumstances and time in which it is used.").
87. For an excellent discussion of the government's ability to chill free speech, see Schauer,
Fear, Risk and the First Amendment: Unraveling the "Chilling Effect," 58 B.U.L. REv. 685 (1978).
88. Cf. Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 510 (1951)("In each case [courts] must ask
whether the gravity of the 'evil,' discounted by its improbability, justifies such invasion of free
speech as is necessary to avoid the danger.")(quoting the opinion below, United States v. Dennis,
183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)(L. Hand, J.)).
89. In such cases courts are likely to refer to the role of free speech in "invit[ing] dispute,"
"bring[ing] about a condition of unrest," or "stir[ring] the public to anger." Terminiello v. Chi-
cago, 337 U.S. 1, 4 (1949). When such language is used, the lack of "cooling off time" to allow
reflection is not considered.
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guidelines between evil counsel that is about to lead an insufficiently
educated public astray, and good counsel that merely has convinced an
adequately informed public of its "rightness." Under a test with such
elasticity, speakers who proclaim any radical political doctrine may ex-
pect to receive little or no protection because they will always appear as
a threat to the nation and, thus, embody the most serious of all possible
evils.90 The establishment bias is again obvious.
The clear and present danger test also encourages prolonging de-
bate indefinitely. According to Brandeis, expression may not be pro-
hibited so long as debate remains ongoing. 91 Thus, only the process of
truth-seeking is fully protected; decisions and actions predicated upon
truths once discovered are protected not at all.92 Brandeis's approach
to the marketplace of ideas accordingly encourages prolonged discus-
sion and, therefore, the delay of decisions that might lead to actions
contrary to society's generally accepted "truths." There is, however,
little value in the discovery of truth that cannot be used as a basis of
choice and behavior.
Brandeis's focus on procedural aspects of the market rather than
on the substantive actions it triggers also fosters delay in implementing
any ideas that challenge the status quo perspective. Disputes over the
best solutions for societal problems are converted into disputes over
proper marketplace processes. For example, rather than focusing on
whether the military draft should be reinstated, the debate may well
center on whether antidraft groups should be allowed to stage a mas-
sive demonstration in a business district. Such procedural concerns di-
vert attention from the substantive issue so that the status quo is more
easily preserved.
Through this process of transforming substantive conflicts into
procedural debates, challengers to the status quo may be placated with
a procedural victory while their overt threat is defused.93 This shift in
focus helps to insulate society from the trauma of having to reconsider
its accepted values while at the same time it allows the protesting indi-
vidual and his supporters to believe that they have a fair opportunity to
90. See M. SHAPIRO, FREEDOM OF SPEECH: THE SUPREME COURT AND JUDICIAL REVIEW
65 (1966).
91. See Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377 (1927)(Brandeis, J., concurring).
92. Cf id at 373 ("That the necessity which is essential to a valid restriction does not exist
unless speech would produce, or is intended to produce, a clear and imminent danger of some
substantive evil ... has been settled.").
93. Cf. T. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS OF GOVERNMENT 34 (1935) ("the function of law is not so
much to guide society, ,as to comfort it").
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win popular support for their position.94 If freedom of expression only
gives protection as long as decisions are not yet made, actions are not
yet taken, and debate is still in progress, then there is little threat to
established norms.
The establishment bias of the clear and present danger test is also
apparent when government officials allow speech to enter the market
precisely because they presume it will be ignored. For example, when
the American Nazi Party fought to march through Skokie, Illinois, 95
that city's Jewish community questioned why the arguments of an-
tisemitism and genocide should be given an opportunity to succeed in
the marketplace. 96 Many media representatives, however, suggested
that Skokie's attempt to prevent the march aided the Nazi Party by
giving it national publicity in a context in which the Party was likely to
gain sympathy as the underdog. If the Skokie residents had allowed
the Nazi Party to march, the media argued, few would know, fewer
would care, and still fewer would critically evaluate Party views.97
Thus, the risk of the Nazi Party's success could be discounted because
its position would be publicly ignored.98 In a case like Skokie, then,
the marketplace does not function to foster reconsideration of societal
norms. The Nazi's expression is allowed precisely because officials an-
94. For a more detailed discussion of how established norms are protected by transforming
substantive claims into procedural disputes, see Ingber, Procedure, Ceremony and Rhetoric: The
Minimization of Ideological Conflict in Deviance Control, 56 B.U.L. Rlv. 266, 268-73 (1976).
95. See National Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 434 U.S. 1327 (Stevens, Circuit
Justice, 1977)(denying stay); National Socialist Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43
(1977)(per curiam); Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir.), stay denied, 436 U.S. 953, cert. de-
nied, 439 U.S. 916 (1978). See generally Goldberger, Skokie: The First Amendment Under Attack
by its Friends, 29 MERCER L. REv. 761 (1978).
96. Holnes had argued that all views, even those we detest, need to be given the opportunity
to succeed in the marketplace. See Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 673 (1925)(Holmes, J.,
dissenting).
97. See, eg., Editorial, Nazis, Skokie, andthe A. CL. U., N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1978, § IV, at 10,
col. 1 ("The Nazis selected Skokie because they knew that the ensuing protests would give public-
ity to their miniscule movement."). Even the Nazis admitted that the sole purpose of their march
through Skokie was to draw attention when they otherwise would be ignored by most people. See
Wilson, Nazi Freedom of Speech Challenged, L.A. Times, Oct. 16, 1977, § I, at 6, col. 1 ("If village
officials had let us march last April, all of this would be over and forgotten.").
98. Arguably, the public previously had considered the views of the Nazi Party and had
rejected them. Skokie thus may be viewed as a debate about how much more an idea should be
tolerated in the marketplace once it has been soundly rejected. There is, however, also danger that
the market will assume its infallibility, see supra text accompanying notes 22-26, and allow one
generation to decide issues for future generations. Cf. Lucas v. Forty-Fourth General Assembly,
377 U.S. 713, 737 (1964)(even a majority of voters in a statewide referendum may not authorize
denial of the individual's right to an equally weighted vote).
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ticipate that the marketplace will reject it out of hand.99 In contrast, if
government officials had perceived the Nazi march as seriously threat-
ening to influence decisions and behavior, they might well have forbid-
den the march. In precisely those instances when expression threatens
to disrupt established power structures and norms, courts have aban-
doned the market imagery and the clear and present danger test1t° and
have banned the communication. The Supreme Court's regulation of
obscenity exemplifies this tendency.
b. Obscenity. In a society allegedly seeking the true or best
style of living, all pertinent ideas deserve due consideration. "All ideas
having even the slightest redeeming social importance. . . have...
full protection ..... 101 The Supreme Court, however, in the 1957
decision in Roth v. United States,10 2 viewed obscenity as not deserving
societal attention because the Court considered obscenity to be "utterly
without redeeming social importance."'10 3 Consequently, according to
Roth, the government does not engage in content discrimination if it
bans obscene material because obscenity is outside the Constitution's
protection.: 4
Yet the "redeeming social value" standard is inherently problem-
atic. To whom must the communication be "redeeming"?105 Surely the
obscene material has social value to people who willingly pay money to
99. Perhaps the Nazi's speech should be rejected summarily, see generally Solzhenitsyn, The
Exhausted West, HARv. MAG., July-Aug., 1978, at 21 passim, but certainly this attitude contra-
dicts the marketplaces aspirational search for truth.
100. The Court has revised and reinterpreted the Holmes/Brandeis "clear and present dan-
ger" test since its adoption. See Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444,447 (1969)(The state may not
"forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation except where such advocacy is
directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such
action."). More recently, however, the Court has specifically used the language of "clear and
present danger" to reverse a court order restraining reporters from publishing allegedly prejudicial
pretrial material. See Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562-63 (1976)(citing United
States v. Dennis, 183 F.2d 201, 212 (2d Cir. 1950)(L. Hand, J.,), a'd, 341 U.S. 494 (1951)); cf
Nebraska PressAss'n, 427 U.S. at 569 (probability that pretrial publicity would work evil was not
shown with sufficient degree of certainty to permit prior restraint).
101. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957).
102. 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
103. Id at 484.
104. Consequently, Justice Brennan was correct when, in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413
U.S. 49 (1973), he suggested that to replace the test of "utterly" without social value with one
demanding only a lack of 'serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value," Miller v. Califor-
nia, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)(emphasis added), is inconsistent with the analytic underpinnings of
Roth. Paris Adult Theatre 1, 413 U.S. at 96 (Brennan, J., dissenting); see Schauer, supra note 67,
at 929. Under the Miller standard government can no longer claim indifference to content, but
must instead evaluate the worth of the speech and the "seriousness" of the ideas presented. See
Baker, supra note 1, at 972.
105. See Ginzburg v. United States, 383 U.S. 463, 489-90 (1966)(Douglas, J., dissenting).
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obtain it.t06 The Court can discount this tautology only by insisting
that literature has social value within the marketplace of ideas if it ad-
vocates a way of life, and not if it merely entertains those already com-
mitted to such a life style. 10 7 In essence, the Court believes that
equating the free exchange of political ideas "with commercial ex-
ploitation of obscene material demeans the grand conception of the
First Amendment."' 0 8
The Supreme Court's opinion in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton 10 9
exposed the flaws in this distinction. In Paris Adult Theatre, the Court
held that material could be obscene even though it is exhibited only to
consenting adults. The interests the state protects through this prohibi-
tion include "the quality of life,. . . the tone of commerce. . . and,
possibly, the public safety itself."' 10 States accordingly have the
"power to make a morally neutral judgment" that public exhibition of
obscene materials, or commerce in the obscene, tends to "injure the
community as a whole" by polluting the "public environment.""' The
Court stressed most vehemently that to grant access to obscene material
"is to affect the world about the rest of us." 2
Thus, although the Court has often said that speech is protected
precisely because of its role in "the bringing about of political and so-
cial changes,"'" 3 it refused to protect obscene material in Paris Adult
Theatre predominantly because such material advocates a kind of soci-
ety the Court finds objectionable. The Court's defense of government
regulation of obscenity is based simply on "unprovable assumptions"
106. Richards, supra note 68, at 79-82.
107. See Baker, supra note 1, at 971.
108. Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
109. 413 U.S. 49 (1973).
110. id at 58.
111. Id at 68-69.
112. Id at 59 (quoting Bickel, in On Pornography: II-Dissenting and concurring opinions, 22
PUB. INTEREST 25, 26 (1971)(untitled essay))(emphasis added by the Court).
113. Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957). The obscenity cases, however, may
demonstrate that speech may not be permitted to bring about changes that affront upper class
propensities. It has been thoughtfully observed that the
journey from "Ulysses" to Hustler involved more than a move from literature to smut,
from words to images. It involves the transition from the preoccupation of an educated
minority to the everyday fantasies of the blue-collar majority ....
Once upon a time, obscenity was confined to expensive leather-bound editions
available only to gentlemen. . . .One of the questions asked by the crown prosecutor
[in the trial of the publishers of Lady Chalierly's Lover]... was: "Would you let your
servant read this book?"
Hustler is the servant's revenge.
Neville, Has the FirstAmendment Met Its Match?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 6, 1977, § 6, pt. I (Magazine),
at 18, col. 2.
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about what is good for the people. 114 The Court justifies relying on
such unprovable assumptions by comparing them to the assumptions
routinely made regarding "good" materials. The Court suggests that
because society accepts on faith alone the uplifting quality of good
literature and other art forms, so too, states may accept the correspond-
ing assumption that obscenity corrupts and debases. 1I5 But the Court's
comparison is misplaced, for the state does not and could not compel
its adult citizens to read, watch, or listen to such good works."16 Offi-
cial determination of what social change is unacceptable and should
not be contemplated is just as antithetical to an open search for truth as
is official determination of truth itself.
Pornography may be beyond constitutional protection, while the
Skokie march is not, 17 precisely because judges believe that pornogra-
phy is more likely than Nazi rhetoric to influence community views. "18
As Professor Laurence Tribe has recognized, current obscenity law
seems incompatible with the marketplace premise that awareness of al-
ternative views can never be deemed harmful in itself.'19 Pornography,
however, threatens to make us aware of something about ourselves that
some would prefer not to know. "It threatens to explode our uneasy
accommodation between sexual impulse and social custom," insists
Tribe, and
to destroy the carefully-spun social web holding sexuality in its place.
One need not "sound the alarm of repression" in order to argue that
the desire to preserve that web by shutting out the thoughts and im-
pressions that challenge it cannot be squared with a constitutional
commitment to openness of mind. 120
c. Summary. Although both the clear and present danger and
obscenity standards are rooted in market imagery of an open society
searching for truth, they both allow the banning of expression at the
point where expression threatens established values. A society that em-
114. Paris Adult Theatre I, 413 U.S. at 62.
115. Id at 63.
116. See L. TRiwE, supra note 13, § 12-16, at 668. In addition, the state cannot compel chil-
dren to read officially determined "good books" if their parents do not cooperate. Cf Pierce v.
Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534 (1925)(state statute compelling public as opposed to private
education of school children held to interfere unreasonably with parents' liberty to "direct the
upbringing and education of [their] children").
117. See supra notes 95-100 and accompanying text.
118. In fact, the views of those who wished to march in Skokie may have been patently unac-
ceptable more because of the marchers' self-professed "Nazism," and all that term symbolizes,
than because of their antisemitic views. For a discussion of the importance of packaging, see infra
text accompanying notes 228-33.
119. See L. TRinE, supra note 13, § 12-16, at 669-70.
120. Id (footnotes omitted).
[Vol. 1984:1
MARKETPLA CE OF IDEAS
braces such legal doctrines cannot claim to be open-minded in its
search for truth. The following section considers whether these repres-
sive doctrines are produced by a biased system gone amuck or whether
the marketplace itself is inherently flawed.
2. Truth As Socialization. Although the assumption of the exist-
ence of objective truth is crucial to classic marketplace theory, almost
no one believes in objective truth today. 2 1 Historians, for example,
first determine what type of historical data to seek and then determine
the relevance of the data they find. Thus, history is founded on the
selective perception of historians rather than on any objective historical
truth. 122 The same can be said for the pursuit of truth in any academic,
scientific, or professional discipline.123 The "truth" of a theory depends
on its ability to explain a phenomenon to the judging individual's satis-
faction and on its aesthetic appeal to that individual. 124 Today's truth,
consequently, may become tomorrow's superstition. 2 5
That the marketplace reveals truth, or even the best solutions, is
further belied by the lack of any consensus in this country on what is
true or best. If the marketplace actually revealed truth, diversity and
conflict presumably would diminish rather than increase.12 6 But, be-
cause people's perceptions are based on their varying interests and ex-
121. Cf Baker, supra note 1, at 974 ("Truth is not objective"). "Platonic forms" are no longer
credibly sought. See id (the "moderns appear unwilling to believe in platonic forms"). Their
deficiency as a value source is that their content or accuracy cannot be tested. In addition, those
people who attempt to build a value system upon universals are trapped in a dilemma: either the
alleged universal ends are too few and abstract to aid in deciding specific conflicts, or they are too
numerous and concrete to be truly universal. See R. UNGER, KNOWLEDGE & POLITICS 254-56
(1975).
122. See R. BERKHOFER, A BEHAVIORAL APPROACH To HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 23-26 (1969).
American accounts in high school textbooks of the 'Revolutionary War' need only be compared to
their English counterparts' discussion of the 'War with the Colonies" to demonstrate how two
cultures can have a significantly differing understanding of the same event.
123. See Baker, supra note 1, at 974; seealso T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REvO-
LUTIONSPtaSSiM (2d ed. 1970).
124. See Baker, supra note 1, at 974. For a discussion of the role of models, see Ingber,
X Dialectic: The Fufillment and Decrease of Passion in Criminal Law, 28 RUTGERS L. Rv. 861,
861-62 (1975); Ingber, supra note 75, at 328-29.
125. Consider the response given to Nicolaus Copernicus, Galileo Galilei, and Giordano
Bruno for challenging the Aristotilean/Ptolemaic vision of the universe. See 6 ENCYCLOPEDIA
BRITANNICA 463 (1971)(Copernicus withheld publication of his work until shortly before his
death); 9 id at 1089-90 (Galileo placed under house arrest until his death and forced to recant the
Copernican system); 4 id at 308 (Bruno burned at the stake for his challenges to Aristotilean
physics and astronomy). Their beliefs, contrary to the "relevant" evidence and circumstances of
the time, questioned the very core of their cultures. Astronomers and humanists alike, however,
now view that era's truth as crude superstitution.
126. See Baker, supra note 1, at 967.
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periences, 127 their perceptions are not likely to be socially
homogenized. Consequently, as long as people have differing exper-
iences, there is little guarantee that any society can agree on what is
"true,"1 28 and diversity and conflict will likely persist.129
People seldom want to read or hear that which is contrary to their
convictions. Nor are they usually open to criticisms of groups to which
they belong. To the contrary, it is difficult for a person to reject ideas,
opinions, and positions as being false when they coincide with his own
interests or when they appeal to his half-submerged prejudices. 130
Consequently, if people's perspectives are not homogeneous, a person
will perceive the marketplace as leading to the best result only if it
favors those who, in that specific individual's view, should be favored.
In short, if the preconceived perspectives of individuals are inherently
heterogeneous, then their decisions on the proper outcome of the mar-
ket competition actually are made prior to that purported competition.
Consequently, the very market process reputed as the only way to de-
termine which perspective should win merely reflects the preexisting
127. Even language and syntax are forces that structure, direct, and limit individual percep-
tion. For years ethnologists studying the relation of language to culture have insisted that any
change in language influences both perception and conception. See, e.g., R. BROWN, 1. CoPs, D.
DULANEY, W. FRANKENA, P. HENKLE & C. STEVENSON, LANGUAGE, THOUGHT & CULTURE 1-25
(1958); E. SAPiR, Language, in CULTURE, LANGUAGE, AND PERSONALITY 7passim (1949); Whorf,
The Relation ofHabitual Thought and Behavior to Language, in LANGUAGE, CULTURE AND PER-
SONALITY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF EDWARD SAPIR 75 (L. Spier, A. Hallowell & S. Newman eds.
1941). Edward Sapir, an early leader in ethnology, has written that
[t]he r lation between language and experience is often misunderstood. Language is not
merely a more or less systematic inventory of the various items of experience which seem
relevant to the individual, as is so often naively assumed, but is also a self-contained,
creative symbolic organization, which not only refers to experience largely acquired
without its help but actually defines experience for us by reason of its formal complete-
ness and because of our unconscious projection of its implicit expectation into the field of
experience.
Sapir, Conceptual Categories in Primitive Languages, in LANGUAGE IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY
128, 128 (D. Hymes ed. 1964).
128. Furthermore, dialogue cannot end divergences in perspective if people have differing ex-
periences and conflicting interests. Both logic and reason lack perspective; thus, they cannot alone
justify value choices. Although logic and reason may help to indicate consistency within a chosen
value system, see Ingber, supra note 75, at 320; Weyrauch, Book Review, 25 STAN. L. REV. 782,
800 (1973), the selection of the values to be pursued must precede the effective use of rationality.
Reason standing alone is either an empty source for the determination of values or a camouflage
to conceal flagrantly elitist value preferences. See Ely, The Supreme Court, 1977 Term-Foreword"
On Discovering Fundamental Values, 92 HARv. L. REv. 5, 33-39 (1978); c. Tushnet, " . . And
Only Wealth Will Buy You Justice'-Some Notes on the Supreme Court. 1972 Term, 1974 Wis. L.
REv. 177, 177 ("the Court found constitutional flaws in legislation that it disapproved on policy
grounds, while it found no flaws in legislation that it approved").
129. Social life has great diversity and conflict in individual needs, interests, and experiences,
which may explain why there are more, and more conflicting, paradigms for social relations than
is the case for "scientific" phenomena. Baker, supra note 1, at 974.
130. See Wellington, supra note 1, at 1130.
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perspectives of the market participants.13 1 The marketplace process in
fact changes little.
Conflicts in the marketplace, therefore, are not likely to lead to
conclusive agreement on what is "true" or "best." Rather, the market-
place serves as a forum where cultural groups with differing needs, in-
terests, and experiences battle to defend or establish their disparate
senses of what is "true" or "best." Official adoption and support of one
group's position, allegedly due to its success in the marketplace, merely
enhances through legal mechanisms the stature of that group's subcul-
ture; it does not represent a universal acceptance of that group's
perspective.
Accordingly, it is difficult to treat free speech as uniquely essential
to the discovery of truth or to the encouragement of informed choice.
Experience more likely provides the information needed to confront
life's exigencies than does speech. Rather than being fostered by mere
expression, societal change depends more on the growth of new inter-
ests, needs, and experiences which are used to view sensory data differ-
ently so as to gain new perspectives from which status quo conditions
may be challenged. Such growth requires a governmental and social
system that nurtures new experiences and interests and, consequently,
divergent notions of truth. In such a system, expression would be im-
portant only if it helped to create differing environments suited to the
self-fulfillment of people with contrasting perspectives.
In the United States today, however, most behavior, experiences,
and life-style choices are fully subject to governmental influence and
restriction. Neither our federal nor local governments are under any
obligation to encourage the diversity of experiences necessary for a so-
ciety open to change. On the contrary, both levels of government pro-
mote conformity and consensus by controlling the development of
"proper" perspectives. Through its authority over economic, political,
educational, and social conditions, and its superior position in data
gathering and dissemination, our government actively participates in
the socialization of the citizenry. Contrary to the marketplace image of
independent citizens freely choosing among competing ideas, 132 the
131. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
132. Even Mill himself, in discussing liberty, saw the limits of his philosophy:
It is, perhaps, hardly necessary to say that this doctrine is meant to apply to human
beings in the maturity of their facilities. We are not speaking of children, or of young
persons below the age which the law may fix [for majority] .... Those who are still in
a state to require being taken care of by others, must be protected against their own
actions . ...
J. MILL, supra note 5, at 9. Little remains of freedom of choice, however, if a public education
system socializes the great majority of our children for 12 years and has a self-admitted role in
forming "good citizens." Mill stated, but did not recognize, the conffict in his theory:
Vol. 1984:1]
DUKE LAW JOURX4L
government strongly encourages the public to favor or disfavor certain
views.
Through processes of socialization, government predisposes the in-
dividual to accept some perspectives rather than others. Government
inculcates ideas that tend to protect existing interests, prevailing values,
and current attitudes. 133 In short, the government strongly encourages
the public to choose those ideas within the market that preserve the
status quo. The public school system, combined with compulsory edu-
cation, is one of many effective mechanisms for governmental sociali-
zation and indoctrination.
As far back as Brown v. Board of Education, 134 the Court acknowl-
edged that state sponsored education was a major force in the socializa-
tion of children. 135 Public schools, scholars have noted, 136 provide a
potent forum for state indoctrination: first, the audience's attendance is
compulsory, and the listeners do not yet have the independent knowl-
edge or psychological sophistication necessary for critical evaluation of
what their teachers tell them; 37 second, public schools package their
Society has had absolute power over [its members] during all the early portion of their
existence: it has had the whole period of childhood and nonage in which to try whether
it could make them capable of rational conduct in life. The existing generation is master
both of the training and the entire circumstances of the generation to come ....
Id at 73.
The educational system may thus indoctrinate a value-set precisely to skew later normative
judgments. This social indoctrination, however, may be essential to give a person the frame of
reference necessary to actively participate in governmental and social decisions; without some
normative structure, a person would be no more than a passive receptor of sensory impulses. It is,
in any case, too simplistic to view this process of socialization as being controlled by devious,
manipulating educators. See Ingber, supra note 124, at 870.
133. See T. EMERSON, FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION, supra note 1, at 289; cf. Kamenshine, The
First Amendment's Implied Political Establishment Clause, 67 CALIF. L. REV. 1104, 1104
(1979)(proposing that first amendment be interpreted to include prohibition against political es-
tablishment in order to alleviate government's power to indoctrinate citizens).
134. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
135. Id at 493 ("Today [public education] is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values .... ").
136. See Yudof, When Governments Speak Toward a Theory of Government Expression and
the First Amendment, 57 TEx. L. REv. 863, 875 (1979); see also Kamenshine, supra note 133, at
1134.
137. A comparison of Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1963), with
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 641 (1943), adds some insight. In
Schempp the Court held unconstitutional state laws and practices requiring the recitation of a
prayer in the public schools. 374 U.S. at 205. The fact that individual students could request to be
excused from the exercises furnished no defense. Id at 224-25. The Court recognized that the
school child's age and immaturity likely would make it difficult for him to publicly express his
wish to act differently from his classmates; a subtle but strong pressure would exist for the child to
conform. See id at 289-90 & n.69 (Brennan, J., concurring). In Barnette the Court held unconsti-
tutional a school practice requiring students to pledge allegiance to the United States flag even if
the child did not wish to do so. But, the Court required only that the school permit the students to
excuse themselves. Barnette, 319 U.S. at 630. Unlike its decision in Schempp, the Barnette Court
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message as highly valued education rather than as less trustworthy ad-
vertisement; 38 third, the children are likely to be impressed by the
adult teacher's authority and seemingly vast fund of knowledge; 139 and,
finally, teachers mete out rewards and punishments to those who do or
do not appropriately learn the lesson of the day. 140
A less jaded view of the "indoctrination" that takes place in our
educational institutions emphasizes the necessity of "selectivity" in any
school system. In his dissent in Board of Education v. Pico,14 1 a deci-
sion that imposed first amendment limits on a local school board's dis-
cretion to remove books from junior and senior high school libraries,
Justice Rehnquist stressed that,
of necessity, elementary and secondary education must separate the
relevant from the irrelevant, the appropriate from the inappropriate.
Determining what information not to present to the students is often
as important as identifying relevant material. This winnowing pro-
cess ... is fundamentally inconsistent with any constitutionally re-
quired eclecticism in public education. 142
Although Justice Brennan's plurality opinion in Pico limited the
school board's ability to remove library books, it also readily approved
the indoctrination role of educational institutions:
We are ... in full agreement ... that local school boards must be
permitted "to establish and apply their curriculum in such a way as
to transmit community values," and that "there is a legitimate and
substantial community interest in promoting respect for authority
and traditional values be they social, moral, or political."143
permitted the ritual to continue although the pressure to conform certainly would be as great.
Regardless of Justice Jackson's admirable language in the Barnette decision, 319 U.S. at 641-42,
the Constitution apparently allows subtle political indoctrination even if such religious indoctrina-
tion is prohibited. A state may even refuse to certify teachers not trusted to socialize youngsters to
a particular set of norms. See Ambach v. Norwich, 441 U.S. 68, 78-80 (1979)(New York law
upheld which denied certification of alien teachers in public schools if alien eligible for U.S. citi-
zenship but declines to seek it).
138. That allegedly educational communication can also be intended to propagandize is most
obvious in the legislation of some states requiring courses contrasting the "good" democratic form
of government with the "bad" communist regimes. In Florida, for example, instructors must em-
phasize the American economy as producing "higher wages, higher standards of living, greater
personal freedom and liberty than any other system of economics on earth," FLA. STAT.
§ 233.064(4) (1981), while focusing upon the "dangers of Communism, the ways to fight Commu-
nism, the evils of Communism, the fallacies of Communism, and the false doctrines of Commu-
nism." FLA. STAT. § 233.064(5) (1981). Consider also the recent furor over the rapidly growing
and controversial nuclear education movement in American schools. See Nuclear War Becomes
Hot Topic in Schools, Wall St. J., May 24, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
139. I am reminded of the vehemence with which my 15-year-old son will defend an errone-
ous factual statement made by one of his teachers.
140. See Yudof, supra note 136, at 875.
141. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 904 (1982)(Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
142. Id at 914 (emphasis in original); see Nagel, supra note 18, at 333.
143. Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 864 (1982)(quoting Brief for Petitioners at 10).
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Although the Court distinguished removing books from refusing to ac-
quire them in the first place, the loss of perspectives contained in the
books is just as damaging under the market model whether the school
removes books or initially rejects them. Surely the Court would deem
a school board's decision not to purchase books written from a Black or
Republican perspective unconstitutional. Yet refusal to acquire books
suggesting a Jewish infiltration of our government likely would not
raise a judicial eyebrow. The difference clearly seems to be the cultural
acceptance of one perspective and rejection of the other. Conse-
quently, public schools shape children's attitudes through such selective
exposure and thereby predispose children to accept certain established
perspectives as adults. 44
Thus, as the educational indoctrination process demonstrates,
socialization mechanisms can subtly influence people to separate "fash-
ionable" trends of thought from the "unfashionable" without any signs
of formal censorship.' 45 No expression need be forbidden overtly, no
matter how challenging it may be to the existing order, for socialization
processes will prevent it from effectively penetrating the mass con-
sciousness of the citizenry. 46
Members of the judiciary, responsible for upholding the values
protected by the first amendment, are not immune from the same
processes of socialization and indoctrination that predispose the gen-
eral public to certain perspectives. The members of the courts are, after
all, as much creatures of their culture as are we all.147 Given this inevi-
144. Of course, if a child's parents disapprove of the public school system and can afford to
finance the alternative, they can opt out and place their child in a private educational institution.
See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925). Exercise of this constitutional privi-
lege, however, may be not only expensive, but beyond the means of many parents. Economic
reality, combined with compulsory education, may force those who are not well off, and therefore
have the least objective reasons to be committed to established values, to leave their children in
educational institutions that promote establishment values.
145. Alexander Solzhenitsyn suggested this perspective on American culture in a speech given
before the Harvard commencement in 1978. See Solzhenitsyn, supra note 99, at 23 ("Nothing is
forbidden, but what is not fashionable will hardly ever find its way into periodicals or books or be
heard in colleges. Legally, your researchers are free, but they are conditioned by the fashion of
the day.").
146. See Goodwin, The Shape of American Politics, COMMENTARY, June 1967, at 25, 32
("Ours is one of the most ideological nations of all. The very absence of serious and widespread
public debate proves how successfully ideas have been woven into our national life.").
147. See Desmond, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality ofState Law, in THE FU-
TURE OF FEDERALISM 87, 89 (S. Shuman ed. 1968)(" 'the great tides of currents which engulf the
rest of men do not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by' ")(quoting Benjamin Car-
dozo). Judges are normally affected by the normative culture surrounding government officials;
indeed, judges tend to be drawn from roughly the same rank as legislators. See J. ELY, DEMOC-
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table socialization of the judiciary, marketplace ideals become unrealis-
tic and serve only as a legitimizing myth for a system that encourages
the presentation of a limited range of preselected ideas rather than the
open-minded evaluation it purports to foster.' 48 Speech outside the
range of acceptable norms149 has, not surprisingly, been frequently cur-
tailed with judicial approval. 50 Jurists, like other citizens, are likely to
hear and take seriously only those opinions that do not too openly con-
tradict their own.' 5'
B. The Assumption of Rationality.
Once one recognizes that the marketplace assumption of objective
truth is implausible and that truth and understanding are actually no
more than preconditioned choice, one is prompted to reevaluate other
marketplace assumptions in order to comprehend the marketplace the-
ory's persistence. Foremost among these assumptions is that people
can distinguish rationally between a message's substance and the dis-
tortion caused by its form and focus. Although the implausibility of
the public's ability to separate the form of a message from its substance
RACY AND DIsTRUsT 57 (1980). If, due to their positions, judges are socialized differently than
legislators, such differences may be problematic. See Nagel, supra note 18, at 334:
It is at best unclear why the normally sedate and highly controlled atmosphere of a
courtroom is thought to be a good training ground for appreciating the dynamics of
vigorous public debate. In contrast, political involvement and accountability provide
much of the experience that one might expect would lead to a useful understanding of
the requirements of a system of free speech.
148. This theme will be more fully developed infra in Part IV.
149. Polsby labeled this range the "community agenda of alternatives" in 1963. N. POLSBY,
COMMUNITY POWER AND POLITICAL THEORY 135 (2d ed. 1980); see id at 133-35; see also
Deutsch, Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court: Some Intersections Between Law and
Political Science, 20 STAN. L. Rv. 169, 254 (1968); Ingber, supra note 75, at 344. The "commu-
nity agenda of alternatives" is the universe of alternative decisions that the dominant cultures in
society accept as possible outcomes from the marketplace debate; within this range there are of
course both preferred and unpreferred alternatives. Although the legal system may not support
alternatives outside that agenda without a severe loss of legitimacy, it may symbolically support
an unpreferred alternative within the agenda without engendering such dangers. For a fuller
discussion of this concept, see infra text accompanying notes 361-63.
150. For decisions in which the Court upheld convictions under statutes limiting controversial
speech as not inconsistent with the first amendment, see, for example, Dennis v. United States, 341
U.S. 494, 516 (1951); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, 215 (1919). See also New York v.
Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 774 (1982)(upholding a state law outlawing child pornography).
151. Acculturation or socialization may partially explain some of the obscenity decisions in
which the Supreme Court imposed its own "enlightened" position of selective tolerance for the
tastefully salacious coupled with contempt for the coarsely vulgar. Indeed, the distinction be-
tween Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 568 (1969)(protecting exhibition of obscene films in the
home), and Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 U.S. 49, 67 (1973)(forbidding public display of
obscene films), coincides with a distinction between polite society and the hoi polloi. To protect
the showing of a privately produced movie on a privately owned projector while prosecuting the
exhibition of an identical film in a public theatre smacks of economic and cultural discrimination.
For further discussion of the impact of the Justices' socioeconomic background upon their recep-
tivity to various styles of speech, see Justice Brennan's dissent in FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S.
726, 776-77 (1978)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
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will be demonstrated below,1 52 some legal doctrine has, nevertheless,
developed that attempts to limit irrational responses to communica-
tions by controlling the form in which such messages are presented.
1. A Problem of Form. In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire,t5 3 the
Court denied first amendment protection to ideas packaged in a pa-
tently insulting manner. In upholding the conviction of a Jehovah's
Witness who had gotten into a fight on a sidewalk with the city marshal
after calling him "a God damned racketeer" and "a damned Fas-
cist,' s5 4 Justice Murphy, writing for a unanimous Court, commented:
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prosecution and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any constitutional problems. These include the lewd
and obscene, the profane, the libelous and the insulting or "fighting"
words-those which by their very utterance inflict injury or tend to
incite an immediate breach of the peace.' 55
During the decades since Chaplinsky's attempt to distinguish between
protected and unprotected classes of speech, substantial first amend-
ment problems have arisen under the categories of the "profane" and
the "libelous."1 56 The "fighting words" category, in contrast, consist-
ently has remained beyond the constitutional pale. 5 7 One set of
authors finds the regulation of "fighting words" consistent with free
speech theory because such words trigger an automatic reaction rather
than cognitive reflection.' 58 Consequently, removal of such speech
from the marketplace, according to these authors, only eliminates
thoughtless and irrational responses; 59 little of value is lost, and public
order is preserved.
152. See infra text accompanying notes 178-232.
153. 315 U.S. 568 (1942). In Chaplinsky, the state court had interpreted the state statute to ban
"face-to-face words plainly likely to cause a breach of the peace by the addressee." Id at 573.
Because the addressee here was a Marshal, surely the court could have insisted that a state law
enforcement officer be stringently required to refrain from responding to such speech through a
breach of the peace.
154. Id at 569.
155. Id at 571-72.
156. For the Court's present view on "profanity," see Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S.
130, 134 (1973)(municipal ordinance prohibiting cursing, reveling or use of obscene language
struck down as overbroad); Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 506 (1952)(unconstitutional
censorship of an allegedly "sacrilegious" movie). The modem view of libel is illustrated by New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), and Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1964).
But see Beauharnais v. Illinois, 343 U.S. 250, 266 (1952)(suggesting libel outside scope of first
amendment)(as recently as 1978, Justice Blackmun cited Beauharnair as good law in an opinion
joined by Justice Rehnquist, see Smith v. Collin, 436 U.S. 953 (1978)(mem.)(Blackmun, J., dis-
senting), denying stay of 578 F.2d 1197 (7th Cir. 1978)).
157. See Lewis v. City of New Orleans, 415 U.S. 130, 133 (1974); Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S.
518, 522 (1972).
158. J. NowAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 789 (1978).
159. Id
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The Supreme Court's "provocative speaker/hostile audience" doc-
trine is closely related to the fighting words doctrine. In Feiner v. New
York, 60 the Court, recognizing the state's ability to suppress a provoc-
ative speaker likely to rouse spectator violence against himself and his
supporters, affirmed the disorderly conduct conviction of a soap box
orator who ignored a police command to cease speaking to a racially
mixed crowd. 61 The orator had given the impression that he was "en-
deavoring to arouse the Negro people against the whites, urging that
they rise up in arms and fight for equal rights." 162 The two policemen
on the scene confronted a crowd of about eighty people. At least one
individual threatened violence if the police did not act to stop the
speaker. 63 Although the threat of violence came from a spectator op-
posed to the speaker, Chief Justice Vinson insisted that when a speaker
"passes the bounds of argument or persuasion and undertakes incite-
ment to riot, [the police must not be]. . . powerless to prevent a breach
of the peace.' ' 164 Again the explanation for suppression was that the
speech did not encourage rational discourse, but rather had passed the
"bounds of persuasion."
Despite the Court's attempts to explain the "fighting word" and
"provocative speaker/hostile audience" doctrines in terms of protecting
the rationality of the marketplace, these doctrines are inconsistent with
the Court's other articulations of the marketplace model. For instance,
as early as 1949 the Court insisted in Terminiello v. Chicago165 that
a function of free speech ... is to invite dispute. It may indeed
best serve its high purpose when it induces a condition of unrest,
creates dissatisfaction with conditions as they are, or even stirs peo-
ple to anger. Speech is often provocative and challenging. It may
strike at prejudice and preconceptions and have profound unsettling
effects as it presses for acceptance of an idea .... [T]he alternative
would lead to standardization of ideas either by legislatures, courts,
or dominant political or community groups.166
But what distinguishes suppressible fighting words from protected pro-
vocative words that stir opponents to anger? Socially valuable dissent
often is phrased in unconventional terms and frequently offends polite
160. 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
161. Seeid at 316-18, 321.
162. Id at 317. Feiner also had described the President as a "bum," the mayor of Syracuse
as a "champagne-sipping bum," and the American Legion as a "Nazi Gestapo." Id at 330
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
163. Id at 317.
164. Id at 321.
165. 337 U.S. 1 (1949).
166. Id at 4.
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standards of discourse. The distinction merely seems, at times, to for-
bid "low" styled speech from a "low" statured speaker. This "class"
focus only further entrenches a bias for established norms and respect-
able proponents. 67
Yet the focus on form is an inevitable outgrowth of Chaplinsky's
attempt to separate protected from unprotected speech. Chaplinsky
suggests that the essence of a communication can survive a governmen-
tal purge of the disturbing form in which the communication is
presented for public consideration, 168 but many critics have rejected the
assumption that the content and form of speech somehow are separa-
ble. 69 Yet the marketplace model makes this very assumption. It
167. The civil rights movement of the 1960's demonstrated the danger of the Feiner doctrine
because opposing spectators attempted to use the doctrine to suppress civil rights demonstrations
by claiming that bystanders' emotions would be uncontrollably aroused. The marches and
speeches of Dr. Martin Luther King and others through certain southern communities surely were
as likely to lead to violence from hostile audiences as were the acts of Feiner. The civil rights
movement, however, had the support of established groups throughout much of the country
outside of the southern states. It is therefore unsurprising that the Supreme Court has consistently
distinguished Feiner on its facts, although the Court has never technically overruled it. E.g.,
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 112 (1969)(civil rights demonstration); see also Bachel-
lar v. Maryland, 397 U.S. 564, 567 (1970)(antiwar demonstration); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536,
551 (1965)(citing Feiner but distinguishing it as a "'far cry'" from the civil rights demonstration
involved in the instant case); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229, 236 (1963)(civil rights
demonstration; a "far cry from the situation" in Feiner). Upon comparing these cases it becomes
obvious that when a speaker has greater stature and his cause commands greater support from
established groups, courts will less likely suppress his speech as solicitous of the irrational; instead,
in these cases the courts interpret the first amendment to "include vehement, caustic, and some-
times unpleasantly sharp attacks on government and public officials." New York Times Co. v.
Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
168. See Chaplinsky, 315 U.S. at 571-72 (some utterances are "no essential part of any exposi-
tion of ideas"). This is the basic postulate behind the Court's opinion in FCC v. Pacifica Found,,
438 U.S. 726 (1978)(FCC may regulate radio broadcasts that use indecent but not obscene lan-
guage). The Court insisted that a "requirement that indecent language be avoided will have its
primary effect on the form, rather than the content, of serious communication. There are few, if
any, thoughts that cannot be expressed by the use of less offensive language." Id at 743 n. 18.
169. See, e.g., L. TRIBE, supra note 13, § 12-8, at 606. Justice Brennan stressed this point in his
Pacgfca dissent:
The idea that the content of a message and its potential impact on any who might receive
it can be divorced from the words that are the vehicle for its expression is transparently
fallacious. A given word may have a unique capacity to capsule an idea, evoke an emo-
tion, or conjure up an image.
FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 773 (1978)(Brennan, J., dissenting).
Strangely enough, only seven years earlier in Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971), the
Court had precisely recognized the importance of an expression's packaging to its emotive force.
In holding that the first amendment protects the wearing of a jacket bearing the words "Fuck the
Draft" in a courthouse corridor, Justice Harlan acknowledged that
much linguistic expression serves a dual communicative function: it conveys not only
ideas capable of relatively precise, detached explication, but otherwise inexpressible
emotions as well. In fact, words are often chosen as much for their emotive as their
cognitive force. We cannot sanction the view that the Constitution, while solicitous of
the cognitive content of individual speech, has little or no regard for that emotive func-
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presumes people can use reason to focus on the substance of a message
and to distinguish and reject the emotional and irrational appeals of its
packaging. Evidence from the social sciences has established and em-
phasized the irrational elements of persuasion1 70 and, thus, seriously
challenges this marketplace assumption. As Professor C. Edwin Baker
has recognized, emotional appeals, whether rational or not, are highly
potent: "'subconscious' repressions, phobias, or desires influence peo-
ple's assimilation of messages; and, most obviously, stimulus-response
mechanisms and selective attention and retention processes influence
understanding or perspectives." 17' These processes, coupled with the
phenomenon of cognitive dissonance, 72 insulate individuals from
messages inconsistent with those perspectives that further their per-
ceived self-interests. 73 Marketplace outcomes therefore are deter-
mined more by the packaging of the message and the psychological
tion which, practically speaking, may often be the more important element of the overall
message sought to be communicated.
Id at 26 (emphasis added).
A comparison of Cohen and Pacfica illustrates the judicial ambivalence toward the irra-
tional. In upholding Cohen's right to wear his jacket in a courthouse, Justice Harlan's opinion
recognized that many people would find offensive much valuable speech that awakens the public
to outrages to which it had been blind. Yet in Pacpfca, the Court approved the FCC's ban of
satiric humorist George Carlin's 12 minute monologue, called "Filthy Words," from daytime ra-
dio. The Justices were unable to appreciate that there are those "who think, act, and talk differ-
ently from the Members of this Court, and who do not share their fragile sensibilities." PaciFca,
438 U.S. at 775 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
The Court's attempt to distinguish Pac#Fca from Cohen is unconvincing. See Pacfca, 438
U.S. at 747 n.25. Although the seven "filthy words" broadcast could enter the privacy of one's
home, such "invasion" would only happen if an individual decided to listen to the broadcast;
radios have both an on-off switch and a number of frequencies from which to choose. Notwith-
standing the fact that children could have listened to the broadcast without parental knowledge or
permission, if Carlin's monologue would have been protected had it been made on a public street
in the presence of children, it should not have been any less protected when delivered over radio
waves. Although the Court's language focuses on the broadcast's timing and form rather than its
substance, the Court's divergent analyses in Cohen and Pacftca suggest that substantive consider-
ations were relevant. Apparently, in 1968 during a heated public debate about the Vietnam War
and the military draft, when credible and recognized public leaders were divided over the issues,
one could signal one's position with passionate and emotively colorful language. It would there-
fore appear that when the substance of a communication has the approval of powerful social
forces, as in Cohen, the Court may give more flexibility to the form the message takes than it
would if established groups disapprove the message, as in Pacfca.
170. See, e.g., K. MANNHEIM, IDEOLOGY AND UTOPIApassim (1954); C. MILL, The Structure
oPower in .4merican Society, in POWER, POLITICS AND PEOPLE 23, 23 (I. Horowitz ed. 1963);
C. MILL, The Cultural Apparatus, in id at 405, 405-06; C. MILL, On Knowledge andPower, in id at
599, 609-11; Baker, supra note 1, at 976-78.
171. Baker, supra note 1, at 976.
172. See generally infra note 429 and accompanying text (discussion of cognitive dissonance).
173. See Baker, supra note 1, at 977.
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predispositions of the listeners than by any rational process. 174 Conse-
quently, the market model's reliance on public rationality is, at best,
misplaced. 175
Other scholars also have perceived the marketplace model's ques-
tionable reliance on rationality. They stress, however, that the market-
place's fairness, rather than its ultimate wisdom, justifies its continued
acceptance.176 A fairness justification, nevertheless, fails because estab-
lishment groups dominate the market. These groups have greater ac-
cess to the marketplace's most effective mechanisms for information
dissemination, and also possess the power to legally curtail behavior
that might result in new ideas and perspectives threatening to their
interests. 177
2. A Problem of Access and Style. The first amendment devel-
oped in a society where the major forms of public debate were hand-
printed leaflets, hand-set newspapers, and speeches in town meetings 78
and public parks. With roughly equal decibels and tongues, people
competed for attention and approval using their wit, persistence, and
eloquence. Because of this comparative equal access, the most power-
ful threat to free speech and a free press came from government censor-
174. Because there is no assurance that the individual with the "true" or "best" perspective
will be the superior rhetorician, this point is particularly crucial. The decisionmaker who frankly
conveys the limitations and uncertainty of his position may find that others are more willing to
follow the demagogue who professes to offer certainty and truth. See, e.g., W. GOLDINo, LORD OF
THE FLas 134-92 (1954). For a discussion of the skill of persuasion-or the importance of the
packaging of a message delivered by a lawyer, see Ingber, supra note 75, at 329-30.
175. Consider, for example, the constitutional protection of commercial speech as a feature of
the marketplace model. See generally Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350 (1977); Virginia State Bd.
of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976). In Linmark Assocs.,
Inc. v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 97 (1977), for example, the Court struck down a
township ordinance prohibiting the posting of real estate "For Sale" and "Sold" signs. The ordi-
nance was designed to stem the flight of white homeowners from a racially integrated community.
Id at 86. The Court assumed that homeowners who were wavering whether to sell their houses
would act rationally when, in fact, real estate agents may have been banking on emotive re-
sponses. Id at 95-96. By recognizing the consumers' and homeowners' right to receive messages
from advertisers, id at 92, the Court upheld the advertiser's right to psychologically manipulate
the baser traits of such individuals.
176. See, e.g., A. BICKEL, THE MORALITY OF CoNsENr 62 (1975)("rhe social interest that the
First Amendment vindicates is. . .the successful operation of the political process, so that the
country may better be able to adopt the course of action that conforms to the wishes of the greatest
number, whether or not it is wise or is founded in truth.").
177. See Baker, supra note I, at 978. See generally Baker, Counting Preferences in Collective
Choice Situations, 25 UCLA L. Rav. 381 (1978).
178. See A. MEIKLEIOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 24 (1960). Meiklejohn's concept of democracy
requires that every voter, not just administrators or legislators, be given "the fullest possible partic-
ipation in the understanding of those problems with which the citizens of a self-governing society
must deal." Id at 75. His image is more akin to participatory democracy, such as the town
meeting, than to representative democracy.
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ship or suppression.179 Brandeis's statement about good counsel
counteracting bad180 assumes the continued existence of equal access
and the correspondingly limited role of the first amendment. Histori-
cally this assumption may have been accurate; today, however, it is
indefensible.
The expansion of governmental powers and the creation of a bu-
reaucracy possessing vast quantities of information and expertise have
made the government, rather than individual citizens, the most perva-
sive participant in the marketplace. 81 Most of the information and
views available for consideration within the marketplace come from
government itself. Aided by increasingly subtle means of social con-
trol,18 2 the government's power to overwhelm or block alternative
views from the market'8 3 threatens the theoretical basis of consensual
government.184
Theoretically, however, two methods exist for communicating
nonsanctioned views to the public: the mass communication media for
those with access, and the public forum 8 5 for those without such media
access. This section examines whether either of these mechanisms ef-
fectively conveys perspectives other than those of dominant societal
groups.
179. Cf. Police Dep't v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972)("above all else, the First Amendment
means that government has no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas, its
subject matter, or its content").
180. Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)(Brandeis, J., concurring).
181. See generally Emerson, supra note 75.
182. See supra notes 133-51 and accompanying text.
183. Government need not even allow the press or the public access to many state facilities.
See, eg., Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978)(reversing lower court injunction ordering
prison officials to grant the press access to certain prison facilities). Such a ruling can easily frus-
trate many attempts to gain information or understanding unskewed by governmental selection or
interpretation.
184. See Yudof, supra note 136, at 865. To be fair, government speech may also provide a
necessary check on the ability of large corporations to dominate the communications networks.
See id at 866.
185. Professor Harry Kalven, Jr. first developed the concept of the public forum. See Kalven,
The Concept of the Public Forum: Cox v. Louisiana, 1965 Sup. CT. REV. 1. Much writing has
followed in his wake. See, e.g., Homing, The First 4mendment Right to a Public Forum, 1969
DuKE LJ. 931; Kamin, Residential Picketing and the First Amendment, 61 Nw. U.L. REv. 177,
207-16 (1966); Nahmod, Beyond Tinker: The High School as an Educational Public Forum,
5 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 278 (1970); Stephenson,4 Seat on the Sidelines: The Georgia Appellate
Judiciary and the Public Forum, 3 GA. L. REv. 80 (1968); Stephenson, State Appellate Courts and
the Political Process: Florida and the Public Forum, 23 U. MIAMI L. REV. 182 (1968); Wexler,
Dissent, the Streets and Permrits: Chicago as Microcosm, 2 URB. LAW. 350 (1970); Zillman & Im-
winkelried, The Legacy of Greer v. Spock: The Public Forum Doctrine and the Princplle of the
Military's Political Neutrality, 65 GEo. LJ. 773 (1977); Comment, The Public Forum from Marsh
to Lloyd, 24 AM. U.L. REv. 159 (1974).
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a. The mass media. No one today seriously would argue that
-picketing and leafleting are as effective communication devices as
newspapers and broadcasting. 186 Access to the mass media is crucial to
anyone wishing to disseminate his views widely. Nevertheless, monop-
olistic practices, 187 economies of scale, and an unequal distribution of
resources have made it difficult for new ventures to enter the business
of mass communications. 188 Restriction of entry to the economically
advantaged quells voices today that might have been heard in the time
of the town meeting and the pamphleteer.1 89 The media consequently
carry great power to suggest and shape articulated thought.190 Media
owners and managers, rather than the individuals wishing to speak,
186. See Barron, supra note 73, at 1647. A 1974 survey of 490 prominent educators, labor
leaders, bankers, business people, members of Congress, government officials, and clergy rated
television the most powerful institution in the country. The White House was second and the
Supreme Court third. Who Runs America? A National Survey, U.S. Naws & WORLD REP., Apr.
22, 1974, at 30. But cf. Jaffe, The Editorial Responsibilty of the Broadcaster- Reflections on Fairness
andAccess, 85 HARV. L. REV. 768, 769-71, 787 (1972)("The implication that the people of this
country ... are mere unthinking automatons manipulated by the media, without interests, con-
flicts or prejudices is an assumption which I find quite maddening.").
187. As early as the middle 1950's, 94.3% of the daily newspapers in the United States did not
face competition from rival daily publications. See Nixon, Who Will Own the Press in 1975?, 32
JOURNALISM Q. 10, 13 (1955), cited in F. THAYER, LEGAL CONTROL OF THE PRESS § 22, at 130
(4th ed. 1962). The Supreme Court has recognized the FCC's legitimate concern in limiting this
concentration of power in the broadcast media. See FCC v. National Citizens Comm. for Broad-
casting, 436 U.S. 775, 799 (1978).
188. Cf. F. THAYER, supra note 187, at 128:
When large metropolitan newspapers are valued at figures running into millions of
dollars and when even a nonmetropolitan daily in a city of less than 25,000 population
may represent a valuation of $350,000 to $1,250,000, it is not easy to establish a new
newspaper in such a community or to buy an already established daily.
189. In Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974), the Court acknowl-
edged this restrictive image of the marketplace:
The obvious solution, which was available to dissidents at an earlier time when
entry into publishing was relatively inexpensive, today would be to have additional
newspapers. But the same economic factors which have caused the disappearance of
vast numbers of metropolitan newspapers, have made entry into the marketplace of
ideas served by the print media almost impossible.
Id at 251 (footnote omitted).
190. Television exercises this power to shape thought to a greater extent than does the print
media because of marked differences in the audiences of the two media forms. First, those who
often read tend to be more educated than those who do not. This is true not only for patrons of
books and relatively sophisticated periodicals, but also for readers of pictorial and general interest
magazines. Yet, those with less education tend to watch more television news. Robinson, Amerl-
can Political Legitimacy in an Era ofElectronic Journalism: Reflections on the Evening News, in
TELEVISION AS A SOCIAL FORCE: NEW APPROACHES TO TELEVISION CRITICISM 105, 107
(D. Cater & R. Adler eds. 1975). Second, television viewers do not tend to supplement one me-
dium with another. Generally, the more time readers spend with newspapers, the more time they
will spend with magazines and books. Television viewers, however, tend to use other media less
as they watch television more. Id at 108-09. In other words, public reliance on the print media
has been mitigated by the readers' education and their exposure to a variety of published informa-
tion. Because these factors do not affect television viewers, as television becomes more dominant
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thus determine which persons, facts, and ideas shall reach the public. 191
Accordingly, those facts, ideas, and perspectives most likely to gain me-
dia access and, consequently, large scale public exposure, are those ap-
pealing to the self-interest of those individuals and groups who own
and manage the media, to the mass audience whose patronage provides
the economic and political basis for advertising, 192 and to economic
organizations whose commercial payments directly provide funds for
the media.193 Because all these groups tend to embrace established val-
ues and traditional perspectives, 194 media managers are unlikely to dis-
seminate frequently those ideas most challenging to conventional
wisdom and the established power structure. 95 The granting of media
access accordingly is fraught with status quo biases.
in supplying the public with news and information, the diversity and wealth of the marketplace
decreases precipitously.
191. In 1969, then Vice-President Spiro Agnew announced that "the American people should
be made aware of the trend toward the monopolization of the great public information vehicles
and the concentration of more and more power [over public opinion] in fewer and fewer hands."
N.Y. Times, Nov. 21, 1969, at 22, col. 2-3. Ironically, given Agnew's conservative political affilia-
tion, the "New Left" was making the same argument when it insisted that the system of freedom
of expression favored the status quo, particularly through establishment control of the mass me-
dia. Cf. T. EMERSON, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note I, at 726 (noting several New Left
lines of attack upon freedom of expression). See generally Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in
R. WOLFF, B. MOORE & H. MARCUSE, A CRITIQUE OF PURE TOLERANCE 81 passim (1965).
192. Television, for example, with its overt commercial interest in pursuing the largest audi-
ence, is inevitably pressured to shut out ideas displeasing to some and substitute the bland least
common denominators antagonizing to no one. See J. BARRON, supra note 16, at 84. Like other
content restrictions, this television marketing strategy may distort the market and leave the public
with incomplete and perhaps inaccurate perceptions of the social and political universe.
The media's fear of libel suits also causes content restrictions that encourage mediocrity. In
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974), the Supreme Court limited first amendment
protection in many types of defamation suits. The Gertz decision intensified the media's incentive
to confine its coverage to "safe" issues by giving maximum protection only to publishers or broad-
casters whose sense of news does not extend beyond a combination of officialdom and matters
relating to "public figures," that is, persons who already have attracted media attention. Id at
344-47. Reporters that stray farthest from "mainstream issues" accordingly feel the threat of libel
suits most acutely.
193. See MEDIA AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT IN A FREE SOCIETY 79-80 (Georgetown Law
Journal ed. 1972); Baker, supra note 1, at 979-80.
194. Cf Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 187 (1973)
(Brennan, J., dissenting)("in the commercial world of mass communications, it is simply 'bad
business' to espouse-or even to allow others to espouse--the heterodox or the controversial");
Baker, supra note 1, at 980 (media owners, advertisers, and the mass audience all support the
status quo); Canby, The First Amendment Right to Persuade: Access to Radio and Television, 19
UCLA L. REv. 723, 727 (1972)(faimess doctrine tends to encourage "bland mixture of views on
each station"); Jaffe, supra note 186, at 773 n.26 (media editors avoid controversial stands which
would trigger FCC "equal time" requirements).
195. Those groups powerful enough to control the media probably attained that position in
the community only by conforming to the values of the community. The media, therefore, is not
likely to support and articulate criticism of the fundamental beliefs and practices of society. Rob-
ert Wolff, in critiquing American life and politics, observed that "we find a strange mixture of the
greatest tolerance for what we might call established groups and an equally great intolerance for
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Protection against governmental interference with the press, there-
fore, does not guarantee, as it did in the past, that an individual with
something to say will have effective access to an audience. Private in-
terests can thwart the free exchange of ideas allegedly protected by the
first amendment as easily as can the government. 196 In short, even if
the first amendment erected a wall between the government and the
marketplace, the mere existence of mass media controlled largely by
interests committed to established values and traditional perspectives
limits the forums available for challenges to existing power structures,
Furthermore, the media's actual impact on the consuming public
also reinforces rather than challenges traditional notions. Although it
popularly is believed that the media significantly can alter and shape
people's attitudes and behavior, social science research largely dispels
this myth. Such research instead demonstrates that press and broadcast
media are most effective when they reinforce established perspec-
tives. 197 They effectively create new opinions only when the audience
has no conflicting preexisting belief to defend through selective percep-
tion.198 To be successful, however, status quo critics must alter people's
preexisting beliefs. In this endeavor, use of the mass media is least
effective. 199 Thus, even if the problems of unequal access were elimi-
nated, a status quo bias would be promoted by the skewed impact of
the mass media. Because government communications dominate the
marketplace and mass media cannot or will not effectively disseminate
dissident views, challengers to established status quo perspectives are
left only with resort to public forums.
b. Thepublicforum. For over forty years the courts have recog-
nized the public's right to use public forums-streets, parks, and open
places-for meetings, parades, demonstrations, and canvassing.200
the deviant individual." Wolff, Beyond Tolerance, in R. WOLFF, B. MOORE, & H. MARCUSE,
supra note 191, at 3, 37.
196. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)("Freedom of the press from
governmental interference. . . does not sanction repression of that freedom by private interest.");
cf Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501, 509 (1946)(holding that states could not, under the first and
fourteenth amendments, permit "a corporation to govern a community of citizens so as to restrict
their fundamental liberties").
197. See Canby, supra note 194, at 739-41, and authorities cited therein.
198. See Klapper, Communication, Mass: Effects, in 3 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
THE SOCIAL SCIENcEs 81, 82-85 (D. Sills ed. 1968).
199. Professor Baker's discussion of modern social science research supports the conclusion
that the mass media often fails to persuade people to change preexisting beliefs. See Baker, supra
note I, at 979.
200. See Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 515-16 (1939).
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These alternative forums for public communication enable dissenting
or low status individuals and groups to disseminate their views even
when they cannot gain access to mass media. The mass public demon-
stration, for example, conveys an image of power to bystanders and
participants alike, reinforces the group's commitment to its cause, al-
lows participants to register publicly their opinion, and appears to cir-
cumvent the elite's power to control mass communication. 20 1
Furthermore, public demonstrations have a different impact on the au-
dience than.do newspapers or broadcasts. The audience's experience in
a face-to-face encounter is more imposing than when it passively reads
about or listens to a viewpoint. The interchange is more flexible, more
of the senses are engaged, and the audience's response, whether nega-
tive or positive, is likely to be more pronounced. As Professor Emerson
has written, "the public assembly has a dynamic quality achieved by no
other form of communication. '20 2
The Supreme Court, however, consistently has viewed the right to
use a public forum as relative, rather than absolute; the right must be
exercised "in subordination to the general comfort and convenience,
and in consonance with peace and good order."20 3 The mass demon-
stration, as well as effectively disseminating ideas, often has an unset-
tling impact upon a community. Conflicts arise over the use of space
and the rights of nonsympathizers to avoid contact with demonstrators.
The emotional feedback generated by face-to-face contact designed to
evoke or increase support also may build antagonisms and lead to vio-
lence.2°4 Not surprisingly, the Court consistently has held that such
activities as the use of loud sound trucks, mass demonstrations control-
ling limited space, or parades disrupting traffic flow are subject to regu-
lation. According to the Court, however, only the conduct incidental to
the communication, the "speech-plus," can be regulated; the content of
the communication itself cannot be the target of the regulation.20 5 In
201. Whether mass demonstrations in fact accomplish this result is arguable. See infra text
accompanying notes 205-27, 394-96.
202. See T. EMERSON, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 1, at 286.
203. Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 516 (1939).
204. "Freedom of expression implies controversy," insists Professor Emerson,
and in [the public demonstration] the controversy takes place in the public arena. It
often involves large masses of people, hostile forces opposing each other face to face,
high emotions, and unforeseeable consequences. Street meetings, demonstrations, and
other public assemblies are not always guided by the canons of middle-class politeness;
they may be rough, aggressive and turbulent.
T. EMERSON, FREEDOM 6F EXPREsSION, supra note 1, at 288.
205. Justice Goldberg, writing for the majority in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965), em-
phatically rejected the notion "that the First and Fourteenth Amendments afford the same kind of
freedom to those who would communicate ideas by conduct such as patrolling, marching or pick-
eting on streets and highways, as these amendments afford to those who communicate ideas by
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general, the state may place reasonable time, place, or manner restric-
tions on speech in a public forUm, 20 6 but officials must implement these
regulations without regard to the content of the speech.20 7 The Court
has justified such restrictions because they allegedly are content neu-
tral. In effect, however, they are not.
The Court's distinction between fully protected "pure speech" and
"speech-plus," which is subject to reasonable regulation, significantly
affects the type of ideas conveyed, the nature of the speaker, and the
intensity with which views may be communicated. For example, be-
cause dissidents and the economically disadvantaged rely more heavily
than do status quo supporters on street demonstrations for public ex-
pression of their views, regulation of such demonstrations, although
facially content neutral, restricts the public's access to views challeng-
ing the status quo.20 8 Therefore, the regulation of public forums fur-
ther biases the marketplace in favor of establishment views by
restricting the primary method dissidents use to communicate their
criticisms. 209
The recent case of Hefron v. International Societyfor Krishna Con-
sciousnes 210 exemplifies the disparate impact of time, place, and man-
ner restrictions on nonestablishment groups. In Heifron the Supreme
Court upheld a state's restriction of the distribution and sale of litera-
ture, and the solicitation of donations at a Minnesota state fair to as-
pure speech." I at 555;seealso Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39,48 (1966)(rejecting the premise
that "people who want to propagandize protests or views have a constitutional right to do so
whenever and however and wherever they please").
206. Not all places are public forums. No matter how convenient, symbolically significant, or
necessary for effective communication a place may be, it may not be a public forum if it is pri-
vately owned and used for purposes other than public debate and discussion, e.g., Hudgens v.
NLRB, 424 U.S. 507, 519-20 (1976), if it is publicly owned but not dedicated to public discussion,
ag., Greer v. Spock, 424 U.S. 828, 838 (1976); Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 47, (1966), or if,
while dedicated to discussion, it is limited to a certain method of communication, e.g., United
States Postal Serv. v. Greenburgh Civic Ass'ns, 453 U.S. 114, 128-29 (1981)(access to mailboxes
may be limited to communications that have traveled through the federal mails). But see Grayned
v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 118-21 (1972)(public school grounds); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S.
131, 142-43 (1966)(plurality opinion dictum)(branch public library). For a discussion of whether
government can limit public debate merely by restricting certain areas and thus determining that
they are not public forums, see infra text accompanying notes 215-19.
207. See United States v. Grace, 103 S. Ct. 1703, 1707 (1983); Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local
Educators' Assn., 103 S. Ct. 948, 955 (1983); Heffron v. International Soe'y for Krishna Conscious-
ness, 452 U.S. 640, 648 (1981).
208. Critics of the Vietnam War, for instance, depended much more on mass rallies to convey
their perspective than did the war's supporters; the supporters included many public officials who
had ample access to the mass media.
209. For example, restricting the use of sound trucks in residential areas because of noise or in
commercial districts because of obstruction may mean that those living and working in these areas
will never hear the dissident's message.
210. 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
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signed booths within the fairgrounds. The fair sponsor rented space to
all applicants on a first-come, first-served basis.21' The rule applied
equally to nonprofit, religious, charitable, and commercial enterprises.
The Court found the regulation justified as a means of maintaining
orderly crowd movement.212
Although the regulation was content neutral on its face, it effec-
tively limited dissemination of ideas to those that fairgoers affirma-
tively sought by approaching a booth. Fairgoers, however, are much
more likely to seek information from dominant and established groups
about which they are knowledgable and with which they identify.213
Such groups tend to confirm rather than challenge the fairgoers' per-
spectives. Consequently, the marketplace of ideas at the fairground
was structured to reduce the impact of dissenting views and increase
the market force of dominant status quo perspectives.21 4
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has suggested that the equal ac-
cess doctrine eliminates any marketplace bias in the public forum: 21 5
211. The fair's sponsor charged a rental fee based on the size and location of the booth. Id at
644. The propriety of the fee was not argued before the Court, but such a fee could lead to the
physical segregation of poor groups at less frequented fairground locations.
212. Id at 654.
213. The Court has acknowledged implicitly that it is unlikely that individuals will affirma-
tively seek out views that question those they already hold. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indep.
Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)("Freedom of expression would not truly exist if
the right could be exercised only in an area that a benevolent government has provided as a safe
haven for crackpots.").
214. Dissenting in Adderley v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966), Justice Douglas argued that
[t]hose who do not control television and radio, those who cannot afford to advertise in
newspapers or circulate elaborate pamphlets may have only a more limited type of ac-
cess to public officials. Their methods should not be condemned as tactics of obstruction
and harassment as long as [they] are peaceable.
Id at 50-51 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
In spite of Justice Douglas's advice and the disproportionate impact of the Minnesota regula-
tion upon groups and views deviating from the norm, the Hefron Court refused to compel the
state to consider other less restrictive means to protect the flow of fairgoer movement, such as
penalizing disorderly or disruptive conduct, limiting the number of solicitors, or placing more
narrowly drawn restrictions on the location or movement of the representatives of various groups.
The Court was willing to accept, untested, the assumption that the proposed alternatives would be
less effective. See Heifron, 452 U.S. at 654. In addition, the Court was not concerned that certain
communication would be less effective under the state regulation. 1d at 654-55. Apparently the
Court viewed any legitimate state interest as a higher priority than the communicative interests of
the Krishnas and other such groups.
215. Although a total ban on channels of communication involving "speech-plus" would
clearly have a content specific impact, the case law is ambiguous as to whether such a total ban
would be valid or whether the Constitution mandates some "minimum access" to the marketplace.
An "equal access" approach does not require courts to compel communities to dedicate any par-
ticular space to public discourse and assume all the attendant dangers and costs. A "minimum
access" theory would require such judicial action. "Equal access" merely accepts the decisions of
the community as to the time, place, and manner of public discourse to be allowed and applies
those decisions even-handedly to unpopular as well as popular groups and viewpoints. The many
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once a public forum is open for one viewpoint or subject, opposing
views and alternative subjects must be granted equal access for compa-
rable uses.216 Given the professed purposes and importance of the first
amendment, the Court's focus on "equal access" should be a matter of
some concern. If the Court emphasizes the equal access doctrine, it
may invite government to "equalize" access by totally banning the use
of specific forums to all speakers rather than by lifting the restrictions
from some.217 Indeed, a total ban on a specific public forum is conceiv-
able if the forum is not essential to dissemination of established view-
points and the increased cost of alternative communication for such
viewpoints is outweighed, in the minds of their supporters, by the dam-
age done to dissidents who cannot easily afford or gain access to other
communication channels. Consequently, although the equal access
doctrine superficially protects against marketplace bias in public fo-
rums, the doctrine could restrict a dissident's access to the public and,
thereby, further bias the entire marketplace in favor of the establish-
ment. Thus, rather than preventing marketplace bias, equal access to
public forums only dispels the appearance of a skewed and manipu-
lated marketplace. As demonstrated above,21 8 however, government
regulations need not discriminate overtly against specific viewpoints to
assure that those having meaningful access to the marketplace of ideas
will espouse traditional values.219 Consequently, the Court's reliance
on the equal access doctrine to preserve self-government, "truth" dis-
covering, and individual development, simply is misplaced.
c. Symbolic conduct. Individuals or groups lacking access to the
print and the electronic media may attempt to gain media attention by
staging a "media event." If a large group holds a mass demonstration
it may gain media coverage. Unfortunately, many individuals with
public forum decisions that focus on vagueness and overbreadth, e.g., Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S.
455,470-71 (1980); Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 425 U.S. 610, 620 (1976); Lovell v. City of Griffin,
303 U.S. 444, 451-52 (1938), suggest an "equal access" theory. These decisions concentrate on
governmental discretion and censorship in distributing access rather than on problems of lack of
access.
216. Some authors have assumed that equal access would unite the interests of the politically
powerful with those of minority or dissident groups and thus significantly protect all viewpoints
from interference. Dean John Hart Ely has characterized this approach as one of "virtual repre-
sentation." J. ELY, supra note 147, at 84; see Kalven, supra note 185, at 30; see also Emerson,
supra note 75, at 802-03 (discussion of equal protection). See generally Karst, supra note 9, at 20
(discussion of equal access through equal protection).
217. See Blasi, Prior Restraints on Demonstrations, 68 MICH. L. REv. 1481, 1492-97 (1970); cf.
Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 226 (197 1)(closure of public swimming pools after desegrega-
tion order not violation of equal protection).
218. See supra notes 186-217 and accompanying text.
219. See supra text accompanying notes 132-5 1.
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views they wish to share simply cannot organize a mass demonstration.
A speaker can broaden support for his views through a mass demon-
stration only if a large number of persons already share his opinions.
Without prior and meaningful access to the marketplace, however,
such a following is difficult to obtain.
Individuals with perspectives not popular enough to support a
mass demonstration may still gain media attention through symbolic
acts. For example, during the Vietnam War many young men ex-
pressed their objection to the war effort and the draft by burning their
draft cards in violation of federal laws.220 They argued that their dra-
matic behavior was necessary to compensate for lack of media access.
These young men insisted, therefore, that their acts were communica-
tions221 protected by the first amendment.222
When the Supreme Court confronted the issue in United States v.
O'Brien,223 however, Chief Justice Warren rejected the view "that an
apparently limitless variety of conduct can be labeled 'speech' when-
ever the person engaging in the conduct intends thereby to express an
idea. '224 Instead, Warren insisted that when "speech" and "non-
speech" elements are combined in a single course of conduct, "a suffi-
ciently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech
220. For an account of the draft-card burnings and the background of the federal laws passed
in 1965 outlawing them, see Alfange, Free Speech and Symbolic Conduct: The Draft-Card Burning
Case, 1968 Sup. CT. REV. 1. The relevant provisions of the Selective Service Act, which have not
been substantially amended since 1965, are in 50 U.S.C. app. § 462(b)(3) (1976)(penalizing any
person "who... knowingly destroys, knowingly mutilates, or in any manner changes any such
certificate"); the corresponding Selective Service regulations are in 32 C.F.L §§ 1617.1, 1623.5
(1967)(current relevant regulations, which do not provide for issuance of certificates to registrants,
codified at 32 C.F.R. §§ 1615.1-.9, 1621.1-.2 (1983)).
221. Both the Court and some court critics have tried at times to draw a line between protected
speech and unprotected conduct. See, e.g., United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 376 (1968);
T. EMERSON, FREEDOM OF ExPRESSSlON, supra note 1, at 9. As Professor Tribe has argued, how-
ever, the difficulty with the distinction is that it does not exist:
All communication except perhaps that of the extrasensory variety involves conduct.
Moreover, if the expression involves talk, it may be noisy; if written, it may become litter.
So too, much conduct is expressive.. . . Expression and conduct, message and me-
dium, are thus inextricably tied together in all communicative behavior, expressive be-
havior is "100% action and 100% expression."
L. TRIBE, supra note 13, § 12-7, at 599-600 (footnotes omitted).
222. Peter Kiger, for example, burned his draft card and then pleaded a first amendment de-
fense to the court. Kiger contended that his act was newsworthy only because it was a criminal
act. United States v. Kiger, 297 F. Supp. 339 (S.D.N.Y. 1969), aft'd, 421 F.2d 1396 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970); see J. BARRON, supra note 16, at 120-22. Kiger argued that television
newsworthiness is determined by potential dramatic impact. See id. In Kiger's case, WCBS-TV
gave him instant access to the airwaves for burning his card, access which was not otherwise
available because CBS had refused to sell spot advertisements for social or political opinions. Id
at 121.
223. 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
224. Id at 376.
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element can justify incidental limitations on First Amendment free-
doms." 225 The Court then upheld the anti-draft-card-burning legisla-
tion, finding that it furthered many of the goals and purposes of the
selective service system.226
Under the O'Brien Court's analysis of symbolic conduct, as long as
the government does not directly suppress the "communicative ele-
ment," it may prohibit or control all other aspects of such "expres-
sion. '227 But, if the protesting individual has no meaningful method of
communication other than the prohibited symbolic conduct, his view
effectively is silenced while the government's apparent neutrality is per-
petuated. Consequently, the legal doctrine surrounding "symbolic con-
duct," like the legal doctrine supporting "speech-plus," scarcely is
neutral in the contest between stability and change. Furthermore,
when these doctrines are coupled with dissidents' restricted access to
mass media and the regulation of public forums, it becomes evident
that the first amendment does not give a public voice to those advocat-
ing unpopular positions.
d. Dissidence and unconventionality. Dominant viewpoints of
established groups need little protection given our constitutional
scheme. Electoral accountability ensures that almost all persons who
regularly disassociate themselves or interfere with expression of these
dominant views cannot obtain or hold public office. The disadvan-
taged outsiders who lack the power or stature necessary to gain polit-
225. Id at 376-77.
226. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 376-77. Justice Harlan, concurring separately, stressed that O'Brien
did not show that alternative, equally effective, ways of expressing his message were unavailable.
Id at 389 (Harlan, J., concurring). Given this society's alleged commitment to the marketplace of
ideas, one wonders why Justice Harlan did not place the burden on the state to show that O'Brien
had realistic alternatives. Furthermore, the Court's decision did not even compel the state to
demonstrate the lack of a less restrictive means of fulfilling its stated purposes. At most, the state
showed that the "communicative element" of O'Brien's conduct had not been gratuitously inhib-
ited. See Ely, supra note 62, at 1484-85 ("gratuitous inhibition" is the term Dean Ely adopted to
express the Court's requirement that the restriction must further a legitimate governmental
interest).
227. In O'Brien, the Court created a four-part test to determine whether government regula-
tion of symbolic speech was justified:
[1] ifit is within the constitutional power of government; [2] if it furthers an important or
substantial government interest; [3] if the government interest is unrelated to the suppres-
sion of free expression; and [4] if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment
freedoms is no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. If the government interest Lr related to the communicative content of the
conduct, Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969), and not O'Brien, is the controlling decision.
E.., Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 510, 511 (1969)(school
authorities may not forbid students from wearing black armbands symbolizing opposition to the
Vietnam War while allowing the wearing of other symbols of political or controversial signifi-
cance). For a comparison of O'Brien and Tinker, see generally Ely, supra note 62, at 1491.
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ical influence through conventional methods of organization and
communication also are those who typically test the limits of free ex-
pression. The first amendment protections are most crucial to such
outsiders.22
Yet an anomaly exists in our system of free expression. Although
the rhetoric surrounding the first amendment purports to protect all
expression,229 our laws are, at best, essentially indifferent to creating
opportunities for expression.230 Telling an unpopular speaker that he
will incur no criminal penalty for his expression is of little value if he
has no effective means of disseminating his views. A right that cannot
be meaningfully exercised is, after all, no right at all. 231 Because our
marketplace has severely restricted those inputs most challenging to the
status quo, 232 the resulting outputs similarly are skewed to favor estab-
lished views.
Because dissidents' access to the public is effectively constrained
through both legal doctrines and private control of mass communica-
tion, dissident groups that wish to question the fundamental beliefs and
practices of society must often use unconventional means and terms to
228. Yet, the courts "have certainly not decided to shape and use the law to protect those
weaker groups and weaker critics who cannot rely on wealth or power over public opinion as their
safeguard." Riesman, Democracy and Defamalion" Fair Game and Fair Comment II, 42 COLUM.
L. REv. 1282, 1310-11 (1942).
229. But see supra notes 25-53 and accompanying text (discussion of communications outside
first amendment such as obscenity). The rhetoric rarely acknowledges the exception for obscenity,
which is perceived by the Court as being outside the ambit of the first amendment. See Roth v.
United States, 354 U.S. 476, 485 (1957).
230. Consequently, Herbert Marcuse could argue that,
with the concentration of economic and political power and the integration of opposites
[e.g., government and press] in a society which uses technology as an instrument of dom-
ination, effective dissent is blocked where it could freely emerge: in the formation of
opinion, in information and communication .... Under the rule of monopolistic me-
dia-themselves the mere instruments of economic and political power--a mentality is
created for which right and wrong, true and false are predefined wherever they affect the
vital interests of the society.
Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in R. WOLFF, B. MooRE, & H. MARCUSE, supra note 191, at 95.
231. This perspective has been accepted by the Supreme Court in other areas of law. For
example, the Court has sought to guarantee that all classes of citizens may exercise their right to
counsel. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344-45 (1963)(sixth amendment requires
states to provide indigent felony defendants competent legal counsel). Justice Harlan warned that
decisions of this nature tend "to read into the Constitution a philosophy of leveling that would be
foreign to many of our basic concepts of the proper relation between government and society."
Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353, 362 (1963)(Harlan, J., dissenting). In a society fearful of this
sort of leveling, however, the rights of the poor may be theoretical at best. Cf. Deutsch, supra note
149, at 190 n.78 (discussing whether or not constitutional right to attend private schools depends in
practical sense on ability to bear such financial burden).
232. See Z. CHAFEE, FREE SPEECH IN THE UNITED STATES 559 (1941). Any attempt to bypass
the media and enter the market through mass demonstrations, soundtrucks, and the like faces
increased governmental control through regulation of "speech-plus" and "symbolic conduct." See
supra notes 200-27 and accompanying text.
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reach the public's awareness. It is therefore easier to understand, if no
easier to sympathize with, those who must resort to disruptive, even
violent, conduct to make their grievance known in the marketplace.
Such has been the history of all major social and political movements
in this country.233 Yet, the public must evaluate the content of the dis-
sident's message while remaining impervious to any associated disrup-
tive conduct if the market is to remain rational.
As noted above,2 34 the public's ability to separate a message's
packaging from its substance is, at best, doubtful. The public tends to
focus more on the dissenting message's packaging than on its content
precisely because of the dissident's unconventional personality, method
of communication, and terminology. In fact, the public hostility and
anxiety created by unconventional and disruptive presentations com-
pound the difficulty the audience has in understanding, or even per-
ceiving, the intended message. In contrast, orthodox positions
generally are heard from respected "responsible" individuals in "re-
sponsible" contexts, thereby increasing their acceptability to the public.
In order to gain acceptance by the public, the dissident must thus over-
come both a socialization system that predisposes the public against
unconventional perspectives, as well as a negative response to his
message's packaging. The marketplace is, therefore, skewed to afford
status quo views greater opportunity for public exposure and accept-
ance. It is hardly likely that the public will give dissident views a "ra-
tional" evaluation in this marketplace.
C. The Marketplace as a Sef-Fulfilling Prophecy.
The marketplace of ideas is more myth than reality.235 In practice,
communications flowing into the market largely reflect conventional
political, economic, and social points of view. Many would-be speak-
ers gain only severely restricted access to the market, and diversity of
perspective is largely nonexistent. In reality, the marketplace is hardly
the laissez-faire type of free market the model suggests. Some critics,
explaining its continuing viability, have noted that the marketplace
functions as a self-fulfilling prophecy.236
233. For example, recall the "Black Revolution" of the 1960's and the Boston Tea Party.
234. See supra notes 169-227 and accompanying text.
235. The myth that the marketplace is open to ideas of social criticism and change has sup-
plied the courts with a justification to approve the outlawing of behavior perceived as dangerous
to norms and values embraced by dominant groups. See, e.g., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S.
494, 501 (195 1)("Whatever theoretical merit there may be to the argument that there is a 'right' to
rebellion against dictatorial governments is without force where the existing structure of govern-
ment provides for peaceful and orderly change.").
236. Baker, supra note 1, at 980.
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Despite the aforementioned flaws, to those who accept traditional
values and conventional wisdom the market seems to be functioning
successfully. Because dominant groups espousing established perspec-
tives have relatively complete access to the market and find their views
largely adopted by the public, they, unlike dissidents, do not perceive
marketplace outcomes as predetermined, or as strongly influenced by
socialization, access, or packaging. Because the perspectives that domi-
nant groups think "best" are quite likely adopted, to those who adhere
to dominant beliefs the marketplace does seem to reach the best result.
Therefore, the marketplace model provides a dominant group with a
basis for its self-serving belief that the dominance of its perspectives is
justified.237 This byproduct of the market model might in turn explain
the marketplace theory's persistence despite its serious and obvious
malfunctions.
Dissidents, who have experienced only restricted access to the
marketplace, and little if any success in it, will of course not see the
market process as arriving at the best perspectives. Marketplace theory
is, in the minds of some dissidents, nothing but an ideological construct
designed to deflate protest and delude the populace into believing that
it, rather than an elite, controls its destiny.238 Such dissidents perceive
stronger and more strident expressions or actions as necessary to over-
come these market failures. Consequently, neither holders of dominant
views nor dissidents need feel pressured to alter their views in light of
market outcomes.
Although some dissidents believe the marketplace inevitably is bi-
ased and thus should be rejected, others who believe that free expres-
sion preserves individuality continue to support marketplace
imagery.239 This latter group stresses the need for marketplace reform,
to assure equal access to all.24° Such cries for reform are, however, not
limited to those uttered by dissidents.
III. REFORMING THE MARKET
To correct the imbalance in perspective that the marketplace offers
to the public and to aid the effective advocacy of dissident, underprivi-
leged, and unorganized groups or interests,241 Professor Jerome Barron,
almost two decades ago, argued for a first amendment right of
237. Id
238. This was the view of Marcuse. See supra note 230 (quoting Marcuse).
239. See, ag., Baker, supra note 1, at 980-81.
240. See, e.g., id
241. According to one critic, "enormous freedom exists for the press, but [due to unequal
access], not for the readership." Solzhenitsyn, supra note 99, at 23.
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access.242 He questioned the worth of a right to speak if, because of the
unpopularity of the message or the poverty of the speaker, no viable
forum existed. This argument is reminiscent of Meildejohn's assertion
twenty years earlier that by the words of the first amendment, "Con-
gress is not debarred from all action upon freedom of speech. Legisla-
tion which abridges that freedom is forbidden, but not legislation to
enlarge and enrich it."243 Thus, a first amendment tightrope becomes
apparent: government intrusion into the marketplace may lead to un-
acceptable governmental control and media censorship,244 yet govern-
mental refusal to regulate the media may permit those with political
and economic influence to maintain private control of the major chan-
nels of communication. Either outcome defeats free expression as envi-
sioned by the marketplace model of the first -amendment. Despite the
danger of government censorship, however, the Supreme Court has en-
couraged presentation of, and has at times approved of, market reform
proposals.245
A. Reform Proposals.
By creating various access rights, reformers hope to give dissenting
individuals or groups effective opportunities to communicate with large
audiences. Reformers rely upon these access rights to overcome dispar-
ities in speakers' capitalization, communicative and marketing skills,
perceptivity, popular acceptance, organizational skills, continuing com-
mitment, stature, hard work, charisma, luck, and all other factors
which traditionally determine a speaker's effectiveness in communicat-
ing with his audience. Yet such reliance seems unfounded; indeed,
these reforms create significant problems of their own.
All reform proposals attempt to ensure either "adequate" or
"equal" access. 246 Adequate access does not mean that everyone must
242. Barron, supra note 73, at 1678.
243. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 19 (1960); see also COMMISSION ON FREEDOM OF
THE PRESS, A FREE AND RESPONSIBLE PRESS 127 (1947)(adopting a similar view). The Supreme
Court, however, has struck down some statutes ostensibly designed to enrich the flow of ideas.
See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 790-92 & n.30 (1977); Buckley v. Valeo, 424
U.S. 1, 48-49 (1975).
244. For a discussion of the dangers of entrusting government with power to regulate media
access, see infra text accompanying notes 269-75.
245. See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1975)("It is the right of view-
ers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount."); see also CBS, Inc. v.
FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 394-95 (1981). But see Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l
Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 126-30 (1973).
246. See generally B. SCHMIDT, FREEDOM OF THE PRESS VS. PUBLIC ACCESS 18-22 (1976)
(discussing purposes of access requirements). Some reformers have suggested that vigorous en-
forcement of antitrust laws would dismantle monopolistic control of mass communications. See,
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be given a voice or that all perspectives must be granted equal time. It
demands only that all viewpoints receive enough access to the public to
allow members of society rationally to evaluate each viewpoint's truth
and value.247 Consequently, where "adequate," "fair," or "reasonable"
access has been granted, further access is not required.248
For adequate access reform proposals to succeed in correcting the
market, however, the public must be able to separate the form and style
of a message from its substance. Unless the public can rationally eval-
uate a communication's content irrespective of its packaging, adequate
access provides only the appearance, rather than the reality, of an op-
portunity to gain a foothold in the marketplace of ideas. Unfortu-
nately, the public's ability to make these necessary distinctions is, at
best, doubtful.249
Adequate access reform proposals also require objective criteria
for determining whether access has been adequate, criteria that are dif-
ficult if not impossible to develop. 250 To know whether a perspective
has received adequate access, a decisionmaker must consider the con-
text, form, and content of the proposed and competing perspectives, as
well as the accessibility, socialization, interests, and experiences of the
audience. These considerations do not lend themselves readily to stan-
dardized judgments; thus, decisionmakers usually must rely on their
own subjective judgment. 251 This of course opens the door for market
failures of a different kind.
e.g., B. OWEN, ECONOMICS AND FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 184-86 (1975). The Court itself sug-
gested this method of reform in Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945)("Surely a
command that the government itself shall not impede the free flow of ideas does not afford non-
governmental combinations a refuge if they impose restraints upon that constitutionally guaran-
teed freedom."). Even if such proposals successfully diversified ownership, however, the prohibi-
tive cost of purchasing or beginning a newspaper or broadcasting station would still limit media
ownership to the wealthy who, like their predecessors or competitors, are likely to choose only
acceptable viewpoints for widespread dissemination. See supra note 195; supra text accompany-
ing notes 186-99.
247. See Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 122 (1973); A.
MEIKLFJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 26 (1960); Emerson, supra note 75, at 818.
248. If the Constitution only requires that each view receive adequate access, the government
could permissibly restrain the speech of individuals wanting to further support a position that
someone has already expressed in the marketplace. But see Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 39-51
(1976)(disallowing restraint of speakers even though their perspective may have already been ex-
pressed in the marketplace by others); Baker, supra note 1, at 982-83 & n.65.
249. See supra text accompanying notes 153-233.
250. Meiklejohn, for example, stressed that under the first amendment "[wihat is essential is
not that everyone shall speak, but that everything worth saying shall be said." A. MEIKLEJOHN,
POLITICAL FREEDOM 26 (1960). Meiklejolm did not specify, however, how to determine what
speech is "worth saying."
251. The practical functioning of adequate access proposals reminds one of the capriciousness
with which Humpty Dumpty attached meanings to words, see L. CARROLL, THROUGH THE LOOK-
ING GLASS 94 (spec. ed. 1946), for one does not have any idea whether access is sufficient until the
government so determines. See The Handling of Public Issues under the Fairness Doctrine and
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When government officials evaluate adequate access, arbitrary
judgments are especially likely.252 A speaker may fail to win acclaim
for his idea in the marketplace either because of inadequate access or
because the public rejected the merits of his argument. Consequently,
before the government can determine whether access has been ade-
quate, first it must decide implicitly the proper outcome of the market-
place debate.253 If the citizenry rejects a perspective which government
officials believe is "true" or "best," the officials might well account for
the public rejection as due to inadequate market access. On the other
hand, if a dissident group, with which government officials disagree,
claims its viewpoint has not succeeded in the marketplace because of
inadequate access, government officials are likely to assert that access
was adequate and that the dissident viewpoint simply failed to per-
suade its audience.254 If the first amendment requires that unpopular
ideas be given an opportunity to defeat established dogma, government
the Public Interests Standards of the Communications Act, 58 F.C.C.2d 691,707 (1976)(memoran-
dum opinion and order on reconsideration of the fairness report)(Robinson, Comm'r, dissenting).
For a description of the fairness doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 277-80.
Lack of objective standards leads to further difficulties. A debate participant who loses the
debate usually believes his perspective failed, not because of its lack of "rightness," but rather
because of a malfunctioning market. The losing participant may therefore feel justified in using
unconventional, disruptive methods to correct these market malfunctions. Such methods, how-
ever, might well further alienate his prospective audience. See supra text accompanying notes
232-33.
252. If the decision rests with an executive agency, there is always the risk that the doctrine
will be used to censor and ultimately restrict the number, scope, and diversity of viewpoints gain-
ing exposure. See Note, AdvocacyAdverising: A Question of Fairness and the Reasonable Agency,
27 CAT-. U.L. REV. 785, 802 (1978). See generally Note, The Fairness Doctrine and Access to
Repiy to Product Commercials, 51 IND. L.J. 756 (1976)(arguing that FCC may not insulate product
advertising from fairness obligations); Note, Fairness and Unfairness in Television Product Advertis-
ing, 76 MIcH. L. REv. 498 (1978)(examining effect of television product advertising upon viewers
and investigating statutory basis of possible FCC intervention). Judicial oversight is available to
prevent such censorship, of course, but judicial line-drawing can itself become a facade for gov-
ernmental censorship. Many first amendment scholars, not surprisingly, have expressed concern
over discretion arising from unclear boundaries limiting governmental action. See, e.g., T. EMER-
SON, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 1, at 10.
253. Historical experience should foster a hearty skepticism about government officials' ability
to decide what is "adequate" or "fair" political debate. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S.
323, 346 (1974)(rejecting the ability or appropriatenesss of judges deciding on an ad hoc basis
which defamatory publications addressed issues of "general and public interest" and which did
not).
254. Precisely such a governmental attitude may explain the disagreement between O'Brien's
position and Justice Harlan's concurrence in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 388 (1968),
discussed supra note 226. The question whether other "adequate" opportunities for presenting
O'Brien's views existed was central to Justice Harlan's position. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 388-89
(Harlan, J., concurring). O'Brien argued that the very continuation of the war and draft proved
the inadequate access afforded his viewpoint, because his "correct" position would have been
successful in a properly functioning market. Justice Harlan, in turn, presumed adequate access for
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officials should not be allowed to determine the adequacy of access. In
short, adequate access proposals almost inevitably further the status
quo market bias.
Equal access reform proposals attempt to guarantee either all
viewpoints or all individuals "equal" access to the marketplace of
ideas. Reformers who advocate equal access for all viewpoints2 55 be-
lieve that the marketplace can produce a "true" or "best" result, but
reject the assumption that the public can separate a message's packag-
ing from its substance. Consequently, by equalizing access for all view-
points, these reformers seek to neutralize the advantages of "well-
packaged" and frequently offered messages.2 56 In addition to being
based on a naive belief in the existence of a "true" or "best" result,2 57
this reform approach also poses the danger of presenting the public
with more information than it realistically can assimilate. Conse-
quently, rather than guaranteeing all perspectives an opportunity for
success, the equal access for viewpoints approach may only make the
public perceive the marketplace as an arena full of nothing but "noise,"
and thereby decrease the public's willingness to reassess opinions it al-
ready holds.
Reformers advocating equal access for all individuals reject all the
assumptions underlying the classic marketplace model: the existence of
objective truth, the dominance of rationality, and the ability of the pub-
lic to distinguish between a message's form and substance. These re-
formers justify continued support of the marketplace not because the
market produces the "best" results, but rather because it helps to per-
petuate a democratic system of government by allowing all people to
participate equally in public decisionmaking.2 58 The leveling effect of
the equal access for individuals approach seems, however, inconsistent
with the capitalist foundation of our society.25 9
Both forms of equal access, that which focuses on individuals as
well as that which focuses on viewpoints, suffer additional infirmities.
Both define ambiguously what must be equalized. For example,
should a viewpoint indifferently held by a few receive access equal to
O'Brien's perspective did exist and that O'Brien's view merely had insufficient support to change
governmental policy. See Baker, supra note 1, at 987-88.
255. Meiklejohn's use of the town meeting image to symbolize first amendment goals appears
to envision equal access for all viewpoints. See A. MEIKLEOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 26 (1960).
256. Baker, supra note 1, at 983.
257. See supra text accompanying notes 121-5 1.
258. See A. BicKEL, supra note 176, at 62; Baker, supra note 1, at 984; Scanlon, Theory of
Freedom of Expression, supra note 40, at 214.
259. See Baker, supra note 1, at 984.
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that of a perspective passionately held by many?260 If so, scarce re-
sources may be wasted on trivial ideas, 261 and the marketplace may
reflect inaccurately the strength, and possibly the value, of positions
competing for adherents. 262 Furthermore, guaranteeing such equal ac-
cess is virtually impossible without an intricate and extensive leveling
system of public subsidies and spending restrictions. Even if govern-
ment officials could design and properly administer such a system,
there is no guarantee that an opportunity for equal access would create
an opportunity for equal influence.263 Regardless of equal access, val-
ues in which the public have been indoctrinated or socialized will still
prevail, and speakers with stature, influence, and skill will still be more
persuasive than those without.264 Because equal access still allows vari-
ance in the opportunity to influence among differing individuals or
viewpoints, equal opportunity to influence can be attained only
through affirmative action such as by giving the least popular or least
able speaker the most access to the marketplace. 265
260. Cf. Winter, Poverty, Economic Equality, and the Equal Protection Clause, 1972 Sup. CT.
REv. 41, 66-77 (the equality created by making certain goods and services free, or by subsidizing
their use by some individuals, may lead to grossly inefficient use of scarce resources). In a market
where communications are costless or publicly subsidized, individuals or groups with only the
most remote or incidental interest in an issue's outcome would have equal input with those for
whom the issue may be a matter of life and death. One must question whether such inequality of
concern or impact should be irrelevant in allocating communicative opportunities.
The voting-rights cases mandating a one person/one vote requirement suggested that, at least
for elections, the Constitution requires governmental indifference to the intensity with which pub-
lic views are held. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964). In an election situation,
however, voter intensity is accounted for through the voters' ability and willingness to organize
and lobby to influence both election outcomes and the behavior of elected officials. A system of
truly equal market access, however, would need to guarantee equality of all communication, in.
cluding lobbying techniques. Consequently, it is unlikely that equal market access systems could
register differences in the intensity with which public views are held.
261. Consequently, Meiklejohn insisted that the first amendment protects only speech "worth
saying." See supra note 250 (quoting Meiklejohn).
262. See generally Baker, supra note 1, at 989.
263. The Court noted this concern in Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 56-57 (1976).
264. Martin Mayer, criticizing the access reform movement in his popular studyAbout Telepv.
sion, has written that
access to media means nothing at all . ... Access to audience might have some
value.... But access to audience must be earned, with talent. There is something
bittersweet funny about the sight of all these groups of ardent young lawyers and gradu-
ate students and junior executives at foundations, none of whom can write a song anyone
would sing or a book anyone would read or a play anyone would act, none of whom
holds a position which gives his thought significance in the lives of others or could gather
twenty-five people to hear him speak at a meeting--"demanding" access to the great
audience of an entertainment medium.
M. MAYER, ABoUT TELEVISION 388 (1972), quoted in B. SCHMIDT, supra note 246, at 212.
265. Cf. N. PoLsBY, supra note 149, at 135 (discussing Dahl's principle that those with views
outside of the "political consensus" may require enormous resources to achieve their goals).
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This exposes a dilemma of marketplace reform. Earlier I argued
that market outputs will be biased in favor of dominant values because
certain individuals of stature, such as public officials and established
interest group leaders, exercise particular influence when they commu-
nicate.266 Correction of this imbalance would demand greater access to
the marketplace for those lacking such stature. Such a system would
give the greatest access opportunities to those who have no responsibil-
ity or accountability to act in the public interest. The development of
opinion leaders and individual expertise would be discouraged. 267
Those individuals perceived by the public as without wisdom and expe-
rience would receive greater access than those believed to have such
qualities. Thus, overcoming the marked bias in favor of the statured
communicator may create an even more unfortunate result: it may re-
quire us to be confronted most by those who may, in fact, have the least
of significance to say. Equal access reform proposals, therefore, either
prove insufficient to correct marketplace bias, or create problems equal
to those they correct. Additionally, all market reform proposals pose
the danger of unacceptable governmental interference with the market.
B. The Dangers of State Intervention.
Because market reform proposals create the need for government
oversight of the mass media, of the allocation of resource subsidies, and
of the enforcement of expenditure restrictions, all such proposals would
generate significant government interference in the marketplace. The
success of these reform proposals would require intricate and extensive
government regulation. If the principle of equal access were taken seri-
ously, for example, the likely result would be "a complex of redistribu-
tive measures which would make current welfare programs look
extremely modest. ' 268 Thus, such reform measures may put "the head
of the camel inside the tent and enable administration after administra-
tion to toy with [the media] in order to serve its sordid or its benevolent
ends.,,
2 6 9
Constitutional limitations on government ensure the public's free-
dom from arbitrary governmental interference in a restricted number
of areas, which are predominantly political rather than economic. 270
266. See text accompanying note 234.
267. See Baker, supra note 1, at 989.
268. Buchanon,,4utonomy and Categories of Expression" A Reply to Professor Scanlon, 40 U.
Prrr. L. RFv. 551, 557 (1979).
269. Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 154 (1973)(Doug-
las, J., concurring).
270. See Manning, Corporate Power and Individual Freedonr Some GeneralAnalysis and Par-
ticular Reservations, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 38, 46-53 (1960).
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The first amendment has been a primarily negative force preventing
government from prohibiting, harassing, or interfering with speech or
other forms of communication.27' If courts permit reformers to alter
the first amendment's traditional role as a limitation on governmental
authority so as to authorize affirmative government action to apportion
access rights to the marketplace, the judiciary unwittingly may create a
massive censorship system masquerading as marketplace reform.
Indeed, entrusting government with the power to determine media
access creates at least three dangers. First, if government requires me-
dia to bear the cost of providing access for those opposing a viewpoint
that the media have presented, media managers may simply choose not
to present controversial issues.272 Second, such a process might invite
manipulation of the media by the very governmental bureaucrats ap-
pointed to ensure access. 273 Finally, governmental interference may es-
calate from access regulation to more dubious types of governmental
control. For example, giving government administrators discretion in
access decisions risks the use of administrative machinery to force the
271. Professor Thomas Emerson attempted to list the possible ramifications of a system of
governmental censorship. He studied the contexts in which governments have invoked censorship
and the actions of the responsible agencies. Emerson found that:
(1) There was a consistent tendency to overestimate the need for restriction upon
freedom of expression....
(2) The forces generated in the administration of limitations on freedom of expres-
sion tended to push application of the measures to extremes ...
(3) The difficulties in framing definite and precise limitations were not solved ...
(4) . . . [A]dministration of the limitations resulted in the creation of an enforce-
ment apparatus which embodies practices most obnoxious to a free society ...
(5) In practice the restrictions were employed to achieve objectives quite different
from the theoretical purposes of the law ...
(6) The social gains attributable to the restrictions proved to be minimal ...
(7) On the other hand, the social losses were heavy. The impact of the restrictions
was felt not only by those convicted, but by many who were merely prosecuted and by
countless others who could not accurately judge the boundaries imposed on freedom or
those who were fearful to take the risk.
T. EMERSON, FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 1, at 23-24. Many similar ramifications are likely to
result from governmental programs and agencies responsible for marketplace "reform."
272. For example, television networks have rejected requests for the purchase of noncommer-
cial advertisements (advertisements pertaining to issues not directly related to promoting the sale
of a product or service) by claiming such advertisements would trigger the FCC's fairness doc-
trine. See Lee, The Problems of "Reasonable Access" to Broadcastingfor Noncommercial Expres-
sion: Content Discrimination, Appellate Review, and Separation of Commercial and Noncommercial
Expression, 34 U. FLA. L. REv. 348, 352 (1982). For a discussion and evaluation of the fairness
doctrine, see infra text accompanying notes 277-314.
273. Even Newton Minow, former Chairman of the FCC, has acknowledged that groups can
and have harassed stations by convincing scores of individuals who have been criticized on the air
to request reply time under the fairness doctrine: "Inevitably, stations react by trying to avoid
such critical programs." Minow, Foreword to S. SIMMONS, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE AND THE
MEDIA at XI (1978). Walter Cronkite of CBS News has testified that "[i]t is only natural that
station management should become timid, and newsmen should sidestep controversial subjects
rather than face the annoyance of such harassment." See id
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media to conform to official positions. Such governmental supervision
thus could undermine the media's role as government critic and antag-
onist.274 Therefore, rather than guaranteeing a voice for dissenters, ac-
cess reforms may well protect government from having to confront a
potent media adversary.2 75
As the foregoing analysis reveals, market reform proposals either
continue the status quo bias of the marketplace or create new and po-
tentially dangerous problems. A review of two governmental attempts
at market revision,276 the Federal Communications Commission's
(FCC) fairness doctrine and the Federal Election Campaign Acts
(FECA), demonstrate that experience has confirmed this conclusion.
1. The Fairness Doctrine. Since the 1940's the FCC has placed
a "fairness" duty upon radio and television broadcasters. 77 Broadcast-
ers must provide time, free of charge if necessary,278 for the coverage of
274. See Z. CHAFEE, GOVERNMENT AND MASS COMMUNICATION 476-77 (1947).
275. Nevertheless, corporations that engage in the media business and government may have
more areas of common agreement than disagreement. See infra part IV and text accompanying
notes 352-63.
276. Although courts have upheld legislative attempts at market reform, the government has
never been affirmatively compelled by the courts to protect or enhance anyone's market opportu-
nities. The Supreme Court has refused to create a constitutionally mandated access right, see
Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 127 (1973), or a right to
know, see Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 9 (1978). But cf. Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v.
Virginia, 448 U.S. 555 (1980)(absent some overriding circumstance, the first amendment guaran-
tees the public and the press the right to attend criminal trials, despite unopposed request of
defendant for closed trial).
277. See Barrow, The Equal Opportunities and Fairness Doctrine in Broadcasting Pillars in the
Forum of Democracy, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 447, 462 (1968). For a concise, layman's explanation of
the fairness doctrine, see A. SHAPIRO, MEDIA ACCESS 107-217, 247-54 (1976). For an early history
of the doctrine and its original purpose, see Simmons, Fairness Doctrine: The Early History, 29
FED. COM. B.J. 207 (1976). Key fairness doctrine documents include: Broadcast Procedure Man-
ual, 39 Fed. Reg. 32,288, 32,290 (1974); The Handling of Public Issues Under the Fairness Doc-
trine and the Public Interest Standards of the Communications Act, 48 F.C.C.2d 1 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Fairness Report]; Applicability of the Fairness Doctrine in the Handling of
Controversial Issues of Public Importance, 29 Fed. Reg. 10,415 (1964); Report on Editorializing
by Broadcast Licensees, 13 F.C.C. 1246 (1949) [hereinafter cited as Editorializing]. For an excel-
lent contemporary analysis of the constitutional questions raised by the doctrine, see Bazelon,
FCC Regulation of the Telecommunications Press, 1975 DUKE L.J. 213; see also Schenkkan, Power
in the Marketplace of Ideas: The Fairness Doctrine and the First Amendment, 52 TEX. L. REV. 727,
733-40 (1974).
278. Reply time often has to be provided at the broadcaster's expense, see Cullman Broadcast-
ing Co., 40 F.C.C. 576, 577 (1963); Fairness Report, supra note 277, at 14 n.13; the FCC feared
that otherwise the sale of media time would merely convert economic power into political power.
This fear also may explain the Supreme Court's unwillingness in Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v.
Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94 (1973), to accept the Democratic Party's insistence that
CBS was required to sell time for editorial advertisement. Such a ruling would only protect
groups who could pay for such advertisements and thus still would most support economically
comfortable organizations. Id at 123.
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controversial issues of public importance279 and for the presentation of
contrasting views concerning such issues.280 Furthermore, individuals
personally attacked during a broadcast on these issues are entitled to
"reply time" so they can broadcast a response to the attack.281 The
fairness doctrine developed because the electronic media were alleg-
edly unwilling to open their communication channels to others.282
Faimess regulations presume that when a few individuals or groups
control a critical medium, they will stifle competition of ideas and
block the emergence of truth.283
The fairness doctrine epitomizes the tension within the first
amendment between the broadcasters' right to control program content
and the audience's need for access to diverse perspectives. 2 4 In Red
Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC,285 the Supreme Court upheld the FCC's
reply time requirement,28 6 and found that rather than violating the
broadcasters' first amendment rights, the fairness doctrine furthered the
279. A holder of a federal broadcast license is required to survey community interests within
the receiving area of his licensed broadcast signal. Fairness Report, supra note 277, at 10 & n.9
(citing Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Applicants, 20 F.C.C.2d
880, 881 (1969)). A nontrivial portion of broadcast time must be devoted to the treatment of
public issues deemed significant within his broadcast area. Fairness Report, supra note 277, at 7,
9. Each broadcaster bears this expense, if commercial sponsorship is unavailable, whether or not
the licensee would personally have chosen to forebear such coverage. See supra note 278.
280. Each licensee who broadcasts a partisan perspective on any controversial public issue
must also provide a fair representation of other views, although not necessarily on the same pro-
gram and not necessarily in equal proportion to the time, or timing, of the original broadcast.
Fairness Report, supra note 277, at 7-8, 10-11. This obligation is not lessened even when other
broadcasters in the same market have carried opposing views, id at 10-11, or when such views
already may have been featured in other sources of news and opinion (such as newspapers and
magazines) readily accessible to persons within the same market. See Brandywine Main Line
Radio, Inc. v. FCC, 473 F.2d 16, 63-80 (D.C. Cir.)(Bazelon, J., dissenting), a/jg 27 F.C.C.2d 565
(1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 922 (1973).
281. See Amendment of Part 73 of the Rules to Provide Procedures in the Event of a Personal
Attack or Where a Station Editorializes as to Political Candidates, 8 F.C.C.2d 721, 723-24 (1967).
282. See M. ERNEST, THE FIRST FREEDOM 176 (1946)(quoting Sen. Burton K. Wheeler)(radio
broacasters fail to present all views).
283. See Editorializing, supra note 277, at 1249. For an attack on the premise that the broad-
casting industry is monopolistic, see R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 22.3, at 312-13
(1972).
284. For a discussion of broadcast regulations and the first amendment, see generally B.
OwEN, supra note 246; B. SCHMIDT, supra note 246; Robinson, The FCC and the First Amendment."
Observations on Forty Years of Radio and Television Regulation, 52 MINN. L. REv. 67 (1967).
285. 395 U.S. 367 (1969). During part of a "Christian Crusade" broadcast series aired by the
defendant station, the Reverend Billy James Hargis attacked author Fred J. Cook. Hargis, dis-
cussing Cook's book, Goldwater-Extremist on the Right, claimed that a newspaper had fired
Cook because Cook had falsely leveled charges against a city official and that Cook had subse-
quently worked for The Nation, "one of the most scurrilous publications of the left." Red Lion,
395 U.S. at 371 n.2. Cook demanded free reply time and, upon the station's refusal, filed a formal
letter of complaint with the FCC.
286. The Court contended:
It is the purpose of the First Amendment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas
in which truth will ultimately prevail, rather than to countenance monopolization of that
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first amendment's goal of informing the public. 287 The Court at-
tempted, however, to limit the RedLion opinion to the broadcast media
under a "public airwaves" rationale.288 Because the number of avail-
able television and radio frequencies cannot accommodate all those
wishing to broadcast their message, the government licensing of fre-
quency use was justified to prevent airwave interference from crippling
the broadcast system.289 On the basis of this practical justification for
governmental regulation, the Court upheld the doctrine's regulation of
program content.290 As a result, government is now fully involved in
and is allegedly responsible for the opening of communication chan-
nels to groups otherwise unable to command access. 291
market, whether it be by the government itself or a private licensee. .... It is the right
of the public to receive suitable access to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas
and experiences which is crucial here.
Redion, 395 U.S. at 390. In CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 397 (1981), the Court held constitu-
tional a statute that provided candidates for federal office with "reasonable access" to the broad-
casting media. See 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1976). Chief Justice Burger, writing for the majority,
reiterated the conclusion that "'it is the right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the
broadcasters, which is paramount.'" Id at 395 (quoting Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 390)(emphasis
omitted).
287. RedLion, 395 U.S. at 375.
288. Indeed, the Court has subsequently indicated that Red Lion has only such limited appli-
cability. See First Nat'l Bank v. Belotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n.30 (1978).
289. See Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 389:
There is nothing in the First Amendment which prevents the government from requiring
a licensee to share his frequency with others and to conduct himself as a proxy or fiduci-
ary with obligations to present those views and voices which are representative of his
community and which would otherwise, by necessity, be barred from the airwaves.
290. Id at 388-90. The logic of RedLion, however, is flawed. Although there may be a thresh-
old need for governmental regulation, techniques less intrusive than the fairness doctrine could
solve problems of frequency interference. Cf. Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 488 (1960)(insist-
ing that state use least restrictive means when regulating first amendment interests).
291. Many states, responding to similar claims of unfair access distribution, enacted statutes
requiring newspapers either to retract defamatory statements they had circulated or to publish a
reply by the defamed individual. The Court held these statutes unconstitutional in Miami Herald
Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974). In 1972 Torillo was a candidate for the
Florida House of Representatives. The Miami Herald on two occasions printed editorials critical
of his candidacy. In response, Tornillo demanded the paper print verbatim his replies. The
Herald refused. Id at 243-44. Tornillo brought suit under the Florida "right of reply" statute,
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 104.38 (West 1973)(repealed 1975):
[I]f any newspaper in its columns assails the personal character of any candidate for
nomination or for election,. . . [or] attacks his official record,. . . such newspaper shall
upon request of such candidate immediately publish free of cost any reply he may make
thereto in as conspicuous a place and in the same kind of type as the matter that calls for
such reply, provided such reply does not take up more space than the matter replied to.
Tornillo argued that restriction of entry into the media marketplace had given newspapers the
same control over communication that limited frequencies gave to broadcasters. He stressed that
the economic environment had caused American newspapers to become big business, placing "in
a few hands the power to inform the American people and shape public opinion." Tornillo, 418
U.S. at 250. Consequently, the reply statute was a rough counterpart to the FCC's fairness doc-
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The fairness doctrine raises innumerable questions. Who deter-
mines whether a broadcaster is being fair? What controversial issues of
trine reply provision and should be held equally constitutional. The Court rejected Tornillo's
argument. Id at 254. The Court feared that the economic ramifications of a right to free reply
space would "chill" the press. Id at 257-58. The Justices also were concerned that the Florida
statute would intrude upon the function of editors. Id at 258.
The apparent contradiction between Tornillo and RedLion must be considered. If scarcity of
resources is the basis for regulation, any distinction between the cases seems unjustified, both in
the context of the cases themselves, see F. FRIENDLY, THE GOOD GUYS, THE BAD GUYS, AND THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 5-7 (1975)(Miami Herald much less subject to meaningful competition than
RedLion broadcast licensee), and in the context of their corresponding media forms today. As
the number of newspapers decreases and the cost of running successful ones increases, many com-
munities have fewer papers than broadcast stations. See "Freedom and the First Amendment",
Remarks by William S. Paley, Chairman, CBS, Inc., delivered at The Family of Man Awards
Dinner held by the Council of Churches of the City of New York 4-5 (Nov. 16, 1982)(nearly 8
broadcasting stations and cable systems for each daily newspaper in 1981)(copy on file with au-
thor) [hereinafter cited as Paley Speech]. But even if we accept the distinction and assume persons
can enter the print media more easily than the broadcast media, the question remains why the
purported openness of the newspaper market cannot be considered an important factor in assess-
ing the significance of concentration in the broadcast media. Conceivably, an alternative conclu-
sion to draw from this situation is that legislative action is not required in any media branch, i.e.
the print media, as long as people can gain access somewhere within the mass media as a whole.
In considering why the Court has allowed broadcasters to be closely regulated under the
auspices of the FCC while it has protected the print media, at least three factors merit discussion.
First, the print media in the United States has a history and tradition of crusading against, and
being protected from, governmental interference. But cf Act of July 14, 1798, ch. 74, 1 Stat. 596
(Sedition Act, expired 1801); Espionage Act, ch. 30, § 3, 40 Stat. 217, 219 (1917)(repealed 1948).
Because electronic media are relatively young and have always been subject to some governmen-
tal control, there is no tradition of freedom to overcome and there is thus less appearance of
illegitimate governmental action. If the first amendment's concern is only to maintain the appear-
ance of a government prohibited from illegitimate interference with the media, the difference
between Red Lion and Tornillo makes sense.
Second, unlike the electronic media's licensing system, the print media has an unlimited
number of frequencies, i.e., printing presses; accordingly, there is no threshold need for govern-
ment rationing. The argument that the prohibitive cost of starting a newspaper limits access in a
way analogous to the scarcity of broadcast frequencies, and therefore justifies state involvement,
has not been successful. Our existing capitalist system of value distribution therefore has been
preserved: although the press may be an economically scarce resource, it remains generally avail-
able to the wealthy. The well to do, however, are not assured access when dealing with a scientifi-
cally scarce resource, the electronic media, which by necessity is distributed by a nonmarket
process. Thus, because the science of the broadcast media has practical imperatives, market re-
form in this latter setting is not as clearly inconsistent with capitalist principles as is the case with
the print media.
The first two suggested grounds for distinguishing the press from the electronic media both
address the appearance of governmental involvement. Yet the marketplace model assumption of
open access makes no distinction between limitations from governmental and nongovernmental
sources; it can tolerate limits from neither. If market reformers intend to break down elitist con-
trol of communications, it is indefensible to distinguish the press from the electronic media. Cf.
Bollinger, Freedom of the Press and Public Access: Toward a Theory of Partial Regulation of the
Mass Media, 75 MICH. L. REV. 1, 2 (1976)("the Court should now acknowledge that for first
amendment purposes broadcasting is not fundamentally different from the print media").
The third potential distinction between Red Lion and Tornillo is of a somewhat different
order. Certain types of individual behavior, including some kinds of speech, are capable of creat-
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public importance must a broadcaster include in his programming?
What is a reasonable balance between contrasting views on issues?
How should groups be guaranteed an opportunity to speak their views
over the airwaves? Does government intervention to balance public
issue programming improperly inhibit broadcasters from determining
the content of their programming? Does government intervention itself
create the market distortion it is supposed to prevent?
The requirement that issues be both controversial and ofpublic im-
portance before the fairness doctrine can be invoked is an understanda-
ble attempt to ensure that scarce and expensive resources are not
wasted with trivialities or matters of only marginal public concern. 292
This requirement, however, unavoidably results in government officials
or judges determining the agenda of issues worthy of public considera-
tion. The scenario of governmental officers debating what the public
does and does not have a right to know is constitutionally questionable
at best. The fairness doctrine inevitably requires repeated ad hoc eval-
uations of whether coverage of a specific "issue" would be wasteful, a
mere whetting of public curiosity, or would convey information about
which the public has a justifiable interest. Such determinations by gov-
ernment officials conflict with the very core of first amendment market-
place theory.2 93
To minimize the potential danger and arbitrariness of purely sub-
jective evaluations of an issue's importance, the FCC has added a
number of "objective" criteria for determining which issues are both
important and controversial.2 94 "Public importance" is determined, at
least in part, by the degree of media coverage and the degree of atten-
tion an issue receives from government officials and other community
ing highly impassioned community responses. When dealing with such areas, federal courts have
been more comfortable with decisions made by federal agencies such as the FCC, representing
national communities, than with those made by state institutions representing secluded local com-
munities such as in Tornillo. Cf. Ingber, supra note 124, at 866 & n.31 (noting that federal statutes
are more likely to survive "lack of notice" challenges than are state laws). But see Miller v. Cali-
fornia, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973)(local community standards to be applied in defining obscenity).
Judicial acceptance of federal but not state reform proposals, therefore, may protect a national
dominance in the creation of orthodoxy in the face of challenges from locally dominant groups
whose views do not conform to those of national elites. This point, as well as that suggesting that
prevention of the perception of governmental bias of the market is the true function of the first
amendment, will be developed more fully infra in part IV.
292. This concern with not wasting scarce media resources is precisely the ground upon which
the Court concluded, in Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94, 125
(1973), that an unlimited right of access would not best serve the public interest.
293. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 346 (1974).
294. Fairness Report, supra note 277, at 13-14.
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leaders.295 "Controversiality" demands a consideration of these same
factors, as well as whether an issue has been debated vigorously within
a given community.296 In addition, the fairness rules require only that
"major viewpoints and shades of opinion 297 be aired; they do not re-
quire that all opinions on the subject be presented.298 Consequently,
the views of small minorities may well not receive any assistance from
the doctrine.
Obviously there is a tension between a first amendment designed
to protect speech that the community wishes to silence 299 and a fairness
doctrine contingent upon debate among substantial elements of the
community. Because ideas must already be popular to some degree to
merit the doctrine's application,300 the doctrine gives government
assistance to viewpoints precisely when government involvement is
least important. In fact, the doctrine grants further access to views of
significant community leaders that already have been actively debated
within the marketplace. This merely compounds the market advantage
held by community leaders over those who find the media intractable
and community leaders insensitive or unsympathetic.
In addition to these theoretical difficulties, the regulatory appara-
tus created to enforce the fairness doctrine has potential for abuse.
During the Nixon presidency, executive branch officials attempted to
use the FCC to reduce media criticism of the administration 30' and
295. See id at 11-12. Polls and contacts with previously identified community leaders are
required for the determination of "public importance." Because such a process of information
gathering is likely to reflect rather than challenge the concerns of existing leadership, it contains
an inherent bias in favor of the status quo.
296. Id at 12.
297. Id at 15 (emphasis omitted).
298. See generally Primer on Ascertainment of Community Problems by Broadcast Appli-
cants, 27 F.C.C.2d 650 (1971).
299. Even the FCC, at an earlier time, required that licensees ignore the "possible unpopular-
ity" of a viewpoint. Editorializing, supra note 277, at 1250, para. 7. This position is clearly not in
accord with the standards articulated in the 1974 Fairness Report. See Fairness Report, supra
note 277, at 11-12.
300. If the rest of the community scoffs at a lone dissenter's ideas, there is no debate and
therefore no fairness requirement. See Fairness Report, supra note 277, at 11-12, If rejection of
the idea is due to insufficient access for a full articulation of the viewpoint, or to unappealing non-
media packaging, then the fairness doctrine will deny an idea access because it did not have
sufficient initial access to develop beyond an embryonic stage. These circularity problems should
not be discounted.
301. In 1970 Charles Colson, the Special Counsel to the President, wrote a memo to White
House Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman containing the following:
I will pursue with Dean Burch [the FCC Chairman appointed by President Nixon] the
possibility for an interpretive ruling by the FCC on the role of the President when he
uses TV, as soon as we have a majority. I think this point could be very favorably
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punish those members of the media viewed as the worst offenders.302
There is no reason to believe that this abuse of process is limited to the
Nixon/Watergate era. Professor Fred W. Friendly has uncovered evi-
dence that in 1963 the Democratic National Committee (DNC) used
the evolving reply right for partisan political purposes.303 Democrats
discovered that the fairness doctrine could be used to inhibit broadcasts
favoring conservative positions associated with Senator Barry Goldwa-
ter. According to Friendly, the DNC set up and funded a "nonparti-
san" committee to monitor such broadcasts, and, by demanding free
reply time, the DNC sought to harass stations that carried right-wing
programs. The DNC thus hoped not merely to gain balanced coverage
but to inhibit anti-Democratic broadcasts. 3°4 One cannot help but
wonder if the doctrine's potential for governmental abuse of this sort is
worth whatever marginal advantage disadvantaged groups obtain
through governmental interjection.3 05
The impact of the fairness doctrine on the marketplace of ideas
may, in fact, be counterproductive. The fairness requirement may en-
courage bland, noncontroversial programming as a result of both eco-
clarified and it would, of course, have an inhibiting impact on the networks.. . . I think
we can dampen their ardor for putting on "loyal opposition" type programs.
Washington Post, Dec. 3, 1973, § A, at 24, col. 5 (memorandum reprinted).
In addition, the New York Times contended in May 1974 that the Nixon White House had
actively considered the imposition of reprisals against the Washington Post for its Watergate cov-
erage by not renewing broadcast licenses held by the Post's parent company. N.Y. Times, May 16,
1974, at 1, col. 3.
302. The New York Times published a memo written by White House Assistant Jeb Stuart
Magruder to Chief of Staff H.R. Haldeman suggesting that "the FCC begin 'an official monitoring
system' to prove bias on the part of the networks." N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1973, at 34, col. 3.
303. See Friendly, "/hat's Fair on the Air?, N.Y. Times, Mar. 30, 1975, § 6 (magazine), at 12.
304. An excerpt from a report by Wayne Phillips, the executive at the DNC who set up the
monitoring effort, indicates the DNC's intent: "'[E]ven more important than the free radio time,
however, was the effectiveness of this operation in inhibiting the political activity of these right-
wing broadcasts."' Id at 37, col. 1. Although a DNC attempt simply to give airtime to Demo-
cratic viewpoints would be quite consistent with the premises of the fairness doctrine, another
DNC memorandum quoted by Friendly shows that this was not the DNC's primary motive:
The right-wingers operate on a strictly cash basis and it is for this reason that they are
carried by so many small stations. Were our efforts to be continued on a year-round
basis, we would find that many of these stations would consider the broadcast of these
programs bothersome and burdensome (especially if they are ultimately required to give
us free time) and would start dropping the programs from their broadcast schedule.
N.Y. Times, Apr. 27, 1975, § 6, pt. 1 (Magazine), at 70, col. 4 ("letters" section). This abuse of the
fairness doctrine obviously is similar to another of Professor Emerson's conclusions about censor-
ship systems. See supra note 271 (quoting Emerson).
305. These concerns ,ith potential government abuse echo a number of the dangers Professor
Emerson identified in systems of censorship. See supra note 271 (quoting Emerson). He con-
cluded that governments often overestimate the need for restriction, have difficulties in framing
definite and precise limitations, and utilize restrictions which only minimally contribute to articu-
lated goals. See id
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nomic cost and institutional insecurity.30 6 Broadcasters, fearing the
cost of balanced presentations or the expense of defending against a
complaint for unbalanced programming, may avoid controversial is-
sues altogether. In 1979, for example, over 5000 such complaints were
filed with the FCC.30 7 Only a handful were successful,308 but those
successes demonstrate a governmental power to control aspects of the
media. The mere existence of this power chills some broadcasters and
causes others to censor themselves.30 9 Given the indefiniteness of the
standards to which the FCC will hold broadcasters and the significant
expense and disruption of defending against a complaint,310 broad-
caster conservatism should take no one by surprise.31' Rather than en-
couraging diversity in public debate, a "fair" market may instead be
dominated by a dull "centrism. ' '312
The fairness doctrine thus has not assured marketplace access to
those individuals, groups, and viewpoints least able to gain public ex-
306. Many critics of the fairness doctrine argue that it discourages journalists from engaging
in discourse on important social issues. See Paley Speech, supra note 291, at 7; see also Kalven,
Broadcasting, Public Policy andthe First Amendment, 10 J.L. & EcoN. 15, 19-23 (1967); Robinson,
supra note 284, at 136-40; cf Lange, The Role of the Access Doctrine in the Regulation of the Mass
Media: A Critical Review and Assessment, 52 N.C.L. REv. 1, 70-71 (1973)(discussing right of
reply).
The possibility that journalists will shirk their responsibility to address controversial issues is
accentuated because the FCC has more vigorously enforced the requirement that broadcasters
present the issues that they choose to air in a balanced fashion than it has enforced the require-
ment that licensees devote a reasonable time to issues of public importance. Simmons, The Prob-
lem of "Issue" in the Administration of the Fairness Doctrine, 65 CALIF. L. REV. 546, 548 (1977).
Thus, broadcasters can minimize the doctrine's impact on their programming by minimizing the
coverage of controversial issues.
307. Paley Speech, supra note 291, at 3.
308. Id
309. ld
310. For example, Sherwyn H. Heckt, 40 F.C.C.2d 1150 (1973), a fairness doctrine case re-
solved in favor of the licensee, consumed 480 hours of station personnel time and legal expenses of
about $20,000. First Amendment Clarfcation Act of 1977" Hearings on S.22 Before the Subcomm.
an Communications of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science, & Transportation, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 62 (1978)(statement of Henry Geller); see H. GELLER, THE FAIRNESS DOCTRINE IN BROAD-
CASTING: PROBLEMS AND SUGGESTED COURSES OF ACTION 40-43, 134 (Rand Corp. No. R-1412-
FF 1973).
311. See Interview with Bill Monroe by Steven J. Simmons (Sept. 12, 1975), quoted in S. SIM-
MONS, supra note 273, at 217 (describing broadcaster conservatism in face of FCC complaints).
The broadcasters' responses to the fairness doctrine are reminiscent of Professor Emerson's
conclusion that the impact of censorship is felt not only by those convicted, but also by many
merely prosecuted, and by countless others who cannot accurately judge the boundaries imposed
on freedom or who are fearful to take the risk of prosecution. See T. EMERSON, FIRST AMEND-
MENT, supra note 1, at 23-24 (quoted supra note 271).
312. This tendency toward conservatism is eloquently criticized in Lange, supra note 306, at
77-89. Broadcaster conservatism is further encouraged by the Commission's statement of duties
under the fairness doctrine. Fairness Report, supra note 277, at 15 ("the broadcaster. . . is not
expected to present the views of all political parties no matter how small or insignificant").
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posure. Indeed it has enhanced access differentials between traditional
positions and unconventional views. It also has been employed to
achieve objectives inconsistent with the doctrine's theoretical pur-
pose.313 Cogent arguments have been made that instead of correcting
marketplace flaws and biases, the fairness doctrine has compounded
them.314
2. Federal Election Campaign Acts. The Federal Election Cam-
paign Acts (FECA)315 suffer from similar infirmities. In 1976, the
Supreme Court confronted a number of constitutional challenges to the
key provisions of FECA in Buckley v. Valeo. 316 With FECA, Congress
attempted to reform the marketplace by limiting the influence of ad-
vantaged individuals or groups during federal election campaigns.
FECA appeared to foster "equal" access for both viewpoints and indi-
viduals whereas the fairness doctrine assures "adequate" presentation
for varied viewpoints.
FECA combined complex contribution and expenditure limita-
tions,317 reporting and disclosure requirements, 31 8 and public subsidies
313. The Supreme Court's recent approval of federal legislation that provides federal candi-
dates with "reasonable access" to the broadcasting media, see CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 397
(1981), may itself lead to abuse. Justice Stevens, in dissent, expressed the fear that the FCC's
approach to the candidate access claims "creates an impermissible risk that the Commission's
evaluation of a given refusal [to grant a candidate access time] by a licensee will be biased--or will
appear to be biased-by the character of the office held by the candidate making the request." Id
at 419.
314. "I have no doubt," remarked William S. Paley, the Chairman of CBS, "that broadcasting
would produce a greater abundance of diverse and informative programming" if the fairness doc-
trine was eliminated along with the provisions for equal time and the criteria for access. Paley
Speech, supra note 291, at 7. In fact, there has been some movement, though unsuccessful, to
repeal the fairness doctrine and other equal opportunity requirements. See, e.g., Repeal of "Equal
Time" Requirements: Hearing on H.A 6013 Before the Subcomm on Communication of the House
Comm. on Interstate & Foreign Commerce, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 5passim (1980).
315. Regulation of federal elections was accomplished through numerous statutes and amend-
ments. See Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 562 (1971);
Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-225, 86 Stat. 3 (both statutes amended by
Federal Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263, and Federal
Election Campaign Act Amendments of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-283, 90 Stat. 475, and Federal Elec-
tion Campaign Act Amendments of 1979, Pub. L. No. 96-187, 93 Stat. 1339)(both statutes codified
as amended in scattered sections of 2 U.S.C., 26 U.S.C., and other scattered sections). Unless
otherwise noted, this statutory scheme will be discussed as the Court confronted it in Buckley v.
Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1975), and will be referred to under the single rubric of "FECA."
316. 424 U.S. 1 (1976).
317. See FECA Amendments of 1974, § 101, 88 Stat. 1263, 1263 (substitute provisions added
by FECA Amendments of 1976, § 112(2), 90 Stat. 475, 486 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C.
§ 441a (1982))). The contribution and expenditure limits were, together, an attempt to prevent a
financially well endowed candidate from defeating another candidate by merely outspending him
in the marketplace. The Act imposed a $1000 limitation on an individual's contributions to a
single candidate, a $5000 limitation on contributions by a political committee to a single candi-
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of election campaigns 319 to foster the goal of equality. The Buckley
Court found only a portion of this legislative package consistent with
the first amendment.
In a per curiam decision, the Court upheld FECA's contribution
restrictions as a limitation upon "the actuality and appearance of cor-
ruption resulting from large . . . financial contributions"; 320 but the
Court held expenditure restrictions unconstitutional because they re-
duced the quantity of expression in the marketplace and, thus, re-
stricted "the number of issues discussed, the depth of their exploration,
and the size of the audience reached."' 32'
Without expenditure limitations, however, FECA can accomplish
little market reform. Wealthy candidates and their financially able
supporters can still inundate the marketplace with their message, and
thereby block out fair perception of the positions of their less well-
heeled opponents. 322 In fact, the Buckley Court explicitly rejected as
illegitimate any congressional goal to equalize the relative ability of
individuals and groups to influence the outcome of elections.3 23
The Court, however, did uphold the FECA provisions that author-
date, and a $25,000 limitation on total contributions by an individual during any calendar year.
FECA Amendments of 1974, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 1263, 1263. The Act also limited expenditures
made by individuals and groups "relative to a clearly identified candidate" to $1000, FECA
Amendments of 1974, § 101(a), 88 Stat. 1263, 1265, restricted candidates in the use of their own
personal funds, and placed ceilings on total campaign costs, FECA Amendments of 1974,
§§ 101(a), 101(b), 88 Stat. 1263, 1264, 1266.
318. See FECA Amendments of 1974, §§ 201-208, 88 Stat. 1263, 1272-79 (codified as amended
at 2 U.S.C. §§ 431-434 (1982)).
319. See Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, Pub. L. No. 92-178, 85 Stat. 562 (1971),
amended by FECA Amendments of 1974, §§ 403-408, 88 Stat. 1263, 1291-97 (current provisions
codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 9001-9008 (1976 & Supp. V 1981) and other scattered
sections).
320. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 26 (1975). In addition, the Court upheld reporting and
disclosure provisions as a means to provide the electorate with information as to where political
campaign money originates in order to aid the voter in evaluating those who seek federal office.
Id at 66-67. The Court also deemed the requirements justified as a means of deterring corruption
and the appearance of corruption and as an essential means of gathering the data necessary to
detect violations of the Act's contribution limitations. Id at 67. The provisions required cam-
paign organizations periodically to report to the Federal Election Commission all individual con-
tributions of over $100 and all political committee contributions regardless of their size. FECA of
1971, § 304, 86 Stat. 3, 15 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. § 434 (1982))(the $100 requirement
since has been raised to $200, FECA Amendments of 1979, § 104, 93 Stat. 1339, 1351).
321. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 19.
322. Because the Court upheld individual and group campaign contribution limitations, see
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 24-38, individuals or groups desiring to sponsor advertising that supported a
candidate's election often have funneled their money through organizations other than the candi-
date's official campaign committee or have purchased the time or space for such advertising
themselves.
323. See id at 48-49 (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 269 (1964) and
Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)):
MAJRKETPLA CE OF IDEAS
ized public funding of presidential election campaigns. 324 It viewed
leveling campaign expenditures among presidential candidates not as a
mechanism to abridge, restrict, or censor speech, but rather as an at-
tempt to use public money to "enlarge public discussion and participa-
tion in the electoral process, goals vital to a self-governing people."325
The subsidy provisions do not, however, treat all candidates as equals.
Major political parties-defined as parties that had secured over
twenty-five percent of the vote in the preceding presidential election-
qualify for up to two million dollars of funding for expenses incurred
in connection with their nominating campaigns and for subsidies of up
to twenty million dollars for their candidate's presidential cam-
paigns.326 Minor parties-defined as those that had secured between
five percent and twenty-five percent of the vote in the preceding presi-
dential election 327-- qualify for convention reimbursements and cam-
paign subsidies proportional to their share of the vote in the preceding
election, with the possibility of additional post-election payments if
they increase their share of the vote.328 Other political parties or candi-
dates qualify for post-election support only if they obtain over five per-
cent of the vote in the current election. 329 The Buckley Court brushed
aside as "speculative" the insistence by representatives of nonestab-
lished groups that such a subsidy system would harm their interests.330
The Court deemed such harm insufficient to overcome Congress's pur-
pose to prevent the use of public money to "foster frivolous candidates,
create a system of splintered parties, and encourage unrestrained
factionalism." 331
[T]he concept that government may restrict the speech of some elements of our society in
order to enhance the relative voice of others is wholly foreign to the First Amendment,
which was designed "to secure 'the widest possible dissemination of information from
diverse and antagonistic sources,'" and "'to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for
the bringing about of political and social changes desired by the people."'
324. See Buckley, 424 U.S. at 85-109.
325. Id at 92-93.
326. Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, §§ 9002-9008, 85 Stat. 562, 563-69, amended
by FECA Amendments of 1974, §§ 404-406, 88 Stat. 1263, 1291-96 (current provisions codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 9002-9008 and other scattered sections)(apart from the $2,000,000 pro-
vided for in § 9008, which has since been raised to $3,000,000, see FECA Amendments of 1979,
§ 202, 93 Stat. 1339, 1368 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 9008(b)(1) (Supp. V 1981)), these provisions
adjust the amounts disbursed in any given year to account for inflation).
327. See Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, § 9002(7), 85 Stat. 562, 563 (codified at 26
U.S.C. § 9002(7) (1976)).
328. Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, § 9004(a)(2)(A), 85 Stat. 562, 565, amended by
FECA Amendments of 1974, §§ 404(b)(1), 406(a), 88 Stat. 1263, 1291, 1294 (codified as amended
at 26 U.S.C. §§ 9004(a)(2)(A), 9008(b)(2) (1976)).
329. Presidential Election Campaign Fund Act, § 9004(a)(3), 85 Stat. 562, 566 (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. § 9004(a)(3) (1976)).
330. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 101.
331. Id
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The public campaign finance measures do little or nothing to give
powerless groups or individuals enhanced access to effective means of
political expression. No money is made available for parties receiving
less than five percent of the vote in both the current and previous elec-
tion.332 Funds for primaries are available only for parties that hold a
convention or for candidates that participate in primaries. 333 Such reg-
ulations create significant disadvantages to minority parties and in-
dependent candidates, 334 who are most likely to need help publicizing
their views. In fact, the subsidy system may decrease the chance that a
minority party will receive five percent of the vote, by increasing the
funds available to its already richer rivals.335 Public financing under
FECA appears to have "enshrined the Republican and Democratic
parties in a permanently preferred position. '336
332. A party may receive funds subsequent to an election in which it received over five percent
of the vote, even if it received less than five percent in the previous election. See Presidential
Election Campaign Fund Act, § 9004(a)(3), 85 Stat. 562, 566 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C.
§ 9004(a)(3) (1976)). The possibility of a minority party or independent candidate receiving pub-
lic funds after the election does not assuage, however, the disadvantage to holders of minority
views. Candidates need funds before the election. Candidates who could secure five percent of the
vote if given the funds prior to the election very well may not reach the five percent threshold
without the additional resources those funds provide. The suggestion by some that such candi-
dates could secure loans before the election, see Buckley, 424 U.S. at 102, may be overly optimis-
tic. There is, in any event, something troubling about committing the fate of a candidate to the
opinion of a "loan officer"; indeed, the financial community may well be hostile to the candidate's
views.
John Anderson's storied campaign for the presidency in 1980 accumulated an estimated
$5,000,000 debt in anticipation of receiving post-election funds. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 5, 1980, at
A21, col. I. The difficulties in candidates and creditors relying on such funds is reflected in Mrs.
Anderson's response to a question as to what she and her husband would do if the funds were not
received: "we will both get jobs." Id at A21, col. 2. Luckily for Mrs. Anderson, Mr. Anderson
tallied over 5% of the electorate.
333. See FECA Amendments of 1974, §§ 406(a), 408(c), 88 Stat. 1263, 1299 (codified as
amended at 26 U.S.C. §§ 9008, 9033 (1976)).
334. Chief Justice Burger recognized in his Buckley opinion these disadvantages to minority
parties and independent candidates. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 251 (Burger, C.J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
335. Publicly financed elections in this context may strengthen the stronger rather than aid the
overwhelmed.
336. Id at 293 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). One critic has aptly
depicted the public campaign finance measures as "public subsidies for established parties."
Buchanon, supra note 268, at 556.
This difficulty may be accentuated now that all candidates, regardless of political persuasion,
are granted reasonable access to television and radio. FECA of 1971, § 103(a)(2)(A), 86 Stat. 3, 4
(adding 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) (1976)("The [FCC] may revoke any station license. . . for willful
or repeated failure to allow reasonable access to or to permit purchase of reasonable amounts of
time ... by a legally qualified candidate for Federal elective office on behalf of his candidacy."));
cf. CBS, Inc. v. FCC, 453 U.S. 367, 394-97 (1981)(upholding 47 U.S.C. § 312(a)(7) as constitu-
tional). The federal legislation creating this right appears on its face to be neutral to all views, but
federal candidates having sufficient funds actually will receive significantly greater access than
will those that are poorly funded, because a broadcaster may continue to refuse all requests for
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Both Congress and the Court understandably were concerned with
a market reform that might either make speech costless or so subsidize
the speech of all groups that the outcome would be a cacophony of
trivia, irrelevancies, and repetitions creating a dysfunctional level of
noise and wasted resources. The Buckley Court recognized the need to
distribute public largesse discriminately so as to avoid "artificial incen-
tives to 'splintered parties and unrestrained factionalism.' "337 But this
concern is difficult to reconcile with the first amendment's "profound
national commitment to the principle that debate on public issues
should be uninhibited, robust and wide-open." 338 Minor parties add
variety and complexity to public debate, and often force major parties
to address candidly issues they might otherwise be tempted to avoid.339
But even if this were not the case, marketplace theory proscribes gov-
ernment hostility to either new associations34° or variety in public de-
bate.34' Both the fairness doctrine and FECA, upon analysis, support
only those perspectives and viewpoints already well represented in the
marketplace.
C. Future Reform Possibilities.
Reform attempts to minimize the marketplace of ideas' status quo
bias have been of little aid to those with truly deviant ideas. At best,
these reforms only slightly widen the market's mainstream views, but
free access, see CBS, Inc., 453 U.S. at 382 n.8. This disparity greatly skews the marketplace in
favor of only certain views because it is unlikely that well financed candidates represent the entire
political spectrum. Further, because the legislation is directed toward candidates, groups that lack
a candidate representing their viewpoint but who wish to speak against a candidate or his views
have no access protection. The public funding of major parties, therefore, magnifies the already
existing marketplace skew in favor of dominant groups and orthodox viewpoints.
337. Buckley, 424 U.S. at 96.
338. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
339. See Illinois State Bd. of Elections v. Socialist Workers Party, 440 U.S. 173, 185-86 (1979).
340. In 1960 the Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance which prohibited distribution of
any handbill not bearing the name and address of the person who prepared, distributed or spon-
sored it. Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960). The Court found that the potential chilling of
the freedom of speech and association caused by requiring an individual to identify himself as a
supporter of what might be an unpopular view or organization outweighed the state's interest in
using this means to identify those responsible for fraud, false advertisement, or libel. Id at 64-65.
In Buckley, 424 U.S. at 60-84, however, the Court upheld reporting and disclosure requirements
that are just as likely to have such chilling effects. Thus, this market reform measure may decrease
the public exposure to and perception of dissident positions.
341. Although the major political parties do produce some variety in public debate, history
has shown that for such parties to be successful they need to be amorphous, heterogeneous, and
heterodox. See Brown, Book Review, 62 COLUM. L. Rav. 386, 391 (1962). In order to retain and
enlarge their electoral support, the major parties have assumed a nondivisive "centrism" very
similar to that discussed in the context of the fairness doctrine. See supra notes 306-12 and accom-
panying text. It is therefore not surprising that the basic positions of the major parties have more
in common with each other than in conflict.
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their dependence upon government to regulate and perfect the market
raises grave issues of government control of communication in a demo-
cratic society and is highly dangerous.342 The dangers of government
involvement and potential abuse seem so great that a laissez-faire sys-
tem appears preferable to some despite all of its limitations.3 43
Representatives of the media344 and a number of scholars345 have
insisted that the technology of cable television systems renders obsolete
the scarcity of frequencies rationale for the fairness doctrine. These
critics propose limiting government regulation to a requirement that
cable systems dedicate one channel as a noncommercial public access
channel available without charge at all times on a pure first-come, first-
served basis.346
If a speaker desires a large, diverse audience, however, he will find
special public access channels ineffective as forums in which to present
competing views on controversial issues. There is something "bitter-
sweet funny"347 about seeing homespun attempts on public access
channels competing with the professionally packaged presentations
found on the commercial channels. The cost of advertising a message
to be aired on a public access station in hope of gaining audience atten-
tion would often exceed the production costs of the message;348 conse-
quently, the audience for a public access channel usually consists of
those who personally know the speaker, and thus already are informed
of and committed to his views, and those who have tuned in because of
random curiosity or a desire to be titillated by the possibly more than
342. See supra notes 268-76, 305-12, 324-41 and accompanying text.
343. Emerson, for example, a long-time advocate and defender of the expressive rights of
dissidents, concluded that "[tlhe system of freedom of expression is by definition a laissez-faire
system and must tolerate differences in the economic capacity of the various participants ...
[A]ny attempt to eliminate all differences based on economic factors would involve governmental
regulation and governmental domination on a scale that would destroy the system." Emerson,
supra note 75, at 823; see Columbia Broadcasting Sys. v. Democratic Nat'l Comm., 412 U.S. 94,
125 (1973)(the risks of a laissez-faire system of free speech are "calculated risks" taken in order to
preserve "higher values").
344. See, e.g., Paley Speech, supra note 291, at 4-5.
345. See general, Simmons, The Fairness Doctrine and Cable TV, I I HARV. J. ON LEois. 629
(1974).
346. See Bollinger, supra note 291, at 39. On February 12, 1972, the FCC issued rules requir-
ing every cable system within the top 100 markets to provide such a public access station. Cable
Television Report & Order, 36 F.C.C.2d 143, 190 (1972).
347. M. MAYER, supra note 264, at 388 (finding similar humor in the character of the persons
demanding access time)(quoted supra note 264).
348. Cf. Price & Morris, Public Access Channels- The New York City Experience, in SLOAN
COMMISSION ON CABLE COMMUNICATIONS, ON THE CABLE app. 229, 230 (1971)("Unless an or-
ganization or an individual can be assured of some regularity of appearance on the public chan-
nel, the opportunity to develop a viewing 'constituency'. . . will be slight.").
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occasional crackpot. 349 Limiting marketplace access to an area "that a
benevolent government has provided as a safe haven for crackpots '350
is a far cry from the freedom of expression that Brandeis and Holmes
extolled. In order to understand the continued popularity of unimpres-
sive market reform measures such as the public access station proposal,
a different perspective on the marketplace of ideas must be explored.
IV. THE FUNCTION OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT
Whether the marketplace of ideas fulfills its classically articulated
functions depends on whether it allows fair consideration of criticism
of the fundamental beliefs and practices of society.351 Yet the market,
as it functions within our society of high technology and unequal distri-
bution of wealth, position, and communicative skill, is strongly biased
toward status quo viewpoints. A consideration of the social functions
of the first amendment and its marketplace imagery helps to explain
the continued use and popular acceptance of the market model.
A. Fine-Tuning Among Elites.
A major tenet of classic first amendment theory is that each citizen
has a right to participate in governmental decisionmaking. Under this
tenet, the commands of government are legitimated by a democratic
process that, when it functions properly, ensures that the subject has a
hand in making the laws to which he submits. The difficulty with this
view of "self-government 352 is that the role of citizens in the actual
making of decisions involving public issues is quite attenuated. Al-
though Meiklejohn concludes that the marketplace of ideas guarantees
that "public issues shall be decided by universal suffrage," 353 such is-
sues actually are decided by those who claim to represent the people.354
Public opinion is not an amalgam of the independent thoughts of indi-
viduals choosing among alternatives in a totally open system. Instead,
349. D. Othmer, The Wired Island: The First Two Years of Public Access to Cable Television
in Manhattan (Sept. 1973)("Watching public access programming is much like spending an eve-
ning in Times Square. It is exhilarating, frustrating, shocking and boring--above all, it is simply
amazing.").
350. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969)("Free-
dom of expression would not truly exist if the right could be exercised only in an area that a
benevolent government has provided as a safe haven for crackpots.").
351. See T. EMERSON, FIRST AMENDMENT, supra note 1, at 16.
352. Such a view of "self-government" is implicit in the writings of both Meiklejohn and
Emerson. See sources cited supra note 1.
353. A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM 27 (1960).
354. The "town meeting" analogy so often relied upon to analyze the relationship of freedom
of speech to democracy is simply not an apt description of the process of community decisionmak-
ing. Individual citizens rarely if ever directly make or implement public decisions.
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an individual's opinion is influenced by his socialization and by the
stature and style of the message bearer. Public opinion, therefore, is
often the product of indoctrination and socialization. Right and
wrong, and true and false virtually are predefined by a learned institu-
tional mentality wherever these judgments affect the "vital interest" of
our society.
The disagreements we perceive within our society are indisputably
real; a plethora of issues divide our communities with vociferous pro-
ponents on various sides. Most of these conflicts, however, are among
established groups battling for superiority while arguing over mere
shadings of the same orthodox values. Their resolution involves
societal fine-tuning rather than any basic reevaluation or critique of
societal beliefs and practices. Although the positions of established
groups are not totally congruent, they have more common than con-
flicting interests. Debate accordingly almost always is conducted
within understood and usually respected parameters.
From this perspective, Board of Education v. Pico355 can be under-
stood more fully. Recall that Justice Brennan's plurality opinion,
which held unconstitutional a school board's decision to remove certain
books from public school libraries, emphasized the distinction between
removing books and simply never acquiring them.3 56 Yet, as asserted
earlier,357 the distinction between expulsion and exclusion should be
irrelevant under classic marketplace theory. Regardless of the method
used, the perspectives contained in the affected books would be denied
to the library user.358 If both the school board and local educators ini-
tially had agreed not to purchase these books because of their objec-
tionable content, it seems clear that the Court would not have found a
first amendment violation.359 Although the petitioners in Pico were
355. 457 U.S. 853 (1982). See generally supra notes 141-46 and accompanying text.
356. Justice Brennan stressed that
the action before us does not involve the acquisition of books. Respondents have not
sought to compel their school board to add to the school library shelves any books that
students desire to read. Rather, the only action challenged in this case is the removal
from the school libraries of books originally placed there by the school authorities, or
without objection from them.
Pico, 457 U.S. at 862 (emphasis in original).
357. See supra text accompanying notes 143-44.
358. Because the books involved were likely available at other locations, such as commercial
book stores, this assertion may be too strong. A more precise statement may be that access to the
perspective contained in the excluded books intentionally was made more difficult than access to
"less objectionable" perspectives.
359. In an earlier case similar to Pico, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit concluded that
some authorized person or body has to make a determination as to what the library
collection will be. It is predictable that no matter what choice of books may be made by
whatever segment of academe, some other person or group may well dissent. The ensu-
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students, the propriety, content, and impact of student indoctrination
was not the issue; the issue for the Court was only whether the school
board would control this specific indoctrination process, or whether it
would be left to the educators to decide which books the students might
read. Essentially, this issue represents a dispute between two elite
groups over control of the socialization process. These two groups
probably would agree on the selection of the overwhelming majority of
books. The rare case of disagreement demands only some fine-tuning.
The marketplace functions to allow such fine-tuning among established
groups whether they are school boards and educators, 360 big govern-
ment and big media, or Democrats and Republicans.
All these established groups implicitly accept a "community
agenda of alternatives" consistent with the dominant culture. This
community agenda is the universe of alternative decisions accepted as
possible by that dominant culture, including both preferred and unpre-
ferred alternatives.36' Established groups may debate the question of
which alternative is preferable, but the alternatives evaluated will all be
drawn from a commonly held agenda. The community agenda of al-
ternatives thus accounts for the empirically observable phenomenon
that "[s]ome, perhaps most, possible alternatives are never considered
in community decision-making. '362 The system encourages presenta-
tion of only a limited range of ideas from a limited group of individu-
ing shouts of book burning, witch hunting and violation of academic freedom hardly
elevate this intramural strife to first amendment constitutional proportions. If it did,
there would be a constant intrusion of the judiciary into the internal affairs of the school.
Presidents Council, District 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289, 291-92 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 998 (1972).
360. In fact, the marketplace may fine-tune even more subtly, encouraging debates only be-
tween school boards and the dominant teachers' union. See Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local
Educators' Assn., 103 S. Ct. 948, 951 (1983)(school board can agree with dominant teachers' union
to provide only that union, and no other, access to interschool mail system and teachers'
mailboxes).
361. See N. POLSBY, supra note 149, at 133-35; Deutsch, supra note 149, at 254.
362. N. PoLsBYsupra note 149, at 133. A contemporary example of the community agenda is
the movement for equal treatment of women. At one time people generally felt that women need
not be accorded the equal protection of the law guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment because
they were different from men, being weaker, less self-sufficient, and less mature. Cf., e.g.,
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 141 (1873)("Man is, or should be, woman's protector and de-
fender."). Statements to the contrary were rare and were usually discounted. It was not until this
perception changed, particularly during World War I, see, e.g., C. CATr & N. SHULER, WOMAN
SUFFRAGE AND POLITIcs 338 (1926); A. MARWICK, THE DELUGE 95-105 (1965)(discussing British
experience), that women's equality was accepted as a possible legal alternative; until then market-
place consideration of legal equality among the sexes was not meaningful. Because an ideology
initially perceived as radical became acceptable and was absorbed into the community agenda of
alternatives, its legal counterpart became conceivable. For a discussion of the crucial question of
how an alternative initially beyond the community agenda comes to be accepted into it, see infra
text accompanying notes 417-18.
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als. Therefore, market access reform, without more, will have little
impact on the diversity of views that the marketplace might adopt. 363
Political pluralists strenuously attack the concept of a dominant
culture and a correlative community agenda of alternatives.364 They
reject the existence of any common consciousness in society. The work
of Professor Robert Daihl is illustrative; his exploration of the political
power distribution within New Haven in Who Governs? is particularly
pertinent.365 Dahl found that no single social or economic group either
controlled, or regularly benefitted from, the decisionmaking process.
He concluded, therefore, that power in New Haven was held by con-
stantly shifting issue-oriented coalitions.366
The pluralists' theory, as illustrated by Who Governs?, however, is
built on the assumption that the community decisions being canvassed
represent conflicts sufficiently serious to force all potentially affected
groups to mobilize their resources to influence the outcome. The theory
fails to recognize that established groups are unlikely to participate in
the dynamic political behavior studied by Dahl unless they perceive
that important interests potentially are threatened. Dahl failed in his
study to distinguish between conflicts that an elite would perceive as
threatening and those over which it could remain relatively indifferent
because of its belief that its core interests were not endangered. 367
Dahl, and the pluralists generally, also fail to consider whether differ-
ent interest groups can clash in public debate over their positions even
though these positions share and accept certain overarching common
assumptions. This common acceptance of assumptions sets the param-
eters in which established groups conduct their public competition, and
it is only the battle taking place within these limits that the pluralists
observe.368
363. Market access reform is not likely to aid a group professing a perspective not encom-
passed by the community agenda. Such reform may produce only a new "centrism" with a
slightly widened mainstream. See Lange, supra note 306, at 81-89.
364. Pluralism developed predominantly as a liberal attack upon the theory of a ruling elite,
as expounded by radicals such as C. Wright Mills. See generally C. MILLS, THE POWER ELITE
(1956).
365. See R. DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITYpassitn
(1961). Dahl identified a number of important political decisions and the participants in them,
studied the behavior of those participants in the course of decisionmaking, and analyzed the bene-
fits and disadvantages various participants incurred as a result of the outcomes that ensued.
366. See id at 85-86, 169-220.
367. For similar discussions of these objections to Dahl's findings, see Bachrach & Baratz, Two
Faces of Power, 56 AM. POL. Sci. REV. 947, 950-52 (1962); Deutsch, supra note 149, at 250-56;
Simon, Notes on the Observation and Measurement of Political Power, 15 J. POL. 500 (1953).
368. This objection to the pluralist's methods arises from the pluralist's failure to take into
account what Professor Carl Friedrich first described as the "rule of anticipated reactions": the
belief that much political behavior is governed by the actor's perceptions of, and adjustments for,
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Pluralism recognizes the extent to which the group has replaced
the individual as the potent force in modem society,369 but it views the
group matrix as constantly open, fluid, and shifting. At one time this
theory may have been an accurate account of American society; once
pluralists depict the group matrix, however, the picture tends to be-
come frozen. Thereafter, when changes occur in the pattern of social or
economic groupings, pluralist theorists tend not to acknowledge them
because such new groupings deviate from the accepted picture. A plu-
ralist view of society, therefore, tends to favor existing groups over
those in the process of formation. As Robert Paul Wolff observed in
his critique of pluralism:
There is a very sharp distinction in the public domain between legiti-
mate interests and those which are absolutely beyond the pale. If a
group or interest is within the framework of acceptability, then it can
be sure of winning some measure of what it seeks. . . . On the other
hand, if an interest falls outside the circle of the acceptable it receives
no attention whatsoever and its proponents are treated as crackpots,
extremists or foreign agents. 370
The marketplace is useful for resolving differences among perspectives
"within the framework of acceptability" but it is blind to potential evils
outside of this boundary that afflict the body politic on the whole.
Consequently, the marketplace cannot be depended upon to consider
thoroughgoing social revisions that challenge, and help our evaluation
of, the fundamental beliefs and practices of society.
Despite the idealism of pluralists and others, free speech is not
useful primarily for the discovery of truth or the creation of an in-
formed citizenry. An individual's experience bestows knowledge as
much as do the lessons learned from speech. Individual choice and so-
cietal change therefore depend less upon free expression than upon the
development of new needs, demands, and experiences allowing, or
the reactions he expects would be provoked by possible actions on his part. See C. FRIEDRICH,
CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS 16-18 (1937); see also Deutsch, supra note 149, at
252-53; Simon, supra note 367, at 505-06.
The pluralists ignore the possibility that policymaking institutions may ensure their own le-
gitimacy by functioning like a chameleon and changing their color to conform to the dominant
cultural environment. Cf. Ingber, supra note 75, at 346-48 (discussing the responsive nature of the
Supreme Court). Instead of blindly assuming that pluralistic competition determines public pol-
icy, researchers must explore how dominant values, cultural myths, rituals, and political institu-
tions tend to favor the vested interests of some groups relative to others. See Bachrach & Baratz,
supra note 367, at 950.
369. Pluralism, therefore, views as pure rhetoric the presumption of the Jacksonian model of
democracy that each person's ideas have the same inherent worth and that the widest possible
articulation of different views maximizes society's benefit. See L. LEWIS, supra note 45, at 199-
201. First amendment marketplace theory also professes this assumption of Jacksonian democ-
racy. See supra notes 50-53 and accompanying text.
370. Wolff, supra note 195, at 43-44.
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forcing, individuals to change their perspectives. 371 To focus on diver-
sity of expression rather than diversity of experience is to focus on the
dependent rather than the independent variable. Yet the dominance of
the market model and conventional theories of the first amendment
demonstrate our nation's emphasis on free expression. This focus is,
obviously, less threatening to established norms because of its status
quo bias. In short, in the United States today free speech is a device by
which established interests may both refine their minor differences and
promote their commonly held assumptions of truth; it is not a device to
change society.
B. Bestowing an Advantage on National Elites.
There are situations, however, when even market fine-tuning is in-
sufficient to resolve conflicts among established groups. Such occasions
often arise during conflicts between the perspectives of national and
local power elites.372 When the community agenda of alternatives for
national and local communities do not coincide, the first amendment
may play a determinative role because the forum for final resolution of
such differences will be the federal courts.373 These courts more readily
overturn the actions of state and local officials than those of the federal
government.374 The first amendment, therefore, gives national interests
a veto of sorts over local established group positions by ensuring final-
ity to decisions made by institutions attuned to nationally held perspec-
tives.375 First amendment protection of the civil rights movement, 376
371. Cf. Nagel, supra note 18, at 304-05 (listing factors that "coalesce to determine the amount
of tolerance or intolerance" of society).
372. A "locality" can in some instances comprise an entire region of the country, as was the
case in the civil rights dispute.
373. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1332 (1976)(federal question and diversity jurisdiction for federal
district courts); 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (1976)(Supreme Court review of federal appellate court deci-
sions); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 304 (1816)(Supreme Court authority to re-
view constitutional validity of final decisions of highest state courts).
374. See supra note 291.
375. This may be reflected in the Supreme Court's decision to overturn a state reply statute in
Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, 258 (1974), while upholding the reply
requirement of the FCC's fairness doctrine in Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
375 (1969). See supra note 291 and accompanying text.
376. See Gregory v. Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 111-13 (1969)(reversing disorderly conduct con-
victions of "peaceful" and "orderly" civil rights marchers who disobeyed police order to disperse);
Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 136-37, 142-43 (1966)(plurality opinion)(reversing breach of the
peace conviction for sit-down protest in public library); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 538, 552,
558 (1965)(reversing convictions of civil rights marchers for disturbing the peace and obstructing
public passages, on numerous constitutional grounds); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229,
230, 236-38 (1963)(reversing convictions of 187 persons arrested for breach of the peace during
civil rights march).
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and, at times, of the arts, 377 may be viewed not as the protection of
dissident or outcast groups and perspectives, but as the imposition of
national values over an overtly deviating local elite.
C. System Legitimacy and the Myth of Autonomy.
In spite of the fact that the marketplace of ideas significantly fa-
vors established groups and values, so long as representatives of disad-
vantaged groups and viewpoints do not perceive themselves as
systematically excluded from the market,378 the resultant social system
remains "legitimate." Before the significance of the first amendment
can be understood fully, one must first appreciate its mythical function
and also take notice of the practical steps that most courts and com-
mentators have taken to preserve the perception of myth as reality.
Although, when invoking "freedom of expression," people usually
are focusing on the individual rights of those who wish to express
themselves, first amendment theory usually emphasizes the interest of
audiences.37 9 The right to send ideas, to communicate, is most often
viewed as a right to influence or to confront one's audience.380 A
number of theorists have questioned whether such a public utility justi-
fication for the freedom of speech is sufficient.381 Some have proposed
377. When local artistic rejection conflicts with national artistic acclaim, the Supreme Court
has found the local response a violation of first amendment principles, in spite of the Court's
articulated deference to local community aesthetic perspectives in Miller v. California, 413 U.S.
15, 30-34 (1973). See Jenkens v. Georgia, 418 U.S. 153, 161 (1974)(finding film CarnalKnowledge
to be protected speech in spite of local jury's determination that it was "patently offensive" under
community standards); see also Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 549 n.4,
560-61 (1975)(denying municipal board managing city theatre in Chattanooga the right to refuse
permission for theatre's use for showing of musical Hair under policy that called for its use only
"for cultural advancement and for clean, healthful entertainment").
378. A popular consensus in favor of a marketplace biased toward the status quo does not
necessarily indicate that established groups manipulate that consensus in some conscious sense.
Established groups would presumably act to oppose any attempt to change the community agenda
of alternatives to their disadvantage; however, as long as no such attempt occurs, as long as the
populace generally perceives the market outcomes as properly derived, there is no reason to sup-
pose that the established group's acceptance of the system is any more self-conscious than its
acceptance by any other group.
379. Scanlon, Freedom of Expression and Categories of Expression, 40 U. Prrr. L. REv. 519,
528-29 (1979).
380. Justice Brennan did attempt to characterize the essence of free speech as an interest of the
communicator rather than of the recipient of communication when he noted that "the right to
receive ideas follows ineluctably from the sender's First Amendment right to send them ....
More importantly, the right to receive ideas is a necessary predicate to the recioient's meaningful
exercise of his own rights of speech, press, and political freedom." Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457
U.S. 853, 867 (1982).
381. See, e.g., Baker, supra note 1, at 964-67, 974-81; Scanlon, supra note 40, at 1043-46.
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a theory of personality, a liberty perspective382 viewing the freeing of
the human spirit as the prime social value of free speech. 383 Still other
theorists argue that the first amendment assures a necessary precondi-
tion of legitimate government by forcing the state to respect individuals
as "equal, rational and autonomous moral beings. '384 Professor C. Ed-
win Baker asserts:
Both the concept of coercion and the rationale for protecting speech
draw from the same ethical requirement that the integrity and auton-
omy of the individual moral agent must be respected. Coercive acts
typically disregard the ethical principle that, in interactions with
others, one must respect the other's autonomy and integrity as a per-
son. When trying to influence another person, one must not disre-
gard that person's will or the integrity of the other person's mental
processes. 385
In contrast to Professor Baker's position, the first amendment protects
only the appearance of individual autonomy, while it permits govern-
ment and private power elites to socialize and indoctrinate the citizenry
in support of these groups' beliefs.
1. The Myth of Autonomy. Both branches of the lib-
erty/autonomy theory of the first amendment are plagued with difficul-
ties. As a liberation of the human spirit, speech is no more pivotal than
is any other human activity.386 In fact, if an individual's perspective
depends on how his interests, needs, and experiences lead him to slice
and categorize sensory data, then the ability to follow a wide range of
behavioral options is much more crucial for the liberation of the
human spirit than is freedom of expression alone. Yet only freedom of
expression is guaranteed. Emerson, in explaining this special status for
382. This liberty theory may be deduced from Justice Brandeis's concurring opinion in
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927):
Those who won our independence believed thal the final end of the State was to make
men free to develop their faculties .... They valued liberty both as an end and as a
means. They believed liberty to be the secret of happiness and courage to be the secret of
liberty.
But given the facts of the case, and the result of the decision that led to these beautiful abstrac-
tions, one remains skeptical of the theory's relevance.
383. Professor David Richards, for example, contends that "the first amendment rests more
fundamentally on the moral liberties of expression, conscience and thought; these liberties are
fundamental conditions of the integrity and competence of a person in mastering his life and
expressing this mastery to others." Richards, Free Speech and Obscenity Law: Toward a Moral
Theory of the FirstAmendment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 45, 82 (1974). This view parallels Professor
Emerson's concern for individual self-fulfillment and development. T. EMERSON, FIRST AMEND-
MENT, supra note 1, at 4-7; Sf L. TRIBE, supra note 13, § 12-1, at 576 (arguing that no instrumen-
talist explanation can do justice to first amendment).
384. Baker, supra note I, at 991; see Scanlon, supra note 40, at 214.
385. Baker, supra note 1, at 1001-02.
386. See supra note 67.
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expression, admits that it is because "expression is normally conceived
as doing less injury to other social goals than action. It generally has
less immediate consequences, is less irremediable in its impact. '38 7 Al-
though Emerson identified the most important difference between
speech and behavior, he missed its significance. Expression is allowed
precisely because a person's speech is of little danger when his exper-
iences have first been molded and controlled. Established values are
not threatened, for the individual is given only the sense of autonomy
while the potential impact of this "autonomy" upon the governing sys-
tem is minimized.
The branch of the liberty/autonomy theory that emphasizes the
relationship between individual autonomy and governmental legiti-
macy is no less flawed. Ironically, the very scholars that recognize the
fallacy of the marketplace assumption that individuals are independ-
ent, rational beings making unbiased choices among competing market
alternatives continue to embrace a theory of liberty/autonomy which
also presumes such an individual.3 88
The mechanisms of socialization and indoctrination that are nec-
essary correlates of modern, complex society are, however, sufficiently
subtle to allow the continued appearance of individual self-direction.
The image of a neutral, objective, and fair marketplace of ideas pro-
motes greater cohesion in society because people more readily accept
adverse decisions if they feel they have, or could have, participated in
the decisionmaking process. The citizenry perceives these decisions as
legitimate rather than as imposed by dominant societal forces. 389 The
mythology of the first amendment thus diverts efforts for social change
away from attempts to overthrow forcibly the existing social power
structure and toward attempts to create a popular consensus. If a gov-
ernment's citizenry and ministers view the system as guaranteeing free
expression, they may well be content to replace the strategem of force
with that of logic. 390 Logic, however, only ensures consistency within a
387. T. EMERSON, FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION, supra note 1, at 9.
388. See, ag., Baker, supra note 1, at 965-66. Individual autonomy presumably assumes that
individuals may direct themselves and choose among alternatives without having predispositions
engrained into them through indoctrination by government or private establishment groups. See
Wellington, supra note 1, at 1135.
389. Professor Walter Weyrauch, when discussing the general public acceptance of adjudica-
tion, similarly observed that "the masks of objectivity, neutrality, and fairness give the legal pro-
cess an independent power so that it is not [perceived to be] merely the tool of dominant social
forces." Weyrauch, Law as Mask-Legal Ritual andRelevance, 66 CALIF. L. REv. 699, 718 (1978);
see also T. ARNOLD, supra note 93, at 34.
390. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 501 (1951)(Chief Justice Vinson rejecting the
"right to rebellion").
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given system of values. 391 Consequently, its use as a means to con-
demn as "illogical" positions advocating an alternative value system is
an act of subtle obfuscation.
2. Preserving the Myth. Public acceptance of the myth of indi-
vidual autonomy and the neutral marketplace of ideas imparts an aura
of legitimacy and authority to our government. Obvious discrepancies
exist, however, between this myth and how the system actually func-
tions. 392 If the public were fully aware of these discrepancies, the legiti-
macy of the decisionmaking process would be threatened. 393
Protecting the myth thus is crucial to continued social stability. Preser-
vation of the myth requires both that channels appear to be open to all
who wish to communicate, and that there appears to be no systema-
tized manipulation of the individual's perspective through processes of
indoctrination or socialization. The first amendment furthers both
perceptions.
The first amendment guarantees each individual his day in a pub-
lic arena.394 Be it in appearing on a cable public access station, print-
ing and distributing leaflets, or delivering a street corner speech, the
vocal critic is allowed to ventilate his feelings and beliefs. This consti-
tutes the "feel good" function of the first amendment. The issue is not
whether any one else cares, or even listens, but that a communication
opportunity exists to mollify the speaker.395 Although many people
perceive these forums as an annoyance or disturbance (as in the street
forum) or as dominated by oddballs and crackpots (as in the public
391. See Weyrauch, supra note 128, at 800.
392. An observer must distinguish between a myth system that expresses all the assumptions,
rules and prohibitions of a society, and an operational code that tells "operators"-the elite-
when, by whom, and how things are and can be done. This discrepancy, however, is not necessar-
ily an intentional construction of elites, but rather is an inevitable byproduct of social complexity.
See generally W. REisMAN, FOLDED LiEs 1, 15-36 (1979)(outlining concepts of myth systems and
operational codes).
393. See id at 21; cf. Wasserstrom, Lawyers as Professionals.- Some Moral Issues, 5 Hum. RTs.
1, 18 (1975)(discussing need for both professionals and clients to view professional as an elite if
profession is to function effectively).
394. When Thurmond Arnold wrote that "the function of law is not so much to guide society
as to comfort it," T. ARNOLD, supra note 93, at 34, he was referring to the function of law as a
means of providing opponents of established conduct with at least a symbolic recognition of their
precepts. For Arnold, it was essential to the legitimacy of the legal system that it assure each
individual of "his day in court."
395. Emerson recognizes (without appreciating its role) that a system focused only on making
limited communication channels available is functioning as little more than a pacifier. "Nor can it
be said," admits Emerson,
that our system affords equality in the ability to communicate different points of view or
to pursue different goals of inquiry. . . . [N]either equal access to the mass media nor
equal right to the support of public funds presently exists. What we have secured in this
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access stations), their availability probably decreases the pressure to
grant non-mainstream opinions access to more influential forums. 396
Dissidents may thereby assume that they are standing firm against the
stream while in fact they are being pulled along by the current.397
As long as the system bias in favor of established groups and dom-
inant value perspectives remains subtle, and individuals do not feel
manipulated or forced to believe or act in a certain way, the system
retains its legitimacy in spite of its biases.398 If the government wishes
to preserve the myth of a free market, it cannot overtly prefer some
messages over others. Accordingly, it is not surprising that the Court
has held it impermissible for government to restrict speech on the basis
of the message conveyed.3 99
The legal process has helped to preserve the myth by refocusing
value conflicts away from the intense ideological plane to the less im-
passioned levels of process.400 By a remarkable sleight of hand the ide-
ological differences between contending positions are forgotten; the
ideological basis or significance of the underlying governmental deci-
sion loses its importance. This shift in focus screens the inherent biases
of the system while it gives challengers to the status quo the impression
that an avenue is open to obtain both resolution of their conflict 4o1 and
area is rather the right of the individual to follow the truth wherever it may lead, though
the road is often a lonely one.
Emerson, Colonial lntentions and Current Realities of the First Amendment, 125 U. PA. L. REv. 737,
747 (1977).
396. This may explain the popularity of public access stations and the proposals suggesting the
repeal of the fairness doctrine in favor of such stations. See supra text accompanying notes 347-
50.
397. In Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344 n.9 (1974), the Supreme Court, by
grudgingly acknowledging the role of self-help in defamation, recognized that channels of com-
munication must appear open more to ventilate the emotion of the speaker than to give informa-
tion or insight to any potential audience.
398. The public is very sensitive to the appearance of being manipulated. When the govern-
ment required automobile manufacturers to make automobiles so that the ignition system would
not operate unless the front seat belts were buckled, the public showed its disapproval both vo-
cally and by the numbers of individuals who illegally rewired the ignition system to bypass the
safety mechanism. The public has never demonstrated a comparable displeasure toward govern-
mentally mandated passive restraints, even though consumers are given no choice in their
purchase. The difference between active and passive restraints is theperceived experience of being
controlled that exists in one and is lacking in the other.
399. See, e.g., First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n.31 (1978); Linmark Assoc., Inc.
v. Township of Willingboro, 431 U.S. 85, 94 (1977); L. TRIBE, supra note 13, § 12-5, at 591; Bogen,
The Supreme Court's Interpretation of the Guarantee of Freedom of Speech, 35 MD. L. REv. 555,
557 (1976); cf. United States v. O'Brien, 381 U.S. 367, 377 (1968)(government regulatory interests
must be unrelated to the suppression of freedom of expression).
400. For a full discussion of the common use of procedure, ceremony and rhetoric as means to
minimize conflict, see Ingber, supra note 94.
401. For a literary example of the use of procedure to settle conflicts while concealing ideolog-
ical disputes, see Shirley Jackson's short story, The Lottery, in S. JACKSON, THE LOTTERY 291
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official support of their positions.4°2 The leafleteer who wins the right
to distribute his literature must feel vindicated whether or not anyone
reads or takes notice of his beliefs. Thus conflict successfully is
refocused to a nonideological level40 3 because the individual challenger
feels victorious while the policy or ideology with which he initially took
exception continues.404
Board of Education v. Pico405 illustrates this function of the first
amendment. Justice Blackmun, in a separate concurrence, attempted
to confront Chief Justice Burger's assertion that there was no greater
"'official suppression'" in a "decision to remove a book" than in one
"not to acquire a book desired by someone" in the first place.40 6 With
exemplary candor Justice Blackmun confessed,
I also have some doubt that there is a theoretical distinction between
removal of a book and failure to acquire a book. But as Judge New-
man [of the Second Circuit] observed [in his concurrence to the lower
court decision], there is a profound practical and evidentiary distinc-
tion between the two actions: "removal, more than failure to ac-
quire, is likely to suggest that an impermissible political motivation
may be present. There are many reasons why a book is not acquired,
the most obvious being limited resources, but there are few legitimate
(1949). The society Jackson describes in 7he Lottery has no predilection against individual sacri-
fice for collective goals. In fact, it prefers such an arrangement. The story describes a communal
ceremony wherein lots are drawn to determine who will be stoned to death for some unspecified
community need. Although the eventual winner of the lottery objects, the objection is couched in
terms of procedure--that the lots were drawn too quickly--and is not directed at the substance of
the activity. Id at 299.
402. The struggle for official support of a position often causes the idea of right and wrong, the
ethical-juridical conception, to be overshadowed by emphasis upon which groups "win" and
which "lose," the purely agonistic conception. See J. HUIZINGA, HoMo LUDENS: A STUDY OF
THE PLAY-ELEMENT IN CULTURE 78 (1949). In Greenland, for example, an Eskimo who has a
complaint against another challenges him to a drumming contest. Id at 85. The agonistic nature
of this form of conflict resolution is readily apparent. Eskimo society, being in a less "advanced"
phase of cultural development, has not developed the subtleties by which more developed societies
conceal the "battle" element of conflict resolution.
403. In Board of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853 (1982), for example, Justice Brennan emphasized
his concern that the process used to remove the library books departed from the procedures previ-
ously used to make library decisions in the school system: "This would be a very different case if
the record demonstrated that petitioners had employed established, regular, and facially unbiased
procedures for the review of controversial materials. But the actual record in the case before us
suggests the exact opposite." Id at 874 (plurality opinion). Although conformity with process
may assure consistency of treatment and limit the impact of a momentary whim, the student who
desires to read the book is equally frustrated regardless of the process used for its removal. When
special procedures are used the deprivation is merely more dramatic and overt. Consequently, the
community is more likely to perceive that the school board has manipulated the students.
404. See Weyrauch, supra note 389, at 717-19.
405. 457 U.S. 853 (1982).
406. Pico, 457 U.S. at 892 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
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reasons why a book, once acquired, should be removed from a li-
brary not filled to capacity. '40 7
The issue, therefore, is not access or expression, or even actual govern-
mental control and indoctrination; the issue is instead the appearance
of governmental manipulation and indoctrination. 408 Justice Brennan,
consequently, could conclude that the ultimate question was the intent
underlying the school book removal, and not the impact of its removal
on the marketplace. 4°9
Admittedly, school officials may remove books for both bad mo-
tives and good motives. But if the Constitution grants a right to receive
information, the reason for the denial should not matter.410 The
Court's concern in Pico clearly was that of avoiding the appearance
407. Id at 878 n.1 (Blackmun, J., concurring)(quoting Pico v. Board of Educ., 638 F.2d 404,
436 (2d Cir. 1980), af'd, 457 U.S. 853 (1982)); see also 457 U.S. at 871-72 (plurality opinion of
Brennan, J.)(limiting holding to book removal).
408. Justice Rehnquist responded in dissent that if the issue was public visibility "a school
board's public announcement of its refusal to acquire certain books would have every bit as much
impact on public attention as would an equally publicized decision to remove the books." Pico,
457 U.S. at 916-17. Although he may have been right, Justice Rehnquist neglected a vital aspect
of reality. Given the need for routine decisions as to which books the school should initially
purchase, there would be no need to publicize a decision not to purchase any given book. The
decision to remove a book already purchased, however, is likely to be sufficiently exceptional to
require, if brought to public notice, some public explanation. Further, even assuming an isolated
school board member publicly discusses his decision not to acquire a given book, the Court is
likely to hold, as it did in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 384 (1968), that "[w]hat moti-
vates [one official] ... to make a speech about [an institutional decision] . . . is not necessarily
what motivates ... others to [so decide] ... and the stakes are sufficiently high for us to eschew
guesswork."
409. Pico, 457 U.S. at 870-71 (footnote omitted):
[W]hether petitioners' removal of books from their school libraries denied respondents
their First Amendment rights depends upon the motivation behind petitioners' action. If
petitioners intended by their removal decision to deny respondents access to ideas with
which petitioners disagreed, and if this intent was the decisive factor in petitioners' deci-
sion, then petitioners have exercised their discretion in violation of the Constitution.
410. See id at 917 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). The concern in Pico over a governmental deci-
sionmaking process tainted by an impure motivation is reminiscent of equal protection decisions
establishing a distinction between de facto and de jure discrimination. E.g., Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 265 (1977)(intent to segregate is the essential element of
dejure segregation); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 240 (1976)(proof of discriminatory intent
is needed to show equal protection violation); Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 745 (1974)(cross-
district busing improper without showing that intentional discriminatory acts had interdistrict ef-
fect); Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208-09 (1973)(shifting burden to school authori-
ties once intentionally segragative policy found in meaningful or significant segment of school
system, and emphasizing distinction between de facto and de jure segregation). The focus on pur-
posiveness in these decisions seemingly mandates an apparent purity of the decisional process
while making no assurances as to the outcome of that process and its impact on the citizenry.
Furthermore, courts and commentators have ably shown the problems inherent in the use of "leg-
islative" intent. See, e.g., Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 224-25 (1971)(Black, J.); Ely, Legis-
lative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law, 79 Yale L.J. 1205 passim (1970).
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rather than the reality of marketplace and governmental control and
indoctrination.411
3. Defusing Disenchantment. The idea that first amendment
freedom of expression functions to reduce social strife is not new. Jus-
tice Brandeis articulated this concept in Whitney v. California:
Those who won our independence ... knew that order cannot be
secured merely through fear of punishment for its infraction; that it is
hazardous to discourage thought, hope and imagination; that fear
breeds repression; that repression breeds hate; that hate menaces sta-
ble government; that the path of safety lies in the opportunity to dis-
cuss freely supposed grievances and proposed remedies; and that the
fitting remedy for evil counsels is good ones.412
Normally, commentators present defusing disenchantment as a secon-
dary function of the first amendment, subordinate to such features as
the search for truth, self-government, and individual development and
autonomy. In the 1960's, "New Left" spokesmen viewed this function
as the main purpose of the first amendment. They concluded that the
411. The extent to which established groups can use first amendment rhetoric to preserve the
myth of individual autonomy may be increasing. In the modern welfare state, how the govern-
ment decides to allocate its wealth can greatly influence people's substantive behavior. See gener-
ally Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). As we become increasingly socialized,
depending more and more upon government for the support of education, research, and the arts,
the opportunity for governmental control of an individual's life will markedly increase, while the
appearance of individual choice and autonomy is still preserved. The state appears to forbid
nothing and merely seems to regulate distribution of governmental largesse "for the public good."
Under such auspices, and potentially consistent with first amendment doctrine, further inroads
may be made on individual autonomy while retaining the appearances necessary to keep the sys-
tem-legitimizing myth intact.
The concern expressed here is not equivalent to that of "unconstitutional conditions" fre-
quently confronted by both jurists and scholars. See Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad
Comm'n, 271 U.S. 583, 593-94 (1926); Hale, Unconstitutional Conditions and ConstitutionalRights,
35 COLUM. L. REv. 321passim (1935); O'Neil, Unconstitutional Conditions.- Wepfare Benefts wih
Strings Attached, 54 CALIF. L. REV. 443passim (1966). The doctrine of "unconstitutional condi-
tions" seems to provide that a waiver of first amendment rights cannot be annexed to the rationing
of goods and services in the public sector. As Professor William Van Alstyne properly notes,
however,
the doctrine merely protectspreexisting rights from surrender-by-contract with the wel-
fare state. It is limited to a case in which in exchange for some valuable privilege, the
state presumes to take from the individual some measure of freedom previously held by
that individual and still held by all others.
Van Alstyne, The Mebius Strp ofthe First Amendment: Perspectives on Red Lion, 29 S.C.L. REV.
539,567 (1978)(footnote omitted). Thus, a poor individual receiving food stamps along with other
poor individuals could not be denied further governmental aid for speaking critically of the Presi-
dent. A preexisting statutory right would be conditioned upon surrender of a constitutional one.
Nothing in the doctrine, however, forbids government, during a bicentennial anniversary, for ex-
ample, from allocating money to support the writing of patriotic and laudatory novels, plays, and
poetry while creating no equal fund for works critical of the nation or supportive of foreign gov-
ernments. Yet, such governmental promotion will clearly bias the marketplace and mold and
direct the individual.
412. 274 U.S. 357, 375 (1927)(Brandeis, J., concurring).
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system was "a meaningless sop, designed to siphon off protest and de-
lude the populace into believing it has a participating voice. '413
As the preceding pages have demonstrated, these contentions are
not without factual foundation. The first amendment may function
more to placate and divert social tensions than to foster a bubbling of
controversy and encourage individual diversity. But the New Left pre-
sumed that this effect resulted from a conspiracy of established groups.
Their view of the system as a construct of devious, manipulating elites
seems overly simplistic. The elites need not consciously create and im-
pose a system in order to benefit from it. The bias or skew toward es-
tablished groups and dominant value perspectives instead may be
unavoidable in a high-technology society in which resources and skills
are distributed unequally.414 Dominant social perspectives may be
molded not by conspiracies, but by social and economic externalities 415
that make up the ecological setting.416 Those groups that perform in
harmony with this ecological setting may be only the passive benefi-
ciaries of the system in which they find themselves.417 It may nonethe-
less be beneficial to society for the elite to feel responsible for the
discrepancy between the myth of the marketplace of ideas and the real-
ity of socialization and indoctrination.4 18 This unease may cause the
elites to question the justification for, and their own qualifications to
participate in, an elitist decisionmaking process that affects others.
They also may question the wisdom, justice, authority, and necessity of
their decisions.
V. CONCLUSION
In our complex society, affected by both sophisticated communica-
tion technology and unequal allocations of resources and skills, the
marketplace's inevitable bias supports entrenched power structures or
413. T. EMERSON, FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION, supra note I, at 726. See generally R. WOLFF, 3.
MOORE & H. MARCUSE, supra note 191.
414. Cf. Nagel, supra note 18 (claiming the judicial process is unsuited to fulfill goals of the
marketplace model).
415. These externalities might include the density of population and the division of labor. See
generally E. DURKHEIM, SUICIDE 314-20 (J. Spaulding & G. Simpson trans. 1951)(discussing ex-
ternalities and their relationship to the individual and society); E. DURKHEIM, DIVISION OF LA-
BOR IN SOCIETY 256-82 (G. Simpson trans. 1933)(discussing population and division of labor).
416. Ecological setting, like nationalism, includes the concepts of history and cultural develop-
ment. Unlike nationalism, however, it does not necessarily include an individual perception of
national identity; instead, it takes into consideration those factors which cause people to feel such
an identification with a nation.
417. See Deutsch, supra note 149, at 255.
418. A fuller discussion of the importance of elites being sufficiently imbued in the myth to
feel uncomfortable over the operating reality may be found in Ingber, supra note 75, at 352-56.
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ideologies. Most reform proposals do little to help the marketplace
reach its theoretical potential. Instead, such suggestions perpetuate the
marketplace's status quo bias or result in unacceptable levels of govern-
mental interference and regulation. These reform systems easily could
decay into formal systems of governmental censorship or popular
indoctrination.
This critique of the marketplace of ideas has led to the unsurpris-
ing conclusion that protection of expression alone does not guarantee
an environment where new ideas, perceptions, and values can develop.
A diversity of perspectives first requires a corresponding diversity of
social experiences and opportunities. Consequently, in spite of the
rhetoric surrounding it, freedom of speech by itself cannot ensure a
diverse and interactive marketplace of ideas.
If we intend to design a social and political system open to the
development of diverse perspectives and values, we must first under-
stand how an idea initially outside the community agenda of alterna-
tives becomes accepted within it. There is little doubt that a change in
the ecological setting necessarily creates new interests and needs which
in turn alter perspectives. At rare times, as during the Depression,
change comes swiftly. The severity and widespread dislocation caused
by the Depression led to the abrupt realization that poverty was not
necessarily the fault of the poor. Popular consensus so completely
turned away from the traditional values of laissez-faire economics that
policy decisions based on such values became disreputable. Such an
abrupt change, however, is rare. Usually, ecological change takes con-
siderable time.419 Perspectives change slowly enough so that the "new"
ideas generally are absorbed into the community agenda as aspects of
the status quo.
In addition to ecological change, new perspectives and values may
be nurtured in a society that encourages, or at least permits, the devel-
opment of new interests and experiences. Consequently, the status quo
bias of the marketplace can probably be neutralized only by protecting
a greater liberty of action-allowing people to choose among lifestyles
offering differing roles and relationships-rather than merely support-
ing the freedom of speech. American jurisprudence simply has focused
on the wrong leg of Mill's theory of liberty. Instead of merely embrac-
ing his theory of the liberty of thought and discussion,420 our courts
419. For example, increased population and decreased demand for manual labor may slowly
lead to greater acceptance of abortion, homosexuality, and women's liberation. Cf. Nagel, Su ra
note 18, at 337 (arguing that the current mood of societal tolerance was partly caused by funda-
mental cultural shifts).
420. See supra text accompanying note 22.
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should emphasize his view of limited societal authority over the indi-
vidual, a theory of freedom of conduct:
[T]he sole end for which mankind are warranted, -individually or col-
lectively, in interfering with the liberty of action of any of their
number, is self-protection. That the only purpose for which power
can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized commu-
nity, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good,
either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant. He cannot right-
fully be compelled to do or forebear ... because, in the opinions of
others, to do so would be wise, or even right.421
Mill recognized, however, that rulers and fellow citizens tend "to im-
pose their own opinions and inclinations as a rule of conduct on
others. ' 422 He thought that this imposition was hardly ever restrained
by anything but the negation of power.423 Courts reasonably could in-
terpret the first amendment's right of assembly and free exercise clauses
to effectuate Mill's negation of power. Courts could construe these
clauses to prevent governmental interference with the development of
diverse communal groupings that perform their own distinct forms of
socialization and indoctrination.424 Such new groupings, in turn, might
insulate or reduce established groups' control of the marketplace. The
legal doctrine that has developed surrounding these clauses, however,
has kept them from fulfilling this potential.
Courts generally have viewed assemblies simply as a means of
conveying speech and spreading ideas. Consequently, the Supreme
Court has given rights of assembly only subsidiary importance, subject-
ing them to regulation as "speech-plus. ' 425 Furthermore, the Court has
never considered the "freedom of association," 426 arguably based
within the right of assembly, to be a unique, independent right. Instead,
the Court has treated freedom of association as little more than a short-
hand phrase that protects traditional first amendment rights of speech
421. J. MILL, supra note 5, at 8-9.
422. Id at 12.
423. Id
424. Such was the view of one scholar. See Baker, supra note 1, at 1029-39.
425. See T. EMERSON, FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION, supra note 1, at 292-98; Baker, supra note 1,
at 1030.
426. The notion of a right of association developed in the 1950's and 1960's as the federal and
some state governments sought to identify members of allegedly dangerous organizations such as
the Communist Party and the NAACP. See E. CORWIN, THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED
STATES OF AMERICA: ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 966 (rev. ed. 1973). Decisions considering
the right are numerous. See, e.g., Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); United Mine Workers v.
Illinois State Bar Ass'n, 389 U.S. 217 (1967); Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel Va.
State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1964); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960); Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516 (1960); NAACP v. Alabama ex rel Patter-
son, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); see also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482-84 (1965).
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and petition as exercised by individuals in groups.4 27 To the Court, the
freedom of association has meaning only when the association's partici-
pants are attempting to accomplish an objective independently pro-
tected by the freedom of speech.428 Accordingly, people may associate
to advocate certain behavior but may not associate to take action to
implement the ideas advocated. Psychology has long recognized, how-
ever, that requiring behavior inconsistent with belief creates tension
within an individual. That tension is often resolved by altering the be-
lief system to make it consistent with the compelled conduct. This the-
ory of cognitive dissonance 429 recognizes an inalienable connection
between action and belief. The Court's attempt to separate them ac-
cords with the myth of individual autonomy discussed earlier.430 To be
meaningful, assembly and associational rights must transcend expres-
sion and protect the right of individuals to combine to pursue and ful-
fill communal goals.431
The Constitution, however, has developed as an unrealistically at-
omistic document.432 For example, restrictive interpretation has hin-
dered the potential of the free exercise clause to foster diverse ways of
living. As early as 1879, the Supreme Court interpreted the free exer-
cise clause to permit a state to prohibit any action regardless of its reli-
427. See, eg., Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 522-23 (1960)("And it is now beyond
dispute that freedom of association for the purpose of advancing ideas and airing grievances is
protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment."); NAACP v. Alabama ex
rel. Patterson, 357 U.S. 449, 460-61 (1958)("Effective advocacy of both public and private points
of view, particularly controversial ones, is undeniably enhanced by group association, as this
Court has more than once recognized by remarking upon the close nexus between the freedoms of
speech and assembly.").
428. See L. TrimE, supra note 13, § 12-23, at 701-02. For an example of a judicial effort to
limit the freedom of association to group action furthering only free speech objectives, see Runyon
v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175-76, (1976)(parents could establish private educational academies to
advocate segregation, but could not employ admission practices implementing their ideas without
violating Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C § 1981 (1976)).
429. The literature on cognitive dissonance is extensive. See, e.g., J. BREHM & A. COHEN,
ExPLORATIONS IN COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1962); L. FESTINGER, CONFLICT, DECISION, AND
DISSONANCE (1964); R. WICKLUND & J. BREHM, PERSPECTIVES ON COGNITIVE DISSONANCE
(1976); Faxia, Zanna & Cooper, Dissonance and Self-Perception: An Integrative View of Each
Theory's Proper Domain ofApplication, J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOLOGY, Sept. 1977, at 464-
79; Nichols & Duke, Cognitive Dissonance and Locus of Control- Interface of Two Paradigms,
J. SOc. PSYCHOLOGY, Apr. 1977, at 291-97; Tesser & Cowan, Some Attitudinal and Cognitive Con-
sequences ofhought, J. RESEARCH PERSONALIrY, June 1977, at 216-26; Yashida, Effects of Cogni-
tive Dissonance on Task Evaluation and Task Performance, JAPANESE J. PSYCHOLOGY, Oct. 1977,
at 216-23.
430. See supra text accompanying notes 386-91.
431. As argued earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 364-70, freedom of speech and the
marketplace of ideas alone do not assure a pluralistic society.
432. See L. TRiE, supra note 13, § 12-23, at 700-01.
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gious implications, so long as it did not formally prohibit a belief.433
Chief Justice Waite insisted that "Congress was deprived of all legisla-
tive power over mere opinion, but was left free to reach actions which
were in violation of social duties or subversive of good order." 434
Under the Court's interpretation, the freedom to believe was absolute
but the freedom to act upon what one believed was subject to govern-
mental regulation.43 5
Yet if one cannot behave in compliance with one's religious or
ethical beliefs, these beliefs are of little importance.436 As argued ear-
lier, fundamental religious beliefs are extremely difficult to hold if one
is required by the state to act inconsistently with them.437 A change of
belief may be much easier on the psyche than the burden of eternal
damnation. Although our society may require some limits on freedom
of religion, both courts and commentators must question more seri-
ously the extent to which religious behavior should be insulated from
governmental authority.438
433. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 168 (1879)(upholding the application of federal
law prohibiting polygomy to Mormon whose religion required him to engage in the practice).
434. Id at 164.
435. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
436. Baker, supra note 1, at 1037; see, e.g., Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105 (1943)(dis-
tributing religious pamphlets is protected right not subject to license tax).
437. See supra text accompanying notes 429-30 (discussion of cognitive dissonance).
438. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), was a small step in the direction of constitu-
tional protection for differing lifestyles. The Supreme Court held that Wisconsin could not require
members of the Amish church to send their children to public school after the eighth grade.
Yoder, 406 U.S. at 234. Two aspects of the Yoder decision, however, give us reason to pause
before attributing to the Court an interest in protecting divergent lifestyles. First, the Court
stressed that similar claims would likely be unsuccessful, if founded upon a personal or philosoph-
ical rejection of secular values, id at 215-16, or a "recently discovered. . . 'progressive' or more
enlightened process for rearing children for modem life," id at 235. See J. NOWAK, supra note
158, at 877-78; L. TRIBE, supra note 13, § 14-10, at 856-57; Baker, supra note 1, at 1036.
This narrow approach to religion, distinguishing religion from fundamentally held beliefs, is
inconsistent with the broad perspective the Court used in the conscientious objector decisions.
See United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 166 (1965)(sincere belief occupying "a place in the life
of its possessor parallel to that filled by the orthodox belief in God" qualifies petitioner for consci-
entious objector status); see also Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333, 340, 343 (1970)(petitioner
who held deep conscientious scruples against participation in war was entitled to conscientious
objector status despite his lack of belief in a "Supreme Being"). See generally Note, Defning
Religion: Of God, the Constitution and the D-4.AJ, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 (1965). In cases involv-
ing tax exemptions for religious institutions, other courts have construed the applicable statutes to
include non-theistic groups, interpreting "religion broadly in terms of the social function of the
group rather than the context of its beliefs." Galanter, Religious Freedom in the United States: A
Turning Point?, 1966 Wis. L. REv. 217, 260; see Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda,
153 Cal. App. 2d 673, 692-93, 315 P.2d 395, 406 (1957)(equal protection rationale). Even though
the conscientious objector and tax exemption cases add questions of statutory interpretation, the
explicit attempt to separate Yoder from the approach of these decisions suggests a continued in-
sensitivity or resistance by the Court to the important role such divergent groupings could play.
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Despite past doctrinal developments, the Court conceivably could
develop a constitutional safe-harbor for divergent groups by develop-
ing a fresh approach to the right of association and free exercise. Judi-
cial and scholarly effort should be pressed into service to develop an
area of freedom of conduct rather than reiterating the importance of a
nearly impotent freedom of expression. Such a freedom of conduct
might allow the diversity of perspective necessary for the marketplace
of ideas in fact to approach its myth.
Although the Court should focus on developing a freedom of con-
duct, it should exercise caution in so doing. The same factors that have
created an impotent marketplace of ideas may influence an individual's
exercise of a right to choose a lifestyle under a freedom of action. If
society's indoctrination and socialization process molds an individual's
perspectives and values, what then would motivate one to join or create
a group offering real, rather than merely costume differences in roles
and relationships? 439 Perhaps the myth of individual autonomy is the
most for which we can strive given our highly complex society with
sophisticated communication technology and unequal distribution of
resources.
Nevertheless, we must pierce the myth of the neutral marketplace
of ideas and expose the flawed market model assumptions of objective
truth and the power of rationality. A system of freedom focused exclu-
sively on expression fosters only incremental change within a commu-
nity agenda of alternatives reflective of the dominant culture.440 Other
than assuring dominance of national perspectives, the marketplace en-
courages only fine-tuning among established groups. To a much
greater extent than it nourishes criticism and change, a system of free-
dom of expression adds an aura of legitimacy to the governing system
by protecting the appearance of individual autonomy. Individual dis-
enchantment is defused by preserving the facade both of open and ef-
fective channels of communication and of a system that ensures
individual self-determination.
The second point which counsels that the Court did not mean to extend Yoder beyond its
facts is the Court's emphasis that the Amish lifestyle posed no threat to the maintenance of order
and social control. 406 U.S. at 222. Perhaps the Court merely was swayed by a belief that the
Amish posed no challenge to traditional values and norms. See Baker, supra note 1, at 1037.
439. Further, if the titillation of rebellion-tweaking the nose of the establishment-encour-
ages individuals to create or join dissident groups, tolerance of diversity might reduce that titilla-
tion and lead to greater conformity. This, however, is a convenient argument which established
groups can use to justify their dominance, and it should be discounted accordingly.
440. Although those who prefer the dominant culture may find desirable a system that only
allows incremental change, such a system is inconsistent with the often-proclaimed goals of seek-
ing truth, democratic government, and individual freedom and dignity.
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Although I hope to have shed some light on the functioning of the
first amendment and the marketplace of ideas, the costs of such analy-
sis must be acknowledged. Periods of enlightenment can weaken the
mysticism that bestows legitimacy upon institutions, such as the law,
which are, at least partially, based on faith.44 1 But skepticism is, at
times, a healthy perspective. A jurist no more radical than Judge
Learned Hand once mused:
I often wonder whether we do not rest our hopes too much upon
constitutions, upon laws and upon courts. These are false hopes; be-
lieve me, these are false hopes. Liberty lies in the hearts of men and
women; when it dies there, no constitution, no law, no court can save
it; no constitution, no law, no court can even do much to help it.
While it lies there it needs no constitution, no law, no court to save
it .442
Possibly, as Hand suggests, we have expected too much of the first
amendment's freedom of speech; we may have done too little to free
the hearts of men and women so that we can live in an open society,
and not merely talk of it.
441. A friend and teacher once posed the question whether "the saying of the Mass in the
vernacular [forbode] the beginning, or the end, of the relevance of that sacrament to the lives of
the believers?" Deutsch, supra note 149, at 261. The question remains relevant for much of recent
legal scholarship. Cf. Nagel, supra note 18, at 305 (describing thejudiciary's ambitious role in free
speech as being based "in large measure" on faith).
442. THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY, PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF LEARNED HAND 189-90 (I. Dilliard
ed. 1960).
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